Also known as:election frauds · electoral fraud · voter fraud
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Illegal conduct committed in an election, usually in the form of fraudulent voting. Examples include voting twice, voting under another person's name, and voting while ineligible.
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Common Examples
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Photo ID Requirement at Polls
Eva Espinosa arrives at her polling place without a government-issued photo ID. Election officials turn her away even though she is registered and eligible. The state enforces the rule uniformly to verify identity and block attempts at impersonation by ineligible persons.
Mail Ballot Scheme Prosecuted
Ethan Evans mails fictitious ballots in the names of deceased residents. Federal prosecutors charge him with using the mails to carry out the scheme. The conduct constitutes election fraud accomplished through the postal system.
McNally v. United States483 U.S. 350, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987)
In the 1970s petitioners James E. Gray, a former Kentucky public official, and Charles J. McNally, a private individual, along with Howard P. "Sonny" Hunt, participated in arrangements involving the Commonwealth's insurance contracts. After Democrat Julian Carroll was elected Governor in 1974, Hunt became chairman of the state Democratic Party and obtained de facto control over selecting the insurance agencies from which Kentucky would purchase its policies. In 1975 the Wombwell Insurance Company agreed with Hunt that, in exchange for continuing as the Commonwealth's agent for a workmen's compensation policy, it would share commissions exceeding $50,000 a year with other agencies designated by Hunt. Between 1975 and 1979 Wombwell funneled $851,000 in commissions to 21 agencies specified by Hunt, including Seton Investments, Inc., a company controlled by Hunt and Gray and nominally owned and operated by McNally, which received approximately $200,000.
Gray served as Secretary of Public Protection and Regulation from 1976 to 1978 and as Secretary of the Governor's Cabinet from 1977 to 1979. Prior to his 1976 appointment, Hunt and Gray had established Seton for the purpose of receiving the commission payments, which were used to benefit Gray and Hunt. Pursuant to Hunt's direction, Wombwell also made payments through the Snodgrass Insurance Agency that ultimately went to McNally. Hunt later pleaded guilty to mail and tax fraud charges and received a three-year prison sentence.
Petitioners were charged with one count of conspiracy and seven counts of mail fraud; six of the mail fraud counts were dismissed before trial. The remaining mail fraud count was based on the mailing of a commission check to Wombwell by the insurance company that had secured coverage for the State. It alleged that petitioners had devised a scheme to defraud the citizens and government of Kentucky of their right to have the Commonwealth's affairs conducted honestly. The count also charged that petitioners sought to obtain money and other things of value by means of false pretenses and the concealment of material facts. The conspiracy count alleged that petitioners had conspired to violate the mail fraud statute through that scheme. It further alleged that they had conspired to defraud the United States by obstructing the collection of federal taxes.
After trial in the District Court the jury convicted petitioners on both the mail fraud and conspiracy counts, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions in 1986. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1986.
Elise Everly stands inside the 100-foot zone around a polling place and urges voters to support a particular candidate. Officials remove her under a statute aimed at preventing intimidation and fraudulent voting. The restriction applies evenly to all campaign activity in that limited area.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota505 U.S. 377 (1992)
In the predawn hours of June 21, 1990, petitioner R.A.V., then a juvenile, and several other teenagers assembled a crudely made cross by taping together broken chair legs and burned the cross inside the fenced yard of a black family that lived across the street from the house where R.A.V. was staying. Although this conduct could have been punished under several Minnesota statutes carrying significant penalties, the City of St. Paul chose to charge R.A.V. under the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance.
The ordinance provides that whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including but not limited to a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
R.A.V. moved to dismiss the charge on the ground that the ordinance was substantially overbroad and impermissibly content-based and therefore facially invalid under the First Amendment, and the trial court granted the motion. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, construing the ordinance to reach only fighting words and concluding that it was not impermissibly content-based. This Court granted certiorari.
Eric Espinoza protests near an abortion clinic but remains outside the buffer zone. Police do not move him because the zone rule targets only polling places to curb voter intimidation and election fraud. The distinction rests on the unique need for order at election sites.
McCullen v. Coakley573 U.S. 464 (2014)
In 2000 the Massachusetts Legislature enacted the Reproductive Health Care Facilities Act to address clashes between abortion opponents and advocates outside clinics where abortions were performed.
The original statute created an 18-foot radius around facility entrances and driveways. Within that area no person could knowingly approach within six feet of another without consent for the purpose of leafleting, displaying a sign, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling.
By 2007 the legislature amended the Act. Hearings featured testimony from Attorney General Martha Coakley and Captain William Evans of the Boston Police Department. They stated that the six-foot no-approach zones were unenforceable because of crowding and difficulty determining consent.
The 2007 version replaced the floating zones with fixed 35-foot buffer zones. Individuals are categorically excluded from these zones during business hours. The statute retained exemptions for persons entering or leaving the facility, employees or agents acting within the scope of their employment, law enforcement and municipal agents, and persons merely passing through.
Petitioners Eleanor McCullen, Jean Zarrella, Gregory Smith, Eric Cadin, Cyril Shea, Mark Bashour, and Jane Doe engage in sidewalk counseling at Planned Parenthood clinics in Boston, Worcester, and Springfield. They initiate conversations by offering literature and information about alternatives to abortion while maintaining a calm demeanor and direct eye contact. The buffer zones displaced them from positions near clinic entrances and driveways.
In January 2008 petitioners filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Attorney General Coakley and other Commonwealth officials. They alleged that the Act violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments both facially and as applied. Petitioners testified that they have had many fewer conversations and distributed many fewer leaflets since the zones went into effect.
Ella Emerson distributes anonymous leaflets criticizing a candidate. State officials fine her under an election law requiring disclosure. The rule seeks to deter fraud by ensuring accountability for election-related communications.
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission514 U.S. 334 (1995)
In April 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets at a public meeting at Blendon Middle School in Westerville, Ohio, where the school superintendent planned to discuss a proposed tax levy. The leaflets, which she composed on her home computer and had printed professionally, expressed opposition to the levy and were signed in some versions by "CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS" rather than her name. She handed out additional leaflets at another meeting the following evening, with assistance from her son and a friend in placing some on car windshields.
The proposed levy was defeated in the initial two elections but passed in November 1988. Five months later, a school district official who supported the tax filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission alleging that McIntyre's distribution of unsigned leaflets violated Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3599.09(A).
The Commission imposed a $100 fine on McIntyre. The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas reversed the fine, finding that McIntyre did not mislead the public. The Ohio Court of Appeals reinstated the fine. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed by a divided vote, upholding the statute.
McIntyre passed away during the pendency of the litigation. Her executor pursued the claim to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.
Eugene Ellsworth challenges the manual recount of ballots in a presidential election. The Court halts the process because differing standards across counties risk unequal treatment and potential fraud. Uniform rules are required to protect the integrity of the vote count.
Bush v. Gore531 U.S. 98 (2000)
On November 8, 2000, the day following the Presidential election, the Florida Division of Elections reported that petitioner Bush had received 2,909,135 votes and respondent Gore had received 2,907,351 votes, a margin of 1,784 for Governor Bush.
Because Governor Bush's margin of victory was less than one-half of one percent of the votes cast, an automatic machine recount was conducted under section 102.141(4) of the Florida Election Code. This recount resulted in a substantially smaller margin of victory for Bush.
Respondent Gore then sought manual recounts in four counties: Volusia, Palm Beach, Broward, and Miami-Dade. The Florida Supreme Court enjoined certification until November 17, later directed inclusion of completed manual-recount results from Volusia and Palm Beach, and ordered Miami-Dade to finish its recount by November 22. On November 21 the court set a November 26 deadline for all manual recounts and for certification by the Secretary of State. On November 26 the Secretary certified Bush the winner by 537 votes.
Gore filed a contest action in Leon County Circuit Court under section 102.168 alleging rejection of a sufficient number of legal votes to place the outcome in doubt. The circuit court denied relief. The Florida Supreme Court reversed in part on December 8, 2000, ordering a manual recount of all undervotes statewide under a clear-indication-of-voter-intent standard and directing inclusion of 215 net votes from Palm Beach County and 168 net votes from Miami-Dade County. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on December 9 after staying the Florida Supreme Court's order and heard argument on December 11. The dispute involved roughly 45,000 undervote ballots that machines had not tabulated plus partial manual counts already performed in three counties.
Does a state photo ID requirement for in-person voting violate the right to vote?
A state may require in-person voters to present a government-issued photo ID because the evenhanded rule is justified by weighty interests in deterring voter fraud and preserving public confidence in elections without unduly burdening the right to vote.
Supporting sources
What conduct qualifies as election fraud under standard definitions?
Election fraud covers illegal acts in an election, most commonly fraudulent voting such as casting multiple ballots, voting under a false name, or voting while ineligible.
Can states enact buffer zones near polling places to prevent election fraud?
Yes. A statute prohibiting campaign activity within 100 feet of a polling place is constitutional when necessary to serve the compelling interest in preventing voter intimidation and election fraud.
Supporting sources
Does a photo ID rule become unconstitutional if it affects mobile or low-income voters more than others?
No. The rule remains constitutional if it applies uniformly to all voters and serves important interests in election integrity, even when it imposes modest additional burdens on some groups.
Supporting sources
531 U.S. 98 (2000)
…true intent. But they look to state law, not to federal constitutional law, to protect that interest. Neither side claims electoral fraud, dishonesty, or the like. And the more fundamental equal protection claim might have been left to the state court to resolve if and when it was discovered to have mattered. It could still…
Constitutional LawIndividual rights · Other protections, including the privileges and immunities clauses, the contracts clause, unconstitutional conditions, bills of attainder, and ex post facto lawsUBEFoundational