Also known as: express grants · express conveyance
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A method of creating an easement through a written conveyance that meets the formal requirements for transferring an interest in land. The writing must be signed by the grantor and satisfy the Statute of Frauds unless the easement duration falls outside its coverage.
Evelyn Ellison owns Blackacre and signs a deed granting Erika Echevarria a right of way across the north edge of Blackacre for access to Whiteacre. The deed is properly executed and recorded. Erika receives an easement by express grant that runs with Whiteacre upon any later sale of that parcel.
Eugene Ellsworth holds copyrights in several works and challenges a statute extending their terms. The extension functions as an express grant of additional exclusive rights for a defined period. The Court upholds the grant because it falls within Congress's enumerated power to secure rights for limited times.
In 1998 Congress enacted the Copyright Term Extension Act, which extended the duration of all federal copyrights by twenty years. For works created by identified natural persons the new term runs from creation until seventy years after the author's death. For anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works made for hire the term is ninety-five years from publication or one hundred twenty years from creation, whichever expires first. The statute applied these extended terms both to copyrights already in existence and to works created after its effective date. Petitioners are individuals and businesses whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have gone into the public domain. They filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaration that the extension of existing copyrights exceeded Congress's power under the Copyright Clause and violated the First Amendment. On cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings the district court entered judgment for the Attorney General. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. A majority of the panel upheld the statute against both challenges, while Judge Sentelle dissented in part on the Copyright Clause issue. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the extension of existing copyrights exceeds Congress's power under the Copyright Clause and whether the extension violates the First Amendment.
View caseElena Estrada purchases parcel B benefiting from an express grant of a private road easement across parcel A. She later acquires adjacent parcel C and begins using the easement to reach both parcels. The court enjoins the expanded use because the express grant benefits only the original dominant estate.
On April 1, 1977, plaintiffs Will and Jean Brown purchased land designated as parcel B from the Christensens. Parcel B is adjacent to and north of land designated as parcel A owned by defendants Fred and Hattie Voss. Access to parcel B is from the south by means of a road that crosses several parcels including parcel A. The roadway easement across parcel A arose by express grant to the Christensens to provide access to parcel B. On July 31, 1977, the Browns purchased from the Rylanders the contiguous tract designated as parcel C north of parcel B. Parcel C was not a dominant estate with respect to the easement across parcel A. The Browns plan to build a residence that would straddle the property line between parcels B and C. The Browns began clearing parcels B and C in November 1977. They performed most of the preparation of the land for construction during the following spring and summer. To the existing easement road the Browns connected a new road that they had built across parcels B and C. After traversing parcel B, the new road crosses the line between parcels B and C and then loops back onto parcel B. The Browns have used the road in connection with their construction activities. In February and March of 1978, the Vosses erected a chain link fence along the side of the easement road. The parties stipulated that the fence was located upon the 16-foot-wide easement. Sometime in 1978, the Vosses placed obstructions on the easement road. In March 1979, the Browns sought damages and to enjoin the Vosses from interfering with their use of the easement. The Vosses counterclaimed, seeking damages for trespass and an injunction to stop the Browns from using the easement road to gain access to parcel C. Before trial, the parties agreed to relocate the easement. The trial court's order reflected this agreement by declaring that the plaintiffs have an easement of record. It consists of a strip of land 16 feet in width immediately west of the permanent chainlink fence for ingress and egress from the property of plaintiffs. The trial court denied the injunction requested by the Vosses. It ruled that the easement may be used for ingress to and egress from parcel C as long as the properties are developed and used solely for the purpose of a single family residence. The Vosses appealed from the judgment denying their counterclaim for an injunction to the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two.
View caseEwan Eckhart holds an easement in gross over an alley for client drop-offs. He later buys a narrow strip of the alley for parking only. Because the purchased strip does not permit the full scope of drop-off uses authorized by the easement, the express grant remains in force over the remaining alley area.
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View caseThe grant must be in a writing signed by the grantor that satisfies the Statute of Frauds. Short-duration easements may fall outside the statute in some states. The Restatement requires the conveyance to meet the same formal requisites as a conveyance of an estate in land of like duration.
Supporting sources
An express grant arises from the language of a deed or other writing. Implied easements arise from circumstances of a conveyance without explicit language. Prescriptive easements arise from long-continued adverse use. The express method requires a signed writing meeting statutory formalities.
No. The scope of an express grant is determined from the terms of the creating instrument. Use that extends the easement to an additional parcel exceeds the grant and may be enjoined. Courts construe the grant to give effect to the parties' intent at the time of creation.
Supporting sources
…copyrights, unsupported by any consideration of the public interest, frustrate the central purpose of the Clause. VII The express grant of a perpetual copyright would unquestionably violate the textual requirement that the authors' exclusive rights be only "for limited Times." Whether the extraordinary length of the grants…