Also known as: durational residency requirement · residency requirements
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A state law that conditions eligibility for a government benefit or privilege on the applicant having resided in the jurisdiction for a specified minimum period. Such requirements create two classes of residents and are subject to strict scrutiny when they penalize the exercise of the right to interstate travel.
Deborah Dunn moved from one state to another for work and applied for general relief cash assistance two months later. State officials denied her application solely because she had not yet lived in the state for a full year. The denial forced Deborah to choose between forgoing needed subsistence support or returning to her prior state.
Darrell Duncan passed the bar exam after moving from another state but was told he must wait one year before admission. Officials cited concerns that out-of-state lawyers might not stay current with local rules. The waiting period prevented Darrell from practicing law immediately despite meeting all other qualifications.
Dylan Duffy sought admission by reciprocity after relocating and satisfying every substantive requirement except the state's six-month residency rule. The board rejected his application on the ground that recent arrivals might not contribute to local pro bono work. Dylan remained unable to practice while longer-term residents faced no such delay.
Denise Donovan moved to a new state and sought to run for Congress after living there only eight months. State law required candidates to have resided in the district for one year before the election. The rule blocked Denise from appearing on the ballot despite her current residency and intent to remain.
In November 1992 the voters of Arkansas approved Amendment 73 to their state constitution. The amendment's preamble declared that long-term incumbency had reduced voter participation and made elections less competitive and less representative. Section 3 barred any person elected to three or more terms in the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas from appearing on the ballot for that office. It imposed a parallel bar on any person elected to two or more terms in the United States Senate from Arkansas. The amendment was self-executing and applied to all persons seeking election after January 1, 1993. On November 13, 1992, respondent Bobbie Hill, on behalf of herself and similarly situated Arkansas citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters, together with the League of Women Voters of Arkansas, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Pulaski County seeking a declaratory judgment that section 3 was unconstitutional and void. The complaint named then-Governor Clinton, other state officers, the Republican Party of Arkansas, and the Democratic Party of Arkansas as defendants. The State of Arkansas, through its Attorney General, intervened as a party defendant in support of the amendment. Several proponents of the amendment, including petitioner U. S. Term Limits, Inc., also intervened. On cross-motions for summary judgment the Circuit Court held that section 3 violated Article I of the Federal Constitution. In a 5-to-2 decision the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed that holding. The State and the intervenors petitioned for writs of certiorari. The Supreme Court of the United States granted both petitions and consolidated the cases for argument.
View caseDaphne Doyle moved to a new state with her children and filed for divorce after four months. The court dismissed the petition because state law imposed a one-year durational residency requirement for divorce actions. Daphne had to wait eight additional months before the court would hear her case.
Carol Sosna married Michael Sosna on September 5, 1964, in Michigan. They lived together in New York between October 1967 and August 1971, after which they separated but continued to reside there. In August 1972 Sosna moved to Iowa with her three children. The following month she petitioned the District Court of Jackson County, Iowa, for dissolution of her marriage. Michael Sosna was personally served when he visited Iowa and made a special appearance to contest jurisdiction. The Iowa court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction under Iowa Code § 598.6 because Sosna had not resided in the state for one year preceding the filing. Instead of appealing, Sosna filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on constitutional grounds. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. While the federal action was pending, the Iowa Supreme Court decided In re Marriage of Williams, 217 N.W.2d 202 (1974), and upheld the statute's constitutionality. The three-judge court upheld the residency requirement. This Court noted probable jurisdiction. During the appeal Sosna obtained a divorce in New York, though custody and support issues remained unresolved from the Iowa proceeding. She returned to Iowa to prosecute the appeal. Sosna sought class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to represent Iowa residents who had lived in the state less than one year and wished to initiate divorce actions but were barred by the residency requirement. The parties stipulated that numerous people were similarly situated, joinder was impracticable, her claims were representative, and she would adequately protect class interests. The district court approved the stipulation in a pretrial order.
View caseDeanna Davenport relocated to a new state and applied for cash assistance at the higher benefit level available to long-term residents. Officials granted her only the lower amount paid to new arrivals because she had lived in the state less than twelve months. The reduced payment left Deanna unable to cover basic living expenses during her first year.
California participates in the federal AFDC program under the Social Security Act. In 1992 California enacted section 11450.03 of its Welfare and Institutions Code. That statute limited the maximum AFDC benefits payable to any family that had resided in California for less than twelve months to the amount the family would have received in its state of prior residence. In one year the AFDC program served an average of 2,645,814 persons per month at an annual state cost of $2.9 billion. The full monthly grant for a family of two was $456, compared with $275 in Arizona. Three California residents who had recently moved from Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Colorado filed suit in the Eastern District of California. They alleged that their grants would be reduced from $641 or $504 to $190, $341, or $280 for the first year. The district court issued a temporary restraining order and later a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Anderson v. Green because the Secretary of Health and Human Services had not yet determined whether the statute complied with federal requirements. After the Secretary issued a waiver the case was dismissed. In 1996 Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. That statute replaced AFDC with TANF and expressly authorized states to apply the benefit rules of a family’s prior state for the first twelve months of residence. California then announced that enforcement of section 11450.03 would begin April 1, 1997. On that date two new plaintiffs, one who had moved from Oklahoma and one from the District of Columbia, filed the present action in the Eastern District of California. They acted on behalf of a certified class of all present and future TANF applicants who would be denied full California benefits because they had not resided in the state for twelve consecutive months. The district court again issued a temporary restraining order and, after hearing evidence, a preliminary injunction. The evidence showed that California’s benefits ranked sixth highest in absolute terms but eighteenth when housing costs were considered. New residents from forty-three states would face higher living costs. The statute would save the state approximately $10.9 million annually. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction without finally deciding the merits. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The All County Letter implementing the statute provided that even lifelong California residents who left the state for part of a year would have their benefits calculated under the law of the other state for that period. The lower benefit level applied regardless of whether the family had received welfare in the prior state or the motive for moving. Families arriving from another country were exempt. The district court noted that other programs such as homeless assistance and an extra food-stamp allowance partially offset the disparity. The state did not dispute that the statute created significant differences between newcomers and longer-term residents.
View caseThey trigger strict scrutiny when they penalize the fundamental right to travel by denying benefits or privileges to new residents that are available to longer-term residents. Courts apply this standard to welfare eligibility rules and similar classifications that create two classes of residents based solely on length of stay.
No. Protecting the state treasury or discouraging indigent migration is not a constitutionally permissible objective. Courts have rejected these rationales because they directly burden the right to interstate travel.
They are reviewed under the Privileges and Immunities Clause rather than equal protection alone. States must show a substantial justification for discriminating against nonresidents in the pursuit of a common calling such as law practice.
No. Requirements for divorce jurisdiction have been upheld when they serve interests such as ensuring the stability of decrees, while welfare and certain benefit rules have been struck down. The outcome depends on the nature of the benefit and the burden on the right to travel.
…did not seek to intervene or to file an amicus brief. Reasoning that PRWORA permitted, but did not require, States to impose durational residency requirements, Judge Levi concluded that the existence of the federal statute did not affect the legal analysis in his prior opinion in Green . He did, however, make certain additional comments on the…