Also known as: fact questions · question of fact
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A question whose resolution turns on the determination of disputed facts rather than the application of legal rules. The trier of fact resolves it after considering the evidence presented under the circumstances of the case.
Francesca Fowler mailed an offer to sell equipment to Floyd Franklin on Monday morning. Franklin mailed his acceptance on Thursday evening after reviewing inventory needs. Whether the acceptance arrived within a reasonable time depends on the surrounding business circumstances at the time of the offer and response.
Felicia Fuentes struck an assailant with a metal pipe during an altercation. The pipe blow fractured the assailant's arm but did not threaten life. Whether the force used created a substantial risk of serious bodily harm turns on the assailant's known physical condition and the manner of the strike.
Finn Fletcher sued his alleged employer after a workplace injury. The employer presented testimony from a manager claiming Fletcher was an independent contractor. Whether Fletcher qualified as an employee under the state statute presents a fact question for the jury on the full record.
The petitioner, a resident of North Carolina, sued respondent, a South Carolina corporation, for damages for injuries allegedly caused by the respondent's negligence. He was employed as a lineman in the construction crew of a construction contractor. Respondent Blue Ridge Rural Electrical Cooperative, Inc., a South Carolina corporation in the business of selling electric power, had contracted with R. H. Bouligny, Inc. for $334,300 to build approximately 24 miles of new power lines, reconvert about 88 miles of existing lines to higher capacities, and construct two new substations and a breaker station. The petitioner was injured while connecting power lines to one of the new substations. Byrd first recovered full benefits under the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Law from his direct employer Bouligny. He then filed a negligence action against Blue Ridge in the United States District Court for the Western District of South Carolina under diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. At trial Blue Ridge asserted an affirmative defense that Byrd qualified as its statutory employee because the contracted work was part of its trade, business, or occupation. Blue Ridge's manager testified on direct examination that three of its substations had been built by its own construction and maintenance crews. His answers on cross-examination created uncertainty that prompted the trial judge to note he appeared to have changed his testimony. Blue Ridge also introduced evidence that it financed the project with a federal loan, purchased the materials, and maintained an engineering service contract with an independent firm for design and supervision. Its charter under the South Carolina Rural Electric Cooperative Act authorized it to construct generating plants, buildings, and equipment necessary for its operations. After all evidence was presented the district judge struck the affirmative defense, ruling that Blue Ridge could not be a statutory employer because its crews performed work only for its own use rather than for others. The judge then denied Blue Ridge's motion for a directed verdict and submitted the negligence claim to the jury, which returned a verdict for Byrd in the amount of $126,786.80. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, resolved uncertainties in the manager's testimony in Blue Ridge's favor, and directed entry of judgment for Blue Ridge without remanding for further proceedings. Byrd petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. The case had previously been dismissed on the ground that Blue Ridge enjoyed tort immunity as a nonprofit corporation, but the Court of Appeals had reversed that dismissal and remanded for trial. On the present appeal the Court of Appeals did not reach other grounds raised by Blue Ridge because its resolution of the statutory employer issue disposed of the case.
View caseFrank Fisher and Farah Fox were passengers in a car containing firearms. The prosecution invoked a statutory presumption of possession. Whether the firearms were in the sole possession of one defendant rather than shared presents a fact question properly submitted to the jury.
In March 1973, three adult male respondents and a sixteen-year-old girl were traveling in a Chevrolet on the New York State Thruway when the car was stopped for speeding. Police observed two loaded handguns weighing approximately six pounds in an open handbag on the front floor or seat beside the girl, who admitted the bag belonged to her. A machinegun and heroin were discovered in the trunk after it was pried open. The four were tried together in Ulster County Court for possession of the handguns and trunk items. The trial judge instructed the jury regarding the statutory presumption that the presence of firearms in the automobile constituted evidence of possession by all occupants. The jury found the three adult males guilty of handgun possession but acquitted everyone of the trunk charges. The convictions were affirmed by the Appellate Division without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed. The respondents sought federal habeas corpus relief in the Southern District of New York. The district court granted the writ on the ground that the presumption could not support the convictions on these facts. The Second Circuit affirmed the grant of the writ, though on the basis that the statute was unconstitutional on its face. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the procedural and substantive issues raised by the lower federal courts' decisions.
View caseFrostline Textiles owned land taken by the city for a public project. The owner received an opportunity to present evidence on the property's fair market value. Whether the amount awarded constituted just compensation is resolved after the owner is heard in a competent court.
The City of Chicago, acting under an 1872 Illinois statute that became part of its charter in 1875, passed an ordinance on October 9, 1880, to open and widen Rockwell Street from West 18th Street to West 19th Street by condemning parcels of land owned by individuals and parts of the right of way of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company within the city limits. On November 12, 1890, the city filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking condemnation of the property and asking that just compensation be ascertained by a jury, with the railroad company admitted as a defendant along with other interested parties. The jury awarded one dollar as just compensation to the railroad company for the parts of its right of way to be used for the street, while awarding compensation to individual owners for their parcels. The railroad moved for a new trial, which was overruled, and final judgment was entered in execution of the award. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Illinois in 149 Illinois 457. After affirmance the railroad company sued out a writ of error to the United States Supreme Court. The railroad had raised claims under the Fourteenth Amendment in its motion for new trial and in its assignment of errors filed in the state supreme court. The Illinois statute provided no provision for an answer by defendants in condemnation proceedings, but the railroad asserted its federal claims in the written motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial.
View caseFusion Power faced a criminal prosecution. During voir dire a prospective juror stated he had formed a hypothetical opinion about the case but believed it would not affect his verdict. Whether that juror could be deemed impartial is a fact question left to the trial court's discretion on the record.
George Reynolds, a longtime member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, was indicted in the District Court of the third judicial district of the Territory of Utah for bigamy after entering a second marriage to Amelia Jane Schofield while his first wife remained alive. Reynolds had obtained permission from recognized church authorities to contract the polygamous marriage. He and other male church members believed the practice was a religious duty enjoined by divine revelation to Joseph Smith. Refusal would bring damnation when circumstances permitted. The grand jury that returned the indictment consisted of fifteen persons under a territorial statute. This differed from the sixteen to twenty-three persons required by federal statute for United States circuit and district courts. During voir dire, the trial court overruled Reynolds's challenges for cause to prospective jurors including Charles Read who stated they had formed opinions about the case. The court sustained government challenges to other prospective jurors who were or had been living in polygamy. At trial the prosecution offered the transcript of testimony given by Amelia Jane Schofield at an earlier prosecution of Reynolds for the same offense under a different indictment. The government showed that subpoenas were served at Reynolds's house. An officer was told the witness was not at home. Reynolds declined to disclose her location. A later subpoena with the correct name also failed to locate her. Reynolds had been present and able to cross-examine at the prior trial but offered no explanation for her absence. Reynolds requested a jury instruction that he must be acquitted if the jury found he acted in the sincere belief that the second marriage fulfilled a religious duty. The court refused and instead instructed that religious belief could not excuse a knowing violation of the criminal law. The court further instructed the jury to consider the consequences of polygamy for innocent women and children. Reynolds was convicted and the case reached the Supreme Court of the United States on writ of error.
View caseThe jury resolves fact questions after hearing the evidence. The court may decide preliminary fact questions that govern admissibility of evidence under Rule 104(a).
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A fact question requires the trier of fact to weigh evidence and determine what occurred under the circumstances. A question of law requires the court to apply legal rules to those facts.
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Yes. Whether land was conveyed pursuant to a general plan is resolved from the circumstances surrounding the subdivision and deed restrictions.
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