fair and impartial trial

Petitioner, a black man, was indicted in Jefferson Circuit Court on two counts of second-degree burglary and one count of receipt of stolen goods. On the first day of trial, the judge conducted voir dire examination of the venire. He excused certain jurors for cause and permitted the parties to exercise peremptory challenges. The prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all four black persons on the venire. A jury composed only of white persons was selected. Defense counsel moved to discharge the jury before it was sworn. The motion claimed that the prosecutor's removal of the black veniremen violated petitioner's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a jury drawn from a cross section of the community and under the Fourteenth Amendment to equal protection of the laws. Counsel requested a hearing on his motion. Without expressly ruling on the request for a hearing, the trial judge observed that the parties were entitled to use their peremptory challenges to strike anybody they wanted to. The judge denied the motion. The jury convicted petitioner on both counts. He was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment on each count with the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, petitioner argued that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges violated his right to trial by an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner also contended that the facts showed the prosecutor had engaged in a pattern of discriminatory challenges. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the conviction. It relied on Swain v. Alabama and held that petitioner had failed to show that the prosecutor had engaged in a pattern of discrimination in the selection of jurors in a series of cases. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In October 1966, nineteen-year-old Gary Duncan stopped his car on Highway 23 in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, after seeing his two younger Negro cousins talking with four white boys near a formerly all-white high school that had recently experienced racial incidents. Duncan approached the group, spoke with the white boys, encouraged his cousins to leave, and was about to drive away when a dispute arose over whether he had slapped or merely touched one of the white boys on the elbow. At his trial in the Twenty-fifth Judicial District Court of Louisiana, the white boys and a white onlooker testified that Duncan had slapped Herman Landry, while Duncan and his cousins testified that he had only touched the boy. The trial judge found Duncan guilty of simple battery beyond a reasonable doubt. Under Louisiana law, simple battery is a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum of two years' imprisonment and a three-hundred-dollar fine. Duncan requested a jury trial, but the trial judge denied the request because the Louisiana Constitution provides for jury trials only in cases where capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor may be imposed. Duncan was convicted by the judge alone and sentenced to sixty days in the parish prison and a fine of one hundred fifty dollars. Duncan sought review in the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which denied his application for a writ of certiorari. He then petitioned the United States Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), alleging that the denial of a jury trial violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument along with a related case.

Petitioner Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in a Florida state court with having broken and entered a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor. This offense is a felony under Florida law. Appearing in court without funds and without a lawyer, Gideon asked the court to appoint counsel for him. The court denied the request, stating that under the laws of the State of Florida the only time the Court can appoint Counsel to represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense. Put to trial before a jury, Gideon conducted his defense about as well as could be expected from a layman. He made an opening statement to the jury, cross-examined the State’s witnesses, presented witnesses in his own defense, declined to testify himself, and made a short argument emphasizing his innocence to the charge contained in the Information filed in this case. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and petitioner was sentenced to serve five years in the state prison. Later, petitioner filed in the Florida Supreme Court this habeas corpus petition. The petition attacked his conviction and sentence on the ground that the trial court’s refusal to appoint counsel for him denied him rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights by the United States Government. Treating the petition for habeas corpus as properly before it, the State Supreme Court, upon consideration thereof but without an opinion, denied all relief. Since 1942, when Betts v. Brady was decided by a divided Court, the problem of a defendant’s federal constitutional right to counsel in a state court has been a continuing source of controversy and litigation in both state and federal courts. To give this problem another review here, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Since Gideon was proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court appointed counsel to represent him and requested both sides to discuss in their briefs and oral arguments whether this Court’s holding in Betts v. Brady should be reconsidered.