Also known as: ex-facie · on its face
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A Latin phrase indicating that a matter appears directly from the face of a document or instrument itself without extrinsic inquiry. Courts and statutes use the phrase to describe defects, validity, or meaning that are evident on inspection of the writing alone.
Esther Eisenberg filed a complaint alleging an antitrust conspiracy among telecom carriers. The document recited parallel pricing but supplied no facts showing an agreement. The court examined the complaint on its face and dismissed it because the allegations did not cross the line from possible to plausible.
Ezra Eastman received a circular from Evergreen Bank listing interest rates for certificates of deposit. He attempted to accept the listed rates as an offer. The bank refused, explaining that the circular on its face was mere publicity and not an offer.
Esmé Ellington received a certificate from Echelon Security stating only the number of shares. The certificate on its face omitted the required minimum statements. The corporation later refused to recognize the certificate as properly issued.
Emanuel Escobar presented a document labeled money order drawn on a bank and payable on demand. Although described differently on its face, the instrument met the statutory definition of a check. The bank therefore treated it as a negotiable instrument.
Edgar Evers executed a document reciting that it was his last will and left property to a friend. Extrinsic evidence showed the document was created only to induce the friend to cohabit. The court held that the instrument on its face raised only a rebuttable presumption of testamentary intent.
Erika Echevarria challenged a zoning ordinance that on its face imposed different burdens on housing developments serving certain protected classes. The court examined the text alone and found the classification unconstitutional without requiring proof of discriminatory application.
In 1971 Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation applied to the Village of Arlington Heights, Illinois, for rezoning of a 15-acre parcel from single-family to multiple-family classification. Using federal financial assistance under section 236 of the National Housing Act, MHDC planned to build 190 clustered townhouse units for low- and moderate-income tenants. The Village denied the rezoning request. MHDC, joined by other plaintiffs, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging that the denial was racially discriminatory and violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago located about 26 miles northwest of the downtown Loop. Most land in the Village is zoned for detached single-family homes. The Clerics of St. Viator own an 80-acre parcel just east of the center of Arlington Heights that includes a high school, a novitiate building, and vacant land. Since 1959 all land surrounding the Viatorian property has been zoned R-3 for single-family use with relatively small minimum lot-size requirements. In 1970 MHDC entered into a 99-year lease and accompanying agreement of sale covering a 15-acre site in the southeast corner of the Viatorian property. The agreement set a bargain purchase price of $300,000 with the sale contingent upon securing zoning clearances and section 236 housing assistance. MHDC's plans for the Lincoln Green project called for 20 two-story buildings containing 190 units with a mix of one-, two-, three-, and four-bedroom configurations and a large portion of the site left open. The development did not conform to the Village zoning ordinance and required rezoning to the R-5 multiple-family classification. MHDC filed a petition for rezoning with the Village Plan Commission accompanied by supporting materials that included an affirmative marketing plan designed to assure racial integration. MHDC consulted with Village staff and incorporated every recommended change into the plans. During the spring of 1971 the Plan Commission considered the proposal at three public meetings that drew large crowds. Opponents focused on the zoning aspects. They argued that the area had always been single-family. They also argued that the buffer policy adopted in 1962 called for R-5 zoning primarily to serve as a buffer between single-family development and commercial or manufacturing districts. At the close of the third meeting the Plan Commission recommended denial. On September 28, 1971, the Village Board denied the rezoning by a 6-1 vote. In June 1972 MHDC and three Black individuals filed suit against the Village. A second nonprofit corporation and an individual of Mexican-American descent intervened. After a bench trial the District Court entered judgment for the Village in 1974. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed in 1975. The Supreme Court granted the Village's petition for certiorari in 1975.
View caseA document is invalid on its face when the defect appears directly from its text or form without any need for outside evidence. Courts may refuse to enforce the document once that facial defect is identified.
The phrase signals that the relevant fact or defect is visible from the writing itself. When a matter is not apparent on the face, parties must introduce outside evidence to prove it.
Yes. Under the plausibility standard a court looks at the factual allegations appearing on the face of the complaint and determines whether they state a claim that is plausible rather than merely possible.
Yes. Corporate statutes require certain information to appear on the face of each share certificate. Failure to include the mandated statements renders the certificate defective on its face.
…Koota , 389 U. S. 241, 252-255 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister , 380 U. S. 479 (1965). We are not dealing with a statute that, on its face, appears to abridge free expression, an area of particular concern under Dombrowski and refined in Younger v. Harris , 401 U. S., at 50. We find it unnecessary to decide whether the…