Also known as: expert witnesses
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A person qualified by specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education whose opinion testimony assists the trier of fact in understanding evidence or determining a fact in issue. The testimony must rest on sufficient facts or data, employ reliable principles and methods, and reflect a reliable application of those principles and methods to the facts of the case.
In a federal mail-fraud prosecution, the government calls a forensic accountant to explain the charity's ledgers. On direct examination the accountant states that the timing of transfers shows the defendant fully intended to deprive donors of restricted funds. The court sustains the defense objection and strikes the testimony because the opinion directly addresses an element of the charged offense.
A state DNA analyst testifies that a crime-scene profile matches the defendant's profile generated by her own laboratory. She explains that she compared her results to a profile produced by an out-of-state lab and reached an independent conclusion. The court admits the testimony over a confrontation objection because the out-of-state report was used only to show the basis of the analyst's opinion and was not offered for its truth.
In a class action alleging misrepresented cellular coverage, the parties' engineers present conflicting throughput measurements. The district judge, on its own initiative, orders the parties to show cause why a neutral specialist should not be appointed. After the parties submit nominations, the court selects a qualified engineer who consents to serve and directs the expert to advise the parties of all findings.
An aerospace engineer retained by the plaintiff testifies about orbital-stability tolerances. Defense counsel hands the witness a chapter from a recognized engineering treatise and asks whether the author states that certain inspection routines are industry standard. The witness acknowledges the statement. The court permits counsel to read the passage into evidence but refuses to admit the treatise itself as an exhibit.
A plaintiff offers a tire-failure analyst who concludes that a manufacturing defect caused the blowout. The defendant moves to exclude the testimony, arguing that the analyst's visual-inspection method lacks tested reliability. The court conducts a pretrial hearing, finds the methodology unreliable under the governing standard for all expert testimony, and excludes the opinion.
On July 6, 1993, the right rear tire of a minivan driven by Patrick Carmichael blew out. In the accident that followed, one of the passengers died, and others were severely injured. In October 1993, the Carmichaels brought this diversity suit against the tire's maker and its distributor, whom we refer to collectively as Kumho Tire, claiming that the tire was defective. The plaintiffs rested their case in significant part upon deposition testimony provided by an expert in tire failure analysis, Dennis Carlson, Jr., who intended to testify in support of their conclusion. Carlson's depositions relied upon features of tire technology, such as the carcass, plies, belts, beads, and tread, that are not in dispute. The tire was made in 1988 and had been installed some time before the Carmichaels bought the used minivan in March 1993. The Carmichaels had driven the van approximately 7,000 additional miles in the two months they had owned it. Carlson noted that the tire's tread depth, which was 11/32 of an inch when new, had been worn down to depths that ranged from 3/32 of an inch along some parts of the tire, to nothing at all along others. He conceded that the tire tread had at least two punctures which had been inadequately repaired. Carlson concluded that a defect in its manufacture or design caused the blowout. He rested this conclusion in part upon three premises which, for present purposes, we must assume are not in dispute. Carlson's conclusion that a defect caused the separation, however, rested upon other propositions, several of which the defendants strongly dispute. Carlson added that he had inspected the tire in question. Kumho Tire moved the District Court to exclude Carlson's testimony on the ground that his methodology failed Rule 702's reliability requirement. The court agreed with Kumho that it should act as a Daubert-type reliability gatekeeper, even though one might consider Carlson's testimony as technical, rather than scientific. The District Court found that all those factors argued against the reliability of Carlson's methods, and it granted the motion to exclude the testimony as well as the defendants' accompanying motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs asked for reconsideration, and the court granted that motion. After reconsidering the matter, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that Daubert should be applied flexibly. It consequently affirmed its earlier order declaring Carlson's testimony inadmissible and granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. It reviewed de novo the district court's legal decision to apply Daubert. It concluded that Carlson's testimony, which it viewed as relying on experience, falls outside the scope of Daubert, that the district court erred as a matter of law by applying Daubert in this case, and that the case must be remanded for further non-Daubert-type consideration under Rule 702. Kumho Tire petitioned for certiorari, asking the Court to determine whether a trial court may consider Daubert's specific factors when determining the admissibility of an engineering expert's testimony. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in light of uncertainty among the lower courts about whether, or how, Daubert applies to expert testimony that might be characterized as based not upon scientific knowledge, but rather upon technical or other specialized knowledge.
View caseA defendant charged with shooting his wife claims he acted during a confusional arousal and lacked awareness or intent. The trial court, over objection, appoints a psychiatrist to examine the defendant and testify at trial. The expert later testifies about the defendant's mental condition. The court instructs the jury that the expert was appointed because the defense raised an insanity claim.
Tavaris Smith was indicted for the malice murder of his wife on August 26, 2003. The crime occurred on June 5, 2003. A jury found Smith guilty of malice murder on August 15, 2005. The evidence showed that Smith and his wife had marital difficulties. Smith had threatened to kill her. Smith had put a gun to her head on a previous occasion. Ms. Smith was thinking of divorcing Smith. Before trial, Smith indicated his intent to present evidence, including expert testimony. He had a physiological sleep disorder that caused him, while asleep or in a state of confusional arousal due to the disorder, to shoot his wife without any intent to do so and without any awareness that he was doing so. Smith did not file notice of an intent to assert an insanity defense under OCGA § 17-7-130.1. The trial court concluded that Smith was asserting a claim of not guilty by reason of insanity. The court appointed an expert under OCGA § 17-7-130.1 to examine him over Smith's objection. At trial, when the court-appointed expert witness was called to testify, the court instructed the jury that it had classified Smith's defense as an insanity defense. At the end of the trial, the court charged the jury on the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. The court specifically charged the jury that Smith had the burden to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. Smith again objected to the imposition of the insanity defense. Smith's own expert testified that he did not meet the legal definition of insanity. He may have committed the crime in question during a period of unconsciousness due to sleep disorders from which he was suffering. The court-appointed expert also testified that Smith did not suffer from any psychiatric problems. He may have possibly suffered from narcolepsy and confusional arousal. After the guilty verdict, Smith moved for a new trial on August 29, 2005. The trial court denied the motion for new trial on July 16, 2007. Smith filed a notice of appeal on August 15, 2007. The appeal was docketed in the Supreme Court of Georgia on October 16, 2007. The Supreme Court of Georgia heard oral argument on February 11, 2008.
View caseYes. On a party's motion or on its own initiative, the court may order the parties to show cause why an expert should not be appointed and may select any qualified expert who consents to serve, including one of the court's own choosing.
In a criminal case an expert may not state an opinion on whether the defendant possessed a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime or a defense. Those questions remain exclusively for the trier of fact.
An expert may rely on such a report to explain the basis of an independent opinion when the report is not offered for its truth and was not prepared primarily to accuse a targeted individual. The Confrontation Clause is not violated under those circumstances.
A statement from a treatise, periodical, or pamphlet may be read into evidence if called to the expert's attention on cross-examination or relied upon by the expert on direct examination, provided the publication is established as a reliable authority.
…Center conceded liability for the lost transparencies and the issue of damages was tried before a jury. At trial, Gasperini's expert witness testified that the "industry standard" within the photographic publishing community valued a lost transparency at $1,500. See id. , at 227. This industry standard, the expert explained,…