Also known as: exculpatory evidences · exculpatory proof
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Evidence favorable to a criminal defendant that tends to negate guilt or reduce the degree of punishment. The prosecution must disclose such evidence when it is material to guilt or punishment because suppression violates due process even if the nondisclosure is inadvertent.
Elijah Edwards, detained as an enemy combatant, seeks habeas review after a military commission. He discovers server logs created after the proceedings that show a third party caused the alleged attack. The reviewing court must permit introduction of the logs because they directly contest the factual basis for indefinite detention.
Enzo Eastwood is charged with sabotaging a data center. Before he pleads guilty the prosecutor receives server logs and a vendor email showing a hardware defect could have caused the outage. The prosecutor does not disclose the materials. On appeal the court reverses because the evidence is favorable to guilt and material to the plea decision.
Eileen Epstein is on trial for arson. A reliable out-of-court statement from a witness who saw another person start the fire is excluded under the hearsay rule. The court must admit the statement because it is trustworthy exculpatory evidence whose exclusion would deprive Epstein of a fair trial.
Esther Eisenberg is prosecuted for murder. She offers testimony that voluntary intoxication prevented formation of the required mental state. The trial court excludes the evidence under state law. The exclusion is upheld because the evidence does not meet the constitutional threshold for admission as exculpatory proof.
On July 12, 1992, respondent James Egelhoff was camping in the Yaak region of northwestern Montana with Roberta Pavola and John Christenson to pick mushrooms. The three sold the mushrooms they had collected and spent the rest of the day and evening drinking in bars and at a private party in Troy, Montana. After leaving the party after 9 p.m. in Christenson's 1974 Ford Galaxy station wagon, the drinking continued, as Egelhoff was seen buying beer at 9:20 p.m. and recalled passing a bottle of Black Velvet with Christenson. Around midnight, officers of the Lincoln County sheriff's department discovered the station wagon stuck in a ditch along U.S. Highway 2. Pavola and Christenson were in the front seat, each dead from a single gunshot to the head. Egelhoff lay in the rear of the car, alive and yelling obscenities, with a blood-alcohol content of .36 percent measured over an hour later. His .38-caliber handgun lay on the floor near the brake pedal with four loaded rounds and two empty casings, and he had gunshot residue on his hands. Egelhoff was charged with two counts of deliberate homicide under Montana law requiring that he purposely or knowingly caused the deaths of another human being. At trial he claimed an unidentified fourth person must have committed the murders, that his extreme intoxication rendered him physically incapable of committing them, and that it accounted for his inability to recall the events. The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2-203 that it could not consider respondent's intoxicated condition in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense. The jury found Egelhoff guilty on both counts and the court sentenced him to 84 years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the convictions. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseEdith Eberhardt is charged with possessing a firearm after a prior conviction. The prosecution relies on a statutory presumption that possession proves interstate shipment. Eberhardt offers testimony that the gun was purchased locally. The court must allow the rebuttal evidence because it directly negates the presumed element.
In March 1973, three adult male respondents and a sixteen-year-old girl were traveling in a Chevrolet on the New York State Thruway when the car was stopped for speeding. Police observed two loaded handguns weighing approximately six pounds in an open handbag on the front floor or seat beside the girl, who admitted the bag belonged to her. A machinegun and heroin were discovered in the trunk after it was pried open. The four were tried together in Ulster County Court for possession of the handguns and trunk items. The trial judge instructed the jury regarding the statutory presumption that the presence of firearms in the automobile constituted evidence of possession by all occupants. The jury found the three adult males guilty of handgun possession but acquitted everyone of the trunk charges. The convictions were affirmed by the Appellate Division without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed. The respondents sought federal habeas corpus relief in the Southern District of New York. The district court granted the writ on the ground that the presumption could not support the convictions on these facts. The Second Circuit affirmed the grant of the writ, though on the basis that the statute was unconstitutional on its face. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the procedural and substantive issues raised by the lower federal courts' decisions.
View caseElise Everly faces preliminary hearing on felony charges. The court closes the proceeding to the public. A news organization objects because the hearing is the only forum in which Everly can present exculpatory evidence and challenge the prosecution case. The closure order is reversed to protect the right of public observation.
On December 23, 1981, the State of California filed a complaint in the Riverside County Municipal Court charging Robert Diaz with 12 counts of murder and seeking the death penalty. The complaint alleged that Diaz, a nurse, murdered 12 patients by administering massive doses of the heart drug lidocaine. The preliminary hearing on the complaint commenced on July 6, 1982. Diaz moved to exclude the public from the proceedings under Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 868 (West 1985). The Magistrate granted the unopposed motion, finding that closure was necessary because the case had attracted national publicity and "only one side may get reported in the media." The preliminary hearing continued for 41 days. Most of the testimony and the evidence presented by the State was medical and scientific; the remainder consisted of testimony by personnel who worked with Diaz on the shifts when the 12 patients died. Diaz did not introduce any evidence, but his counsel subjected most of the witnesses to vigorous cross-examination. Diaz was held to answer on all charges. At the conclusion of the hearing, petitioner Press-Enterprise Company asked that the transcript of the proceedings be released. The Magistrate refused and sealed the record. On January 21, 1983, the State moved in Superior Court to have the transcript of the preliminary hearing released to the public; petitioner later joined in support of the motion. Diaz opposed the motion, contending that release of the transcript would result in prejudicial pretrial publicity. The Superior Court found that the information in the transcript was "as factual as it could be," and that the facts were neither "inflammatory" nor "exciting." It concluded that there was nonetheless "a reasonable likelihood that release of all or any part of the transcripts might prejudice defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial." Petitioner then filed a peremptory writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal. That court originally denied the writ but, after being so ordered by the California Supreme Court, set the matter for a hearing. Meanwhile, Diaz waived his right to a jury trial and the Superior Court released the transcript. After holding that the controversy was not moot, the Court of Appeal denied the writ of mandate. The California Supreme Court thereafter denied petitioner's peremptory writ of mandate. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseNo. The constitutional obligation arises even without a request because due process requires disclosure of favorable material evidence regardless of whether the defense asks for it.
Evidence is material when there is a reasonable probability that its disclosure would have produced a different result at trial or in plea negotiations.
No. There is no general constitutional duty to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, and a federal court may not dismiss an indictment solely for that reason.
No. The obligation applies to trial proceedings. A convicted defendant has no freestanding federal due process right to post-conviction disclosure of exculpatory evidence such as DNA testing.
…to introduce crucial, relevant evidence: " In the absence of any valid state justification, exclusion of this kind of exculpatory evidence deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor's case encounter and survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing." 476 U. S., at 690-691 (emphasis added) (internal…