Also known as: executive immunities · presidential immunity
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A protection from civil liability granted to the President for official acts performed within the scope of presidential duties. The protection does not extend to unofficial conduct or acts that occurred before the President took office.
Evelyn Ellison sued the sitting President in federal court for wage violations that occurred at a private farm the President had owned a decade earlier. The President moved to dismiss on grounds of absolute immunity. The court denied the motion because the alleged conduct was private and predated the presidency.
The President directed a senior White House staffing aide to reassign several analysts after they raised internal concerns. The analysts sued the President personally for alleged retaliation. The court held that the President was entitled to absolute immunity because the personnel action involved core presidential functions.
In 1968, Ernest Fitzgerald, a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force, testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress that a new transport plane, the C-5A, was substantially over its projected cost. This testimony apparently embarrassed the Department of Defense and the Air Force. Shortly thereafter, Fitzgerald's job was abolished in a reorganization of the Air Force. Fitzgerald brought suit against a number of officials of the Executive Branch, including petitioners Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield. Fitzgerald alleged that Harlow and Butterfield had participated in a conspiracy to violate his constitutional and statutory rights by arranging to have him dismissed from his position in the Air Force in retaliation for his testimony. As evidence of Harlow's involvement, Fitzgerald relied on a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzgerald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. He also relied on a recorded conversation in which the President later voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for canning" Fitzgerald. As evidence against Butterfield, Fitzgerald cited a May 1969 White House memorandum. In it Butterfield claimed to have learned that Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public view. Fitzgerald also cited communications between Butterfield and Haldeman in December 1969 and January 1970 as evidence that Butterfield participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful discharge and prevent his reemployment. Harlow asserted that Secretary Seamans had advised him that considerations of efficiency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force. Harlow had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed. Butterfield stated that he was not involved in any decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until more than a month after the termination had been scheduled and announced publicly. Butterfield never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any official of the Defense Department. The District Court denied the motions of Harlow and Butterfield for summary judgment based on absolute Presidential immunity or, alternatively, qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed in part and remanded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseEdgar Evers, then President, directed the dismissal of a longtime federal analyst whose reports had embarrassed the administration. The analyst sued the former President for damages. The court dismissed the claim because the decision fell within the outer perimeter of official presidential duties.
In January 1970 respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost his job as a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force when his position was eliminated during a departmental reorganization and reduction in force. One year earlier, on November 13, 1968, Fitzgerald had testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee that cost overruns on the C-5A transport plane could approximate $2 billion. Concerned that the dismissal might constitute retaliation for the congressional testimony, the subcommittee held public hearings. At a December 8, 1969 news conference President Richard Nixon promised to look into the matter and directed White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman to arrange for Fitzgerald's reassignment to another administration position. An internal White House memorandum from aide Alexander Butterfield recommended that Fitzgerald "bleed, for a while at least" because of perceived disloyalty, and no further White House efforts to reemploy him occurred. Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission alleging unlawful retaliation. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable civil service regulations based on a finding that the departmental reorganization was motivated by reasons purely personal to respondent. The Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. The Commission explicitly found that the evidence did not support Fitzgerald's allegation of retaliation for his 1968 testimony. At a January 31, 1973 news conference President Nixon stated that he had approved Fitzgerald's dismissal. A day later the White House press office issued a retraction of the President's statement. In 1978 Fitzgerald filed a second amended complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia naming Nixon as a defendant and alleging violations of the First Amendment and two federal statutes. The District Court denied Nixon's motion for summary judgment on absolute immunity grounds. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed the collateral appeal. Shortly after Nixon petitioned for certiorari the parties agreed that Nixon would pay Fitzgerald $142,000 immediately and an additional $28,000 if the Supreme Court ruled he was not entitled to absolute immunity.
View caseThe President directed enforcement of a federal tax policy that affected taxpayers in multiple states. A taxpayer sued the former President in another state's court for actions taken in that official capacity. The court dismissed the suit because the conduct occurred within the scope of presidential executive duties.
In the early 1990s, Gilbert Hyatt earned substantial royalties from a technology patent. Although he had been a long-time resident of California, in 1991 Hyatt sold his house there and took steps to establish residency in Nevada, including renting an apartment, registering to vote, obtaining insurance, opening a bank account, and acquiring a driver's license. When filing his 1991 and 1992 tax returns, Hyatt claimed Nevada as his primary residence, a state that collects no personal income tax. The Franchise Tax Board of California suspected the move was a sham and in 1993 launched an audit. Board employees traveled to Nevada to interview Hyatt's estranged family members and shared his personal information with business contacts, sending more than 100 letters and demands for information to third parties. The Board concluded that Hyatt had not moved to Nevada until April 1992 and owed California more than $10 million in back taxes, interest, and penalties. After an 11-year administrative proceeding, the Board upheld the audit, with the appeal still pending. In 1998, Hyatt sued the Board in Nevada state court alleging torts committed during the audit. The Board sought dismissal on immunity grounds, arguing Nevada courts must apply California law under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The Nevada Supreme Court held that comity entitled the Board only to the immunity Nevada afforded its own agencies. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and in 2003 affirmed that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not prohibit Nevada from applying its own law. After remand, a four-month jury trial resulted in a verdict exceeding $490 million including interest and costs. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld a $1 million judgment on one claim but declined to apply Nevada's $50,000 cap on tort liability for state agencies. The Supreme Court in 2016 reversed, requiring the cap, but was equally divided on overruling Nevada v. Hall. On further remand, the trial court was instructed to apply the cap. The Board petitioned for certiorari a third time, and the Supreme Court granted review in 2018 solely on the question whether Nevada v. Hall should be overruled.
View caseNo. Presidential immunity is limited to official acts. Suits based on unofficial conduct that occurred before the President took office may proceed in federal court.
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Presidential aides receive at most qualified immunity for routine or operational functions. Absolute immunity applies only when an aide performs discretionary functions intimately tied to core presidential responsibilities in especially sensitive areas of national concern.
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No. The President enjoys absolute immunity from civil damages liability for official acts within the outer perimeter of presidential duties, even after leaving office.
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…subcommittee. The District Court denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on the ground of absolute presidential immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the President is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for acts within his…