514 U.S. 334 (1995)
In April 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets at a public meeting at Blendon Middle School in Westerville, Ohio, where the school superintendent planned to discuss a proposed tax levy.1 The leaflets, which she composed on her home computer and had printed professionally, expressed opposition to the levy and were signed in some versions by "CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS" rather than her name.2 She handed out additional leaflets at another meeting the following evening, with assistance from her son and a friend in placing some on car windshields.3
The proposed levy was defeated in the initial two elections but passed in November 1988.4 Five months later, a school district official who supported the tax filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission alleging that McIntyre's distribution of unsigned leaflets violated Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3599.09(A).5
The Commission imposed a $100 fine on McIntyre.6 The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas reversed the fine, finding that McIntyre did not mislead the public.7 The Ohio Court of Appeals reinstated the fine.8 The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed by a divided vote, upholding the statute.9
McIntyre passed away during the pendency of the litigation.10 Her executor pursued the claim to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.11
Whether an Ohio statute that prohibits the distribution of anonymous campaign literature is valid under the First Amendment?12
The First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, protects the right to speak anonymously.13 A statute prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign literature is a content-based regulation of core political speech subject to exacting scrutiny.14 The statute survives only if narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests in preventing fraud and libel or informing the electorate.15
No. The Ohio statute directly regulates the content of speech by conditioning the distribution of campaign literature on disclosure of the author's name and address.16
Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets at public meetings at Blendon Middle School opposing a proposed school tax levy.17 The leaflets, composed on her home computer and printed professionally, bore the signature of "CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS" rather than her own name in some versions.18 No evidence indicated that the leaflets were false, misleading, or libelous.19
The state's asserted interests in preventing fraud and libel and in providing voters with information about the source of messages do not justify the broad prohibition.20 Ohio already enforces separate election laws prohibiting false statements, and the statute applies even to completely accurate speech distributed months before an election.21
Because the statute is not narrowly tailored and burdens core political speech on a public issue, it fails exacting scrutiny.22
The Ohio statute violates the First Amendment.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Ginsburg joined the Court's opinion in full.24 She wrote separately to emphasize that the decision does not preclude states from enacting reasonable disclosure requirements for campaign contributions and expenditures.25 Those requirements serve important informational interests and are subject to a less demanding standard of review under precedents such as Buckley v. Valeo.26
The statute at issue here, however, is a flat ban on anonymous speech that cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.27 She noted that Margaret McIntyre's case resembles other decisions protecting individual leafleteers who spoke their mind within their local community without always disclosing their names.28 The Court appropriately left open the possibility that a state's interest in protecting an election process might justify a more limited identification requirement in larger circumstances.29
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
Justice Scalia dissented from the invalidation of a statute that has existed in Ohio for many years and that is similar to laws in many other states.30 He argued that the statute serves the important interest of informing voters about the source of campaign messages.31 It does not prohibit speech but merely requires that the speaker be identified, representing a reasonable regulation of the electoral process.32
Scalia contended that reliance on Talley v. California was misplaced.33 That case involved a complete ban on anonymous handbills that applied to all speech, not just campaign-related speech.34 The Ohio statute is limited to speech intended to influence elections.35 It therefore serves a more compelling interest.36 He concluded that the decision would make it easier for those who wish to spread false or misleading information to do so without accountability, and he would have affirmed the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court.37
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in full.38 He agreed that the Ohio statute is a reasonable regulation that does not violate the First Amendment.39 Rehnquist thereby expressed his view that the law serves the important interest of informing voters about the source of campaign messages without prohibiting speech.
The requirement merely identifies the speaker and constitutes a reasonable regulation of the electoral process.
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment that the Ohio election law is inconsistent with the First Amendment but urged a different methodology grounded in the original understanding of the First Amendment.40 He examined historical evidence from the founding era, including the widespread practice of anonymous political pamphlets during the ratification of the Constitution and early elections.41 Thomas concluded that the Framers understood the freedom of the press to protect an author's right to publish political views anonymously.42
He reviewed examples such as the Federalist Papers published under the pseudonym Publius, the Zenger trial, and debates over anonymous writings during the ratification period.43 Thomas determined that both Anti-Federalists and Federalists believed the freedom of the press included the right to publish without revealing the author's name.44 He concurred only in the judgment because the majority adopted an analysis largely unconnected to the Constitution's text and history.45