Also known as: preemption · pre-emption · preemption doctrine · federal pre-emption
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
A constitutional doctrine derived from the Supremacy Clause under which a valid federal statute supersedes or displaces inconsistent state law or regulation. The doctrine applies only when Congress regulates private conduct within its enumerated powers and the state rule conflicts with that federal standard. Direct congressional commands to state legislatures or executive officers dictating what they must or must not do fall outside the doctrine and violate the anti-commandeering principle.
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The State of Sierra enacted a statute authorizing app-based sports wagering platforms. Congress then passed a statute stating that no state may authorize or license such platforms. Frontier Capital obtained a Sierra license and sued to enjoin enforcement of the federal statute. The court held the federal provision invalid because it commanded state legislative action rather than regulating private betting conduct.
After Frederick Ferguson died, his ex-wife claimed life insurance proceeds under an ERISA plan. State law treated the designation as automatically revoked by divorce. The plan administrator paid the proceeds to the designated beneficiary instead. The court held that ERISA preempted the state revocation rule because the federal statute directly governed beneficiary designations in employee benefit plans.
Pacific Gas and Electric sought state certification for a new nuclear facility. State law required a showing that adequate storage existed for spent fuel before construction could begin. Federal nuclear safety statutes set standards for plant design and operation but left siting decisions to the states. The court held that the state requirement was not preempted because it addressed economic and land-use concerns outside the field occupied by federal safety regulation.
Federal law required state law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on handgun purchasers. Local sheriffs refused to perform the checks. The court held that the federal command to state officers violated the anti-commandeering doctrine and could not be justified as preemption because it directed state executive action rather than regulating private gun sales.
A student carried a handgun onto school grounds in violation of a federal statute. The student moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Congress lacked power to regulate local school safety. The court held the statute exceeded the commerce power and therefore could not preempt any conflicting state criminal law.
Congress directed states to take title to low-level radioactive waste generated within their borders if they failed to develop disposal sites. New York challenged the take-title provision. The court held that the provision commandeered state legislatures and could not operate as valid preemption because it compelled state governments to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.
A federal statute preempts state law when Congress regulates private conduct within an enumerated power and the state rule conflicts with the federal standard. The Supremacy Clause makes the federal rule supreme. Direct commands to state governments about what they must legislate or enforce do not qualify as preemption.
The anti-commandeering doctrine prohibits Congress from issuing direct orders to state legislatures or executive officers. A federal provision that merely forbids states from authorizing or licensing an activity targets state governmental action rather than private conduct. Such a provision is invalid commandeering and is not a valid exercise of the preemption power.
…see, e. g. , Murdock v. Memphis , 20 Wall. 590 (1875); Michigan v. Long , 463 U. S. 1032 (1983), the whole jurisprudence of pre-emption, see, e. g. , Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. , 331 U. S. 218 (1947); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. , 505 U. S. 504 (1992), and many of the rules governing our habeas jurisprudence,…
…the Washington statute governs family property law — a “fiel[d] of traditional state regulation,” where courts will not find federal preemption unless such was the “‘clear and manifest purpose of Congress,’ ” Travelers , 514 U. S., at 655 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. , 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947)), or the state statute…
…even legislative Acts, are ipso facto invalid.[^maj-6] See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. , 464 U. S. 238, 248 (1984) (federal pre-emption of conflicting state law). This meaning accords well with the context of the passage, which seeks to explain why the new system of
…which see Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Train Dispatchers , 499 U.S. 117, 111 S.Ct. 1156, 113 L.Ed.2d 95 (1991)—courts usually read preemption clauses to leave private contracts unaffected. American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens , — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 817, 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995), provides a nice illustration. A
…1996 (following the settlement of the Phase IV compensatory claims) the court entered final judgment. Exxon renewed the CWA preemption
Yes. In areas of traditional state regulation such as family property law or insurance, courts apply a strong presumption against preemption. Federal preemption will not be found unless Congress has clearly manifested its intent to displace state law or the state rule does major damage to substantial federal interests.
Congress may expressly authorize states to impose surcharges or other measures that would otherwise violate the dormant commerce clause. When Congress provides such authorization in a valid federal statute, the state action is shielded from dormant commerce clause challenge even though it burdens out-of-state interests.