Also known as: equitable remedies · equitable relief
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A nonmonetary judicial remedy such as an injunction or specific performance granted when monetary damages cannot adequately redress the injury. The remedy operates by compelling or forbidding conduct to prevent irreparable harm or to enforce obligations where substitutionary relief falls short.
Edward Everett, a director of Everest Holdings, learns of a valuable real-estate parcel and immediately presents the opportunity to the board. Qualified directors disclaim the corporation's interest following the required procedures. A shareholder later sues claiming the director usurped a corporate opportunity. Because the disclosure and disclaimer occurred before any obligation arose, the court refuses to entertain any claim for equitable relief.
Eugene Ellsworth pays off the entire mortgage on property owned by Esme Ellington after the primary lender refuses further forbearance. A junior lienholder exists on the same parcel. The court imposes subrogation by operation of law, transferring the senior mortgage to Ellsworth so that he may enforce it against the property and avoid an unearned windfall to the junior interest.
Elliot Edmonds, a citizen of State A, sues a State B corporation in federal court under diversity jurisdiction seeking rescission of a contract for fraud. State A law would permit rescission, but the federal court must still determine whether the requested relief falls within the traditional scope of equity historically administered by the English Court of Chancery.
In May 1930 the Van Sweringen Corporation issued $30,000,000 in notes under an indenture naming Guaranty Trust Co. of New York as trustee with power to enforce noteholders' rights. In October 1930 Guaranty and other banks advanced large sums to companies affiliated with the Corporation and controlled by the Van Sweringens. When the Corporation could not meet its obligations, Guaranty participated in an exchange plan under which noteholders could surrender their notes for cash equal to 50 percent of face value plus twenty shares of Van Sweringen stock per $1,000 note; the offer remained open until December 15, 1931. In 1934 respondent York received $6,000 of the notes as a gift from a donor who had not accepted the exchange offer. In April 1940 three accepting noteholders filed the Hackner suit in federal court charging Guaranty with fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the exchange. York's motion to intervene was denied, and summary judgment for Guaranty was affirmed on appeal. On January 22, 1942, after her exclusion from the Hackner litigation, York filed the present class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of non-accepting noteholders. The complaint, resting exclusively on diversity of citizenship, alleged that Guaranty had breached its trust by failing to protect noteholders' interests when it assented to the exchange offer and by failing to disclose its own self-interest. The district court granted Guaranty's motion for summary judgment on the authority of the Hackner decision. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a federal court sitting in equity is not required to apply the New York statute of limitations that would govern an identical suit in the New York state courts. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseEdgar Evers alleges that federal agents violated his Fourth Amendment rights during a warrantless search. He seeks damages and an injunction barring further surveillance. The court recognizes an implied cause of action for damages while noting that equitable relief remains available under traditional equity principles to prevent ongoing violations.
On the morning of November 26, 1965, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics entered Webster Bivens's apartment in the Bronx. The agents broke open the door, handcuffed Bivens in front of his wife and young children, and thoroughly searched the apartment. They then transported Bivens to the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search. Several days later Bivens was released on his own recognizance, and he was never indicted or prosecuted for any offense. Bivens filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the six agents in their individual capacities. His complaint sought fifteen thousand dollars in damages from each agent and alleged that the arrest and search were effected without a warrant, that unreasonable force was employed, and that the arrest was made without probable cause. Bivens claimed to have suffered great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering as a result of the agents' conduct. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the judgment.
View caseEmpire Logistics owns land zoned for industrial use. The village enacts a new ordinance restricting the property to residential development, sharply reducing its market value. Empire seeks an injunction against enforcement of the ordinance on the ground that the restriction constitutes a present and irreparable injury even before any specific application occurs.
The Village of Euclid is an Ohio municipal corporation that adjoins and is practically a suburb of the City of Cleveland. Its estimated population is between 5,000 and 10,000, and its area spans from twelve to fourteen square miles, with the greater part consisting of farm lands or unimproved acreage. It lies roughly in the form of a parallelogram measuring approximately three and one-half miles each way and is traversed east and west by three principal highways and two railroads. Ambler Realty Co. owns a tract of land containing 68 acres situated in the westerly end of the village. This tract abuts on Euclid Avenue to the south and the Nickel Plate railroad to the north. Adjoining this tract on both the east and the west, restricted residential plats have been laid out upon which residences have been erected. On November 13, 1922, the Village Council adopted an ordinance establishing a comprehensive zoning plan. The ordinance divides the village into six use districts denominated U-1 to U-6, three height districts denominated H-1 to H-3, and four area districts denominated A-1 to A-4. Appellee's tract is classified as U-2 for the first 620 feet north of Euclid Avenue, U-3 for the next 130 feet, and U-6 for the remainder. Enforcement of the ordinance is entrusted to the inspector of buildings under rules and regulations of the board of zoning appeals. The board holds public meetings, keeps minutes of its proceedings, and possesses authority to interpret the ordinance in cases of practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship, while penalties are prescribed for violations. Ambler Realty Co. filed suit alleging that the tract has been held for years for sale and development for industrial uses for which it is especially adapted. The bill further alleged that unrestricted market value is about $10,000 per acre but limited to residential purposes the value does not exceed $2,500 per acre, that the first 200 feet back from Euclid Avenue has a value of $150 per front foot if unrestricted but not in excess of $50 per front foot if limited to residential uses, and that the ordinance confiscates and destroys a great part of its value while deterring prospective buyers. The bill sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the ordinance. The district court overruled a motion to dismiss on the ground that the suit was premature. The district court held the ordinance unconstitutional and void and enjoined its enforcement.
View caseEwan Eckhart leases an apartment from Elemental Properties. The unit lacks functioning heat and contains multiple housing-code violations. Eckhart withholds rent and sues for an order compelling the landlord to make repairs. The court grants injunctive relief because monetary damages would not adequately restore the tenant to the bargained-for habitable premises.
Several tenants rented apartments in Clifton Terrace, a three-building apartment complex in Northwest Washington, by separate written leases with First National Realty Corporation. On April 8, 1968, the landlord filed separate actions in the Landlord and Tenant Branch of the Court of General Sessions seeking possession on the ground that each tenant had defaulted in the payment of rent due for the month of April. The tenants admitted that they had not paid the landlord any rent for April but alleged numerous violations of the Housing Regulations as an equitable defense or claim by way of recoupment or set-off. The tenants offered to prove that there are approximately 1500 violations of the Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia in the building at Clifton Terrace, where the defendant resides, some affecting the premises of the defendant directly, others indirectly, and all tending to establish a course of conduct of violation of the Housing Regulations to the damage of defendants. They conceded at trial that this offer of proof reached only violations which had arisen since the term of the lease had commenced. The Court of General Sessions refused the offer of proof and entered judgment for the landlord. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the argument that the landlord was under a contractual duty to maintain the premises in compliance with the Housing Regulations. Because of the importance of the question presented, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the tenants' petitions for leave to appeal.
View caseA court grants an equitable remedy when monetary damages cannot adequately compensate the plaintiff because the subject matter is unique, a suitable substitute cannot be procured, or damages would be difficult to prove with reasonable certainty. The plaintiff must also show that the balance of equities favors the requested relief and that no public-policy bar exists.
No. A valid liquidated-damages clause does not preclude specific performance or an injunction if those remedies would otherwise be appropriate. The clause merely supplies an alternative measure of damages. It does not constitute an agreement to accept payment in lieu of performance.
Legal remedies consist of money damages. Equitable remedies consist of specific performance or injunctions and are available only when damages are inadequate and the balance of equities favors relief. Modern procedure merges the two systems, but the substantive prerequisites for equitable relief remain.
Yes. A right to an equitable remedy such as specific performance or an injunction is a claim under the Bankruptcy Code if the debtor's breach gives rise to a right to payment under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
…to consider the extent to which federal courts, in the exercise of the authority conferred upon them by Congress to administer equitable remedies, are bound to follow state statutes and decisions affecting those remedies.' The question thus carefully left open in Russell v. Todd is now before us. It arises under the following…