Also known as:extreme and outrageous · outrageous conduct · IIED element · outrage
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Conduct that exceeds all possible bounds of decency and is regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. This quality of behavior supplies the central element of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress when paired with intent or recklessness and resulting severe emotional harm.
See Our Sources· 3 primary sources
Model Codes
Restatements
How its tested
Common Examples
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Sustained Intimidation Campaign
Call-center supervisor Dana Ruiz repeatedly flagged customer Jordan Lee's account and directed agents to falsely warn of terrorism monitoring while arranging repeated late-night robocalls with ominous threats. Jordan developed severe anxiety, insomnia, and stress-related ulcers. The coordinated campaign of fabricated threats from a service provider that controlled Jordan's communications lifeline meets the threshold of extreme outrageousness and supports liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Retaliatory False Diagnosis
Surgeon Dr. Lopez, angered by patient Maria Reyes's complaints, deliberately told her that lab results showed an untreatable disfiguring disease even though he knew the results were normal and then withheld the truth for hours. Maria suffered repeated panic attacks and severe insomnia. The calculated exploitation of the physician-patient relationship through a fabricated life-altering diagnosis satisfies extreme outrageousness and supports both compensatory and punitive damages.
Public Funeral Protest
Zara organized twenty advocates to stand on a public sidewalk beside a cemetery during Leah's private burial service and display signs labeling the deceased a slumlord while chanting criticisms of housing policy. Leah and the family inside the grounds suffered severe emotional distress. The timing and personal targeting at a moment of heightened vulnerability support a finding of extreme outrageousness sufficient to overcome First Amendment protection in the tort claim.
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore517 U.S. 559, 575, 580-81 (1996)
In January 1990, Dr. Ira Gore, Jr., purchased a black BMW sports sedan for $40,750.88 from an authorized dealer in Birmingham, Alabama. The vehicle had been manufactured in Germany by BMW and shipped to the United States, where an independent service company in Brunswick, Georgia, determined that its finish had been damaged by acid rain during transit from Europe and refinished it at a cost of $601.37 before delivery to the Birmingham dealership. At the time of the purchase, BMW of North America, Inc., maintained a policy of not disclosing to dealers or customers that a new vehicle had been refinished if the cost of the repairs was less than 3 percent of the suggested retail price, and the refinishing cost for Gore's car amounted to approximately 1.5 percent of that price.
After driving the car for about nine months, Gore took it to an independent detailer, who informed him that the car had been repainted. Gore then filed suit against BMW of North America, Inc., alleging fraud under Alabama law for the failure to disclose the repainting. At trial, BMW acknowledged that it had sold approximately 983 refinished cars as new in the United States since 1983, including 14 in Alabama, without disclosing the repairs when the cost exceeded $300 per vehicle. The jury awarded Gore $4,000 in compensatory damages, representing the difference in value between the car as delivered and its value had it not been refinished, along with $4 million in punitive damages.
BMW moved to set aside the punitive damages award, introducing evidence that its nondisclosure policy aligned with the laws of roughly 25 states that required disclosure only for repairs exceeding 3 percent of the suggested retail price. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the judgment but reduced the punitive damages to $2 million after applying factors from Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby and Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, concluding that the jury's award was excessive but that $2 million remained permissible. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the case.
Hidden Recording Intrusion
A reporter posing as a patient secretly recorded healer Dietemann in his home office while asking about medical conditions and later broadcast the footage. Dietemann suffered severe emotional distress from the invasion. The surreptitious recording and public dissemination of private medical conversations in a place of apparent sanctuary constitute extreme outrageousness supporting liability.
Dietemann v. Time, Inc.449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971)
Dietemann, a disabled veteran with little education, was engaged in the practice of healing with clay, minerals, and herbs—as practiced, simple quackery. Defendant Time, Incorporated, publishes Life Magazine, and its November 1, 1963 edition carried an article entitled “Crackdown on Quackery” depicting plaintiff as a quack and including two pictures of him.
Life Magazine entered into an arrangement with the District Attorney’s Office of Los Angeles County whereby Life’s employees would visit plaintiff and obtain facts and pictures concerning his activities. On September 20, 1963, Life employees Mrs. Jackie Metcalf and Mr. William Ray went to plaintiff’s home using a ruse to gain entrance by claiming they had been sent by a friend, a Mr. Johnson, and once admitted they went into plaintiff’s den where Ray photographed plaintiff with a hidden camera without consent while transmitting the conversation via a hidden radio transmitter in Metcalf’s purse to a tape recorder in a parked automobile.
Prior to September 20, 1963, on two occasions the officials had obtained recordings of conversations in plaintiff’s home without Life employees participating, and on October 15, 1963, plaintiff was arrested at his home on a charge of practicing medicine without a license during which Life made many pictures. The district court awarded plaintiff $1000 general damages after a court trial in an action for invasion of privacy with jurisdiction grounded in diversity and the parties agreeing that California law governed, from which Time appealed.
False Public Accusation
A newspaper columnist published statements accusing high-school coach Milkovich of lying under oath about a brawl at a wrestling match. Milkovich suffered severe emotional distress and reputational harm. The deliberate publication of a provably false factual assertion that branded the coach a perjurer meets the standard of extreme outrageousness.
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.497 U.S. 1 (1990)
In 1974 Michael Milkovich served as head wrestling coach at Maple Heights High School in Ohio. During a match against Mentor High School a fight broke out between the teams. Several wrestlers were injured and one opposing coach was struck in the face. Milkovich and Maple Heights superintendent H. Don Scott testified before the Ohio High School Athletic Association that Milkovich had not been involved in the altercation. The OHSAA censured Milkovich and placed the Maple Heights team on probation for one year.
Several wrestlers and their parents sued the OHSAA in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Ohio, alleging denial of due process. Both Milkovich and Scott testified in that proceeding. The court overturned the OHSAA sanctions on due process grounds. The day after the decision the News-Herald published a column by J. Theodore Diadiun. The column bore the heading "Maple beat the law with the big lie.'"
It stated that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each having given his solemn oath to tell the truth. It further stated that by the time the hearing before Judge Martin rolled around, Milkovich and Scott apparently had their version of the incident polished and reconstructed, and the judge apparently believed them.
Milkovich filed a defamation action against Diadiun and the newspaper’s owner, Lorain Journal Co., in the Court of Common Pleas of Lake County, Ohio. He alleged that the column accused him of committing perjury. The trial court granted a directed verdict for the defendants. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for trial. On remand the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants and the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed.
In a parallel action brought by Superintendent Scott the Ohio Supreme Court held that the same column constituted protected opinion. Relying on that decision the Ohio Court of Appeals in Milkovich’s case affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed Milkovich’s appeal for want of a substantial constitutional question. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Warrantless Home Invasion
Federal agents entered Webster Bivens's apartment without a warrant, searched every room, and arrested him in front of his family. Bivens suffered severe emotional distress from the unannounced intrusion. The agents' deliberate violation of Fourth Amendment protections in the sanctity of the home satisfies extreme outrageousness and supports a damages action.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971)
On the morning of November 26, 1965, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics entered Webster Bivens's apartment in the Bronx.
The agents broke open the door, handcuffed Bivens in front of his wife and young children, and thoroughly searched the apartment. They then transported Bivens to the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search.
Several days later Bivens was released on his own recognizance, and he was never indicted or prosecuted for any offense. Bivens filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the six agents in their individual capacities. His complaint sought fifteen thousand dollars in damages from each agent and alleged that the arrest and search were effected without a warrant, that unreasonable force was employed, and that the arrest was made without probable cause. Bivens claimed to have suffered great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering as a result of the agents' conduct.
The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the judgment.
4 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What must a plaintiff show to prove that conduct meets the extreme outrageousness element of intentional infliction of emotional distress?
The plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct went beyond all possible bounds of decency and would be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Courts evaluate the context, including any power imbalance or exploitation of vulnerability, to determine whether a reasonable jury could find the conduct outrageous. Sustained campaigns of intimidation or calculated lies about life-altering diagnoses in a professional relationship routinely satisfy the element.
Can extreme outrageousness support punitive damages even without a separate IIED claim?
Yes. When conduct is outrageous because of evil motive or reckless indifference to others' rights, punitive damages may be awarded to punish and deter. The same facts that establish extreme outrageousness for IIED liability can independently justify a punitive award under the governing standard.
Supporting sources
Does extreme outrageousness directed at a third person allow a bystander family member to recover?
Yes. When outrageous conduct is aimed at one person, an immediate family member who is present may recover for resulting severe emotional distress even without bodily harm. A non-family bystander present at the time may recover only if the distress produces bodily harm.
Supporting sources
How does the extreme outrageousness requirement limit fraudulent or trivial claims?
The requirement confines liability to extraordinary instances of misbehavior that are more likely to produce genuine severe distress. Ordinary rudeness or isolated insults fall short, while sustained campaigns or exploitation of professional trust cross the threshold and reduce the risk of fabricated suits.
. We, in common with all rational minds, would say that the police response must relate to the gravity and need; that a "shoot" order might conceivably be tolerable to prevent the escape of…
perpetrated by the unauthorized use of their pictures for advertising purposes.” (Emphasis supplied.) 122 Ga. at 218-19. Thus it is shown that, while our learned forefather on this Court…
Constitutional LawIndividual rights · First Amendment freedomsUBEFoundational