Also known as: federal preemption · pre-emption · preemption · federal supremacy
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional doctrine under which federal statutes and regulations displace conflicting state laws pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. Federal law prevails when Congress has occupied a field or when state requirements stand as an obstacle to federal objectives.
State legislators in State A enacted a statute licensing private operators to conduct sports gambling. A federal statute barred states from authorizing such schemes. The Court held that the federal prohibition targeted legislative action rather than private conduct and therefore was invalid under the anti-commandeering doctrine.
California enacted a statute requiring insurers to disclose Holocaust-era policies. Federal executive agreements addressed the same claims through international negotiation. The state disclosure rule was preempted because it conflicted with the federal conduct of foreign affairs.
In 1999, the California legislature enacted the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA). It requires any insurer doing business in the state to disclose details of all life, property, liability, health, annuities, dowry, educational, or casualty insurance policies sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945 by the insurer itself or any related company. This includes any parent, subsidiary, reinsurer, successor in interest, managing general agent, or affiliate. The required disclosures include the current status of each policy, the city of origin or domicile of each policyholder, and the names of the beneficiaries. All information is placed in a central public registry. Noncompliance triggers mandatory suspension of the company's license to do business in California. There are also misdemeanor sanctions for falsehood in required representations about whether and to whom the proceeds of each policy have been distributed. The Act arose against the backdrop of Nazi-era confiscations of Jewish insurance policies and decades of post-war diplomacy. After World War II, the United States participated in the Potsdam and Yalta Conferences and the 1946 Paris Agreement on reparations. The western Allies decided in the London Debt Agreement to put off consideration of claims arising out of the second World War until the final settlement of the problem of reparation. Following German reunification, class-action lawsuits flooded U.S. courts against companies that did business in Germany during the Nazi era. This prompted the federal government to negotiate a resolution. In July 2000, the United States and Germany signed the German Foundation Agreement. Germany established a foundation funded with 10 billion deutsch marks contributed equally by the government and German companies to compensate victims of the National Socialist era. The United States agreed to file statements in U.S. courts that the foundation should be the exclusive remedy for claims against German companies. It also agreed to use its best efforts to encourage state and local governments to respect the foundation as the exclusive mechanism. Parallel agreements were reached with Austria and France. The pacts endorsed the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC) for voluntary handling of insurance claims. This included relaxed standards of proof and procedures for policy information. After HVIRA took effect, administrative subpoenas were issued against subsidiaries of European insurers participating in the ICHEIC. Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Stuart Eizenstat wrote letters to California officials. He stated that the statute damaged the cooperative spirit required for the ICHEIC. He noted that it threatened to derail the German Foundation Agreement by denying companies the legal peace they sought. Several American and European insurance companies and the American Insurance Association then sued California Insurance Commissioner John Garamendi in federal district court. The district court issued a preliminary injunction and later granted summary judgment on due process grounds. The Ninth Circuit rejected the foreign affairs challenge. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2003.
View caseJohnson Controls barred fertile women from battery manufacturing jobs to avoid lead exposure. Federal Title VII prohibited sex-based employment discrimination. The company policy was invalid because federal antidiscrimination law preempted the state common-law tort defense asserted by the employer.
Johnson Controls, Inc. manufactures batteries. The manufacturing process uses lead as a primary ingredient. Occupational exposure to lead creates health risks, including potential harm to a fetus carried by a female employee. Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the company employed no women in battery-manufacturing jobs. In June 1977, Johnson Controls announced its first official policy on employment of women in lead-exposure work. The policy stated that protection of the health of the unborn child is the responsibility of prospective parents. It also stated that it would be illegal discrimination to treat all women capable of pregnancy as though they will become pregnant. The 1977 policy required a woman seeking consideration for employment to sign a statement. The statement acknowledged evidence that women exposed to lead have a higher rate of abortion. It advised that it was medically good sense not to run that risk if she wanted children. Five years later in 1982, after eight employees became pregnant between 1979 and 1983 while maintaining blood lead levels in excess of 30 micrograms per deciliter, Johnson Controls adopted a new policy. The new policy excluded women who were pregnant or capable of bearing children from jobs involving lead exposure. It also excluded them from jobs that could expose them through bidding, bumping, transfer or promotion rights. The 1982 policy defined women capable of bearing children as all women except those whose inability to bear children is medically documented. It applied to any work station where an employee had recorded a blood lead level over 30 micrograms per deciliter. It also applied where the site had yielded an air sample exceeding 30 micrograms per cubic meter over the past year. In April 1984, the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America and individual plaintiffs filed a class action. The plaintiffs included Mary Craig, who chose sterilization to avoid losing her job. Elsie Nason was a 50-year-old divorcee transferred out of a lead-exposed job with loss of compensation. Donald Penney was denied a leave of absence to lower his lead level because he intended to become a father. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The District Court certified a class of all past, present and future production and maintenance employees in UAW bargaining units at nine Johnson Controls plants. The class consisted of those who have been and continue to be affected by the 1982 Fetal Protection Policy. The District Court granted summary judgment for Johnson Controls. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the summary judgment by a 7-to-4 vote. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1990.
View caseArizona required state officers to verify immigration status during lawful stops and made unlawful presence a state crime. Federal immigration statutes occupied the field of alien registration and removal. The state provisions were preempted because they conflicted with federal enforcement discretion and objectives.
In 2010, the State of Arizona enacted the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, commonly known as S. B. 1070. The statute's stated purpose is to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States. Arizona officials described the law as establishing a policy of attrition through enforcement. S. B. 1070 contains four provisions that became the focus of litigation. Section 3 makes it a state misdemeanor to willfully fail to complete or carry an alien registration document in violation of federal law. Section 5(C) makes it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public place, or perform work as an employee or independent contractor in Arizona. Section 6 authorizes state and local officers to arrest without a warrant a person whom the officer has probable cause to believe has committed any public offense that makes the person removable from the United States. Section 2(B) requires officers conducting a stop, detention, or arrest to make reasonable efforts, in some circumstances, to verify the person's immigration status with the Federal Government. The United States filed suit against Arizona in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, seeking to enjoin enforcement of these provisions. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction preventing the four provisions from taking effect. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunction in 2011. Arizona experiences significant effects from unlawful immigration. Hundreds of thousands of deportable aliens are apprehended in the State each year, and unauthorized aliens are estimated to comprise almost six percent of the population. In Maricopa County, which includes Phoenix, unauthorized aliens are reported to account for a disproportionate share of serious crime. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit's decision.
View caseChicago police officers conducted a warrantless search of Monroe's home. Federal civil rights law provided a damages remedy against state actors. The state law immunity defense was preempted because federal law supplied the exclusive cause of action for constitutional violations by officials.
On October 29, 1958, at approximately 5:45 a.m., thirteen Chicago police officers entered the apartment of James Monroe and his family without a search warrant or arrest warrant. The officers roused the Monroes from bed using flashlights and forced them at gunpoint to stand naked in the living room while ransacking every room, emptying drawers, and ripping mattress covers. Detective Pape struck Mr. Monroe several times with his flashlight and called him "nigger" and "black boy." Other officers hit and kicked several of the children and pushed them to the floor. Mr. Monroe was then taken to the police station and detained on open charges for ten hours. During this period he was interrogated about a murder, exhibited in lineups, and not permitted to call his family or attorney, although he was not brought before a magistrate despite their availability. He was released without any criminal charges being filed against him. The complaint alleged that these actions occurred under color of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs, and usages of Illinois and Chicago, and that the City had no rules or controls over its police officers, permitting them to act without restraint. The Monroes claimed deprivations of rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and sought compensatory and punitive damages from the officers and the City. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment.
View caseLopez was convicted under a federal statute for possessing a firearm near a school. Federal law regulated possession in school zones. The conviction was reversed because Congress lacked authority to enact the statute, eliminating any basis for preemption of state criminal law in the same area.
In March 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets. Acting on an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted Lopez, who admitted possessing the weapon. Local police arrested him and charged him under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The following day, state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone. Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate control over public schools. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate activities affecting commerce because the business of schools affects interstate commerce. After a bench trial, the court found Lopez guilty and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release. Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the conviction, holding that the statute was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View casePreemption occurs when federal law regulates private conduct and displaces inconsistent state rules. Commandeering occurs when Congress orders state legislatures or officers to enact or enforce federal policy. The distinction turns on whether the federal statute targets private actors or state governmental processes.
Field preemption requires that Congress intended to occupy the entire field. Obstacle preemption applies when state law stands as an obstacle to federal objectives even if the field is not fully occupied. Courts examine statutory text, structure, and purpose to determine the scope of displacement.
State procedural requirements that do not conflict with federal substantive rules or objectives are not preempted. When the state action addresses distinct local concerns without creating an actual conflict, federal law does not displace the state requirement.
The Supremacy Clause declares the Constitution and federal laws the supreme law of the land. State laws that conflict with valid federal enactments are without effect. This hierarchy requires judges in every state to apply federal law over contrary state provisions.
…see, e. g. , Murdock v. Memphis , 20 Wall. 590 (1875); Michigan v. Long , 463 U. S. 1032 (1983), the whole jurisprudence of pre-emption, see, e. g. , Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. , 331 U. S. 218 (1947); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. , 505 U. S. 504 (1992), and many of the rules governing our habeas jurisprudence,…