Also known as: preemption · pre-emption · preemption doctrine · federal pre-emption
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional doctrine derived from the Supremacy Clause under which a valid federal statute supersedes or displaces inconsistent state law or regulation. The doctrine applies only when Congress regulates private conduct within its enumerated powers and the state rule conflicts with that federal standard. Direct congressional commands to state legislatures or executive officers dictating what they must or must not do fall outside the doctrine and violate the anti-commandeering principle.
The State of Sierra enacted a statute authorizing app-based sports wagering platforms. Congress then passed a statute stating that no state may authorize or license such platforms. Frontier Capital obtained a Sierra license and sued to enjoin enforcement of the federal statute. The court held the federal provision invalid because it commanded state legislative action rather than regulating private betting conduct.
After Frederick Ferguson died, his ex-wife claimed life insurance proceeds under an ERISA plan. State law treated the designation as automatically revoked by divorce. The plan administrator paid the proceeds to the designated beneficiary instead. The court held that ERISA preempted the state revocation rule because the federal statute directly governed beneficiary designations in employee benefit plans.
Donna Rae Egelhoff was married to David A. Egelhoff. Mr. Egelhoff was employed by the Boeing Company, which provided him with a life insurance policy and a pension plan. Both plans were governed by ERISA, and Mr. Egelhoff designated his wife as the beneficiary under both. In April 1994, the Egelhoffs divorced. Just over two months later, Mr. Egelhoff died intestate following an automobile accident. At that time, Mrs. Egelhoff remained the listed beneficiary under both the life insurance policy and the pension plan. The life insurance proceeds, totaling $46,000, were paid to her. Respondents Samantha and David Egelhoff, Mr. Egelhoff's children by a previous marriage, are his statutory heirs under state law. They sued petitioner in Washington state court to recover the life insurance proceeds. In a separate action, respondents also sued to recover the pension plan benefits. The trial courts, concluding that both the insurance policy and the pension plan "should be administered in accordance" with ERISA, granted summary judgment to petitioner in both cases. The Washington Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and reversed. Applying the statute, it held that respondents were entitled to the proceeds of both the insurance policy and the pension plan. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed. Courts have disagreed about whether statutes like that of Washington are pre-empted by ERISA. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
View casePacific Gas and Electric sought state certification for a new nuclear facility. State law required a showing that adequate storage existed for spent fuel before construction could begin. Federal nuclear safety statutes set standards for plant design and operation but left siting decisions to the states. The court held that the state requirement was not preempted because it addressed economic and land-use concerns outside the field occupied by federal safety regulation.
By the late 1970s, spent nuclear fuel had accumulated at reactor sites across the country, totaling some 8,000 metric tons with projections of 72,000 metric tons by the year 2000. Government studies indicated that several reactors could be forced to shut down in the near future due to insufficient storage capacity in on-site pools. California responded to these concerns and the absence of a permanent disposal method by amending its energy laws in 1976. In 1974 California had enacted the Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Act. The Act requires any utility seeking to construct an electric power generating plant, including a nuclear facility, to obtain certification from the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission after a multi-stage review process. The Warren-Alquist Act was amended in 1976 to provide additional state regulation of new nuclear powerplant construction. This section directs the Commission to determine on a case-by-case basis that adequate storage capacity for spent fuel rods will exist when needed. Each utility must also maintain continuous on-site full core reserve storage capacity. Section 25524.2 established a moratorium on the certification of new nuclear plants. Certification is barred until the Commission finds that a demonstrated technology or means for the permanent disposal of high-level nuclear waste has been developed and approved by the United States. In 1978 petitioners Pacific Gas & Electric Co. and Southern California Edison Co. filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. They sought a declaratory judgment that the two sections and other provisions of the Warren-Alquist Act were pre-empted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The District Court held that the petitioners had standing, that the challenges were ripe, and that both sections were invalid as pre-empted. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed standing and ripeness as to section 25524.2 but held the challenge to section 25524.1(b) unripe. On the merits, the court held that the nuclear moratorium provisions of § 25524.2 were not pre-empted because §§ 271 and 274(k) of the Atomic Energy Act constitute a congressional authorization for States to regulate nuclear powerplants for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the ripeness of the challenges to both sections and the pre-emption of section 25524.2.
Federal law required state law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on handgun purchasers. Local sheriffs refused to perform the checks. The court held that the federal command to state officers violated the anti-commandeering doctrine and could not be justified as preemption because it directed state executive action rather than regulating private gun sales.
In 1993 Congress amended the Gun Control Act of 1968 by enacting the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which directed the Attorney General to create a national instant background-check system by November 30, 1998, and imposed interim requirements on firearms dealers and chief law enforcement officers until that system became operational. Under the interim scheme a dealer proposing to transfer a handgun had to obtain a sworn Brady Form from the purchaser, verify the purchaser's identity, forward notice and a copy of the form to the CLEO of the purchaser's residence, and wait five business days before completing the sale unless the CLEO notified the dealer that the transfer would not violate the law. Jay Printz, CLEO for Ravalli County, Montana, and Richard Mack, CLEO for Graham County, Arizona, filed separate federal actions challenging the constitutionality of the interim provisions that required CLEOs to perform background checks and related tasks. In each case the district court held that the obligation imposed on CLEOs was unconstitutional but severable from the remainder of the Act, leaving in place a voluntary background-check system. The Ninth Circuit consolidated the appeals and reversed, holding that none of the Brady Act's interim provisions violated the Constitution. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
A student carried a handgun onto school grounds in violation of a federal statute. The student moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Congress lacked power to regulate local school safety. The court held the statute exceeded the commerce power and therefore could not preempt any conflicting state criminal law.
In March 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets. Acting on an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted Lopez, who admitted possessing the weapon. Local police arrested him and charged him under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The following day, state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone. Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate control over public schools. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate activities affecting commerce because the business of schools affects interstate commerce. After a bench trial, the court found Lopez guilty and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release. Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the conviction, holding that the statute was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
Congress directed states to take title to low-level radioactive waste generated within their borders if they failed to develop disposal sites. New York challenged the take-title provision. The court held that the provision commandeered state legislatures and could not operate as valid preemption because it compelled state governments to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.
Low-level radioactive waste is generated by many sources and must be isolated from humans for long periods. Historically the Nation relied on a small number of disposal sites. Concern about declining disposal capacity prompted Congress initially to adopt the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980. That statute declared a federal policy that each State is responsible for providing for disposal of waste generated within its borders. It authorized States to enter into regional compacts. That Act contained no penalties for nonparticipation. By 1985, with few operational sites and a looming crisis, Congress enacted the 1985 Amendments. The amendments were based largely on proposals of the National Governors' Association. They embodied a compromise among sited and unsited States. The 1985 Act directs each State to be responsible for disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within the State. It authorizes States to enter into interstate compacts. For an additional seven years the three existing disposal sites were required to make capacity available for waste from any source. Sited States were permitted to exact graduated surcharges on out-of-region waste. After the transition period approved compacts could exclude out-of-region waste. The Act provides three types of incentives to encourage States to comply with its requirements. The monetary incentives authorize sited States to impose surcharges on out-of-state waste. They require the Secretary of Energy to collect a portion of the surcharge into an escrow account. They permit distribution of that fund to States that achieve the statutory milestones. The access incentives authorize sited States and regional compacts to increase and ultimately deny access to their sites to waste from States that do not meet federal deadlines. The take title provision requires a State that fails to provide for disposal by January 1, 1996. Upon request of the generator or owner of waste, the State must take title to and possession of the waste and be liable for damages suffered by the generator or owner as a result of the State's failure to take possession. The petitioners, New York and two of its counties, sought a declaratory judgment that the three incentives are inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment and with the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, § 4. The District Court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
A federal statute preempts state law when Congress regulates private conduct within an enumerated power and the state rule conflicts with the federal standard. The Supremacy Clause makes the federal rule supreme. Direct commands to state governments about what they must legislate or enforce do not qualify as preemption.
The anti-commandeering doctrine prohibits Congress from issuing direct orders to state legislatures or executive officers. A federal provision that merely forbids states from authorizing or licensing an activity targets state governmental action rather than private conduct. Such a provision is invalid commandeering and is not a valid exercise of the preemption power.
…see, e. g. , Murdock v. Memphis , 20 Wall. 590 (1875); Michigan v. Long , 463 U. S. 1032 (1983), the whole jurisprudence of pre-emption, see, e. g. , Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. , 331 U. S. 218 (1947); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. , 505 U. S. 504 (1992), and many of the rules governing our habeas jurisprudence,…
…the Washington statute governs family property law — a “fiel[d] of traditional state regulation,” where courts will not find federal preemption unless such was the “‘clear and manifest purpose of Congress,’ ” Travelers , 514 U. S., at 655 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. , 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947)), or the state statute…
…even legislative Acts, are ipso facto invalid. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. , 464 U. S. 238, 248 (1984) (federal pre-emption of conflicting state law). This meaning accords well with the context of the passage, which seeks to explain why the new system of
…which see Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Train Dispatchers , 499 U.S. 117, 111 S.Ct. 1156, 113 L.Ed.2d 95 (1991)—courts usually read preemption clauses to leave private contracts unaffected. American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens , — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 817, 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995), provides a nice illustration. A
…1996 (following the settlement of the Phase IV compensatory claims) the court entered final judgment. Exxon renewed the CWA preemption argument before the Ninth Circuit. The Court of Appeals recognized that Exxon had raised the CWA argument for the first time 13 months after the Phase III verdict, but decided that the…
Yes. In areas of traditional state regulation such as family property law or insurance, courts apply a strong presumption against preemption. Federal preemption will not be found unless Congress has clearly manifested its intent to displace state law or the state rule does major damage to substantial federal interests.
Congress may expressly authorize states to impose surcharges or other measures that would otherwise violate the dormant commerce clause. When Congress provides such authorization in a valid federal statute, the state action is shielded from dormant commerce clause challenge even though it burdens out-of-state interests.