400 S.E.2d 529 (Va. 1991)
In the 1960s, Richmond Real Estate Developers, Inc., owned by E. Carlton Wilton and his two brothers, began constructing the Canterbury East subdivision in the Tuckahoe District of Henrico County.1 The subdivision included a man-made lake shown on the plat filed with the county at the 136-foot elevation contour line.2
Richard L. and Diane Y. Russakoff, Edward E. Haddock, and Edwin M. Lohmann each purchased lots in the subdivision whose rear lines abutted the 140-foot contour, leaving a twenty-foot strip between their lots and the lake reserved for flood plains, sewer lines, and water lines.3
Richmond Real Estate Developers ceased paying taxes on the lake property, causing it to escheat to the Commonwealth of Virginia.4 On September 16, 1983, a tax sale was held at which Kerry I. and Doris J. Scruggs were the highest bidders.5 On May 25, 1984, the Commonwealth conveyed the lake property to the Scruggs.6
After acquiring the property, the Scruggs posted no-trespassing signs, erected a fence around the lake, and sent letters to surrounding homeowners offering use of the lake through rental or purchase of shares.7 The Scruggs also spent over eight thousand dollars on improvements to the lake, including taxes and insurance.8
On February 10, 1988, the Russakoffs filed a bill of complaint in the trial court asserting rights to use the lake under multiple theories.9 The trial court sustained a demurrer to the adverse possession claim but allowed the others to proceed.10 After an ore tenus hearing on the amended bill of complaint alleging prescriptive easement, oral agreement, license, easement by implication, and easement by necessity, the trial court ruled that the lot owners were not entitled to any easement rights to the lake and dismissed the action.11 Russakoff appeals.12
Whether lot owners established an easement for access to and use of a lake?13
Easements may be created by implication when the dominant and servient tracts originated from a common grantor, the use was in existence at the time of the severance, and the use is apparent, continuous, and reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant tract.14
Yes. The lots owned by Richard L. and Diane Y. Russakoff, Edward E.
Haddock, and Edwin M. Lohmann and the lake property originated from a common grantor when Richmond Real Estate Developers, Inc. constructed the Canterbury East subdivision that included the man-made lake.15 Because the use of the servient tract as a lake preexisted severance and was reflected on the plat incorporated into the deeds, the second element is satisfied.16 The use was apparent and continuous because predecessors in title constructed docks, piers, sprinkler systems, and retaining walls while engaging in boating, fishing, and ice skating on the lake.17
Finally, the easement was reasonably necessary because the twenty-foot strip was reserved only for utilities and flood plain purposes, creating a legitimate expectation of lake access upon visual inspection and reference to the plat.18
The lot owners established an easement by implication for access to and use of the lake.19
Whether an easement by implication was created for access to and use of the lake?20
An easement by implication arises upon severance of a single tract when the dominant and servient parcels share a common grantor, a use benefiting the dominant tract existed at severance, and that use remains apparent, continuous, and reasonably necessary to enjoyment of the dominant tract.21
Yes. Richmond Real Estate Developers, Inc. owned both the Russakoff lots and the lake as a single tract before selling the lots whose rear lines abutted the one-hundred-forty-foot contour.22 The lake existed and was shown on the recorded plat at the time the lots were conveyed to the predecessors in title.23 Predecessors openly used the lake for more than a decade through visible structures and recreational activities that Scruggs later observed and interrupted.24
Purchasers of lakeside lots held a legitimate expectation of access given the lake's proximity and the limited purpose of the intervening strip.25
An easement by implication was created for access to and use of the lake.26
Whether the defense of laches bars the lot owners' claims?27
To prevail on laches the defendant must demonstrate that the plaintiffs unjustifiably delayed filing suit and that the delay caused prejudice to the defendant.28
No. Although Scruggs acquired the lake in 1984 and expended funds on improvements, a separate group of landowners challenged his control in 1985, placing him on notice that his expenditures occurred at his own peril.29 The Russakoffs filed their bill of complaint in 1988, yet the record fails to show that any prejudice resulted solely from their delay rather than from the earlier litigation.30 Scruggs therefore cannot satisfy both elements required for laches.31
The defense of laches does not bar the lot owners' claims.32
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Compton
Justice Russell, joined by Justice Compton, dissented on the laches issue.33 He concluded that the lot owners' claim is barred by laches.34 Russakoff had clear notice in 1984 that Scruggs asserted sole control over the waters of the lake and the intervening twenty-foot strip of land.35
Russakoff then knew that he must either purchase an easement from Scruggs or resort to a court of equity to vindicate his claims.36 In the face of that knowledge, Russakoff waited four years before bringing this suit.37 During those four years of silence, Scruggs expended over five thousand dollars on physical improvements to the lake.38
Russakoff now seeks to enjoy the benefit of those improvements.39 This sequence presents the classic fact pattern giving rise to the equitable defense of laches.40