Also known as: effective controls · effectively control · effectively controls · effectively controlling · de facto control
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
Regulatory authority exercised by one state that reaches beyond its borders to dictate prices or conduct occurring in another state.
The material ability of a superior to prevent or punish criminal acts committed by subordinates.
Regulatory authority exercised by one state that reaches beyond its borders to dictate prices or conduct occurring in another state.
Empire Logistics, a beer distributor headquartered in State B, ships product into State A. State A requires every out-of-state seller to file an affidavit swearing that its in-state prices are no higher than prices charged anywhere else. Empire Logistics refuses to file the affidavit and is barred from selling in State A. The requirement is struck down because it gives State A effective control over pricing decisions made entirely within State B.
The material ability of a superior to prevent or punish criminal acts committed by subordinates.
Eric Espinoza, a battalion commander, learns that troops under his formal authority are committing atrocities. Evidence shows he retained the material ability to issue orders and discipline offenders. The tribunal holds him liable because he possessed effective control yet failed to exercise it.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Echelon Security applies for a certificate to operate an ice plant in State A. State A denies the application under a statute that limits entry to protect an existing monopolist. The denial is upheld because the statute keeps the monopoly under effective control by giving a commission power to terminate it whenever public interest requires.
In 1925 the Oklahoma legislature passed Chapter 147 of the Session Laws. That statute declared the manufacture, sale, and distribution of ice a public business. It prohibited any person from engaging in that business without first obtaining a license from the Corporation Commission. The statute directed that a license would issue only after a formal hearing at which competent evidence established the necessity for additional ice facilities at the proposed location. It authorized the Commission to deny an application if existing licensed plants already provided sufficient capacity to meet public needs. New State Ice Company secured such a license and for several years operated an ice manufacturing and distribution business in Oklahoma City in which it had invested $500,000. While New State Ice Company was operating under its license, E.A. Liebmann purchased a parcel of land in Oklahoma City and began construction of an ice plant without applying for or obtaining a license from the Commission. Liebmann acted with the purpose of entering the business in direct competition with the licensed company. New State Ice Company filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma seeking an injunction to prevent Liebmann from manufacturing, selling, or distributing ice without a license. The district court dismissed the bill of complaint for want of equity. It concluded that the ice business is a private enterprise not subject to the statutory restrictions. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. The case arrived in the Supreme Court on appeal from the circuit court decree. The record before the Court included evidence of the structure of the ice industry in Oklahoma, the extent of competition or monopoly in communities across the state, the Commission's prior exercise of regulatory authority over ice plants under earlier statutes dating to 1908, and the practical effects of the 1925 licensing requirement on service and pricing in the state.
View caseEdith Eberhardt grows marijuana solely for personal medical use inside State A. Federal agents seize the plants under a nationwide controlled-substance statute. The seizure is sustained because Congress determined that federal control of intrastate cultivation is essential to effective control of the interstate market.
In 1996 California voters enacted the Compassionate Use Act authorizing limited marijuana use for medicinal purposes by seriously ill state residents upon a physician’s recommendation or approval. Angel Raich and Diane Monson, California residents suffering from serious medical conditions, began using marijuana after their licensed physicians determined that conventional medicines failed to provide relief and that marijuana was the only effective treatment available. Raich, unable to cultivate her own supply, relies on two caregivers who grow and provide locally grown marijuana at no charge, which she then processes into oils, balms, and foods. Monson cultivates her own marijuana plants and ingests the drug by smoking or vaporization. On August 15, 2002, county deputy sheriffs and federal Drug Enforcement Administration agents arrived at Monson’s home. County officials concluded after investigation that Monson’s use complied with California law, but after a three-hour standoff the federal agents seized and destroyed all six of her cannabis plants. Raich and Monson filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against the Attorney General of the United States and the Administrator of the DEA. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief barring enforcement of the federal Controlled Substances Act to the extent it prevented them from possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing cannabis for personal medical use, and they submitted affidavits describing their medical conditions, failed conventional treatments, and physicians’ recommendations. The district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and ordered the district court to enter the injunction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseElla Emerson lives with her adult son in a city-owned apartment. City officials seek to evict the son for misconduct. The court examines whether the city retained effective control over household conduct occurring inside State A before deciding whether eviction can proceed against her.
In early 1973, Mrs. Inez Moore received a notice of violation from the city of East Cleveland. The notice stated that her grandson John Moore, Jr., was an illegal occupant of her home. It directed her to comply with the housing ordinance. Mrs. Moore lived in her East Cleveland home together with her son Dale Moore, Sr., and her two grandsons Dale Moore, Jr., and John Moore, Jr. John came to live with her after his mother's death when he was less than one year old. When she failed to remove John from the home, the city filed a criminal charge against her. Mrs. Moore moved to dismiss the charge. She claimed that the ordinance was constitutionally invalid on its face. Her motion was overruled. Upon conviction she was sentenced to five days in jail and a $25 fine. The East Cleveland ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. The ordinance defined family to include only a husband or wife of the nominal head of the household, unmarried children of the head or spouse provided they have no children residing with them, a parent of the head or spouse, or not more than one dependent child of the head or spouse along with that child's spouse and dependent children. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction after giving full consideration to her constitutional claims. The Ohio Supreme Court denied review of the case. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of her appeal.
View caseEvelyn Ellison, a state attorney general, issues an interpretive rule threatening doctors who prescribe controlled substances for suicide. The rule is invalidated because the federal statute does not give the attorney general effective control over medical judgments traditionally left to the states.
In 1994 Oregon voters enacted the Oregon Death With Dignity Act. The Act exempts state-licensed physicians from civil or criminal liability when they dispense or prescribe a lethal dose of drugs to a terminally ill patient. Eligibility requires a diagnosis of an incurable and irreversible disease expected to cause death within six months. The patient must make a voluntary and informed request and obtain confirmation from a consulting physician. The statute requires attending physicians to determine competency. They must provide information about palliative alternatives. They must refer patients for counseling if depression or psychological disorder impairs judgment. Physicians must maintain detailed medical records that the Oregon Department of Human Services reviews. In 2004 thirty-seven patients ended their lives by ingesting medication prescribed under the Act. The Controlled Substances Act was enacted in 1970. It places substances in five schedules based on potential for abuse, accepted medical use, and safety under medical supervision. Schedule II substances require a written nonrefillable prescription from a registered physician. A 1971 regulation requires every prescription to be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by a practitioner acting in the usual course of professional practice. Physicians must obtain registration from the Attorney General. The Attorney General may deny suspend or revoke registration when inconsistent with the public interest. The Attorney General must consider five statutory factors including state recommendations and compliance with state and federal law. In 1997 members of Congress asked the DEA to prosecute or revoke the registrations of Oregon physicians who assisted suicide. Attorney General Janet Reno concluded that the CSA did not authorize the DEA to displace state regulation of medical practice or override a state's determination of legitimate medical practice. Legislation granting explicit authority failed to pass. In February 2001 Oregon's Attorney General wrote to incoming Attorney General John Ashcroft requesting consultation if the Department revisited the issue. An adviser replied that no review was pending. On November 9 2001 without consulting Oregon officials Attorney General Ashcroft issued an Interpretive Rule. The Rule declared that assisting suicide is not a legitimate medical purpose under 21 CFR §1306.04. It stated that prescribing dispensing or administering controlled substances for that purpose violates the CSA and may render a physician's registration inconsistent with the public interest. The Rule applies regardless of state-law authorization. Every prescription filled under the Oregon Act uses Schedule II substances. Revocation of DEA registration would bar a physician from prescribing them. The State of Oregon joined by a physician a pharmacist and terminally ill patients sued in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The district court entered a permanent injunction against enforcement of the Interpretive Rule. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit invalidated the Rule. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View case2 common questions
In commerce clause cases the phrase describes a state statute whose practical operation reaches across state lines to control conduct occurring entirely elsewhere. In criminal law the phrase measures a superior's real-world capacity to stop or discipline subordinates.
The statute is invalid under the commerce clause even if the Twenty-First Amendment is invoked. The law is treated as an impermissible extraterritorial regulation and cannot be enforced.
On the evening of June 4, 1968, five white United States Marine Lieutenants in formal dress uniforms and a woman named Barbara Kelly entered a hamburger shop in Washington, D.C., around 2:40 a.m. after a night out. They ordered food at the take-out counter and noticed three Black men—appellants Alexander and Murdock and Cornelius Frazier—sitting at the other end of the counter. According to prosecution witnesses, a staring contest between Lieutenant Kramer and Alexander led to Alexander tapping Kramer on the shoulder, asking him to step outside, and making a threat. After a racial epithet from Lieutenant King, Alexander drew a .38 caliber revolver. Murdock then reentered and drew his own revolver, after which shots were fired, killing Lieutenants King and Lesnick and wounding Kramer and Kelly. Alexander, Murdock, and Frazier fled in Alexander's car, with Murdock firing additional shots from the window. They were stopped by police within a few blocks, and two revolvers were recovered from the car floorboard. Defense witnesses Frazier and Murdock testified that the Marines were drunk and aggressive, and Murdock claimed he fired in self-defense fearing for his life. At a joint jury trial in February 1969, both were convicted of carrying a dangerous weapon and four counts of assault with a dangerous weapon; Murdock was also convicted of two counts of second-degree murder. Murdock's trial was bifurcated; after the guilt phase, a separate hearing on criminal responsibility was held in November 1969 before the same jury, which found him criminally responsible. Alexander received consecutive sentences totaling five to twenty-three years, and Murdock twenty years to life. Both appealed their convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which heard argument on December 21, 1970, and issued its decision on April 21, 1972.
View case2 common questions
Effective control turns on the material ability to prevent or punish misconduct rather than on official title or appointment. A superior who holds only paper authority but lacks real power to intervene cannot be held responsible under the doctrine.
No. De jure authority is relevant but insufficient by itself. The prosecution must still prove that the defendant possessed the actual power to prevent or punish the crimes at issue.
…intrastate. “(6) Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic.” 21 U. S. C. §§801(1)–(6). : See United States v. Moore , 423 U. S. 122, 135 (1975); see also H. R. Rep., at 22. : H. R.…