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Patrice Seibert's twelve-year-old son Jonathan, who had cerebral palsy, died in his sleep. Fearing charges of neglect because of bedsores on his body, Seibert was present when two of her teenage sons and two of their friends devised a plan to burn the family's mobile home with Donald Rector, a mentally ill teenager living with the family, inside to conceal the circumstances of Jonathan's death. Seibert's son Darian and a friend set the fire, resulting in Donald's death. Five days later, police officers awakened Seibert at three o'clock in the morning at a hospital where Darian was being treated for burns. Officer Kevin Clinton arrested her without providing Miranda warnings, following instructions from Officer Richard Hanrahan. Seibert was taken to the police station, left alone in an interview room for fifteen to twenty minutes, and then questioned by Officer Hanrahan for thirty to forty minutes without Miranda warnings. During the unwarned questioning, Officer Hanrahan squeezed Seibert's arm and repeatedly stated that Donald was also to die in his sleep, eventually obtaining her admission that she knew Donald was meant to die in the fire. After a twenty-minute coffee and cigarette break, Officer Hanrahan turned on a tape recorder, administered the Miranda warnings, obtained a signed waiver, and resumed questioning by referencing the prior discussion and confronting Seibert with her prewarning statements. Seibert reaffirmed the details of the plan, including that Donald was supposed to die in his sleep. At the suppression hearing, Officer Hanrahan testified that he made a conscious decision to withhold Miranda warnings, question first, give the warnings, and then repeat the question until obtaining the answer previously given. He acknowledged that Seibert's ultimate statement was largely a repeat of information obtained prior to the warning. The trial court suppressed the prewarning statement but admitted the postwarning responses, leading to Seibert's conviction for second-degree murder by a jury. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split in the courts of appeals.

In 2001, three current or former female employees of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.—Betty Dukes, Christine Kwapnoski, and Edith Arana—filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of California alleging that the company had discriminated against them and other women in pay and promotions. Wal-Mart, the nation’s largest private employer with approximately 3,400 stores across the country and more than one million employees, delegated pay and promotion decisions to local store managers who exercised broad discretion in a largely subjective manner. The plaintiffs claimed that this discretion was exercised disproportionately in favor of men, resulting in lower pay and fewer promotions for female employees. They sought to represent a class of approximately 1.5 million current and former female employees who had worked at any Wal-Mart domestic retail store since December 26, 1998. To support their motion for class certification, the plaintiffs presented statistical evidence from experts Dr. Richard Drogin and Dr. Marc Bendick showing pay and promotion disparities between men and women, anecdotal evidence consisting of about 120 affidavits from female employees describing discriminatory experiences at only 235 of the company's 3,400 stores, and the testimony of sociologist Dr. William Bielby who analyzed Wal-Mart’s corporate culture. Betty Dukes began working at a Pittsburg, California store in 1994 as a cashier and was later promoted to customer service manager before being demoted; she alleged retaliation and that male greeters were paid more. Christine Kwapnoski worked at Sam’s Club stores and claimed a male manager yelled at female employees and told her to “doll up.” Edith Arana worked at a Duarte, California store from 1995 to 2001. She was denied opportunities for management training despite repeated requests. The District Court certified the class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), finding that the plaintiffs had presented significant evidence of a company-wide pattern of discrimination. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, substantially affirmed the certification order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether the class certification was consistent with Rule 23(a) and (b)(2).

In December 1948, Morissette went hunting on a large tract of land in Michigan that the Government had used as a practice bombing range for the Air Force. Spent bomb casings from the range had been dumped into heaps and left exposed to the weather for four years or more. Morissette collected three tons of the casings, flattened them at a nearby farm, and sold them for eighty-four dollars. Morissette worked as a fruit stand operator in the summer and as a trucker and scrap iron collector in the winter. He was an honorably discharged veteran of World War II who had a good reputation among his neighbors. He loaded the casings onto his truck and transported them in broad daylight without any effort to conceal what he was doing. When authorities began an investigation, Morissette voluntarily and candidly told them the whole story, explaining that he believed the casings were abandoned and that he had no intention of stealing them. He was indicted for unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly stealing and converting property of the United States valued at eighty-four dollars in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. At trial, the District Court refused to permit Morissette to show that he thought the property was abandoned or to argue that he lacked criminal intent. The court instructed the jury that if it believed the government testimony, Morissette was guilty, and the jury convicted him. The court sentenced him to two months in prison or a fine of two hundred dollars. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The United States brought this civil suit in April 1961 against Grinnell Corporation, American District Telegraph Co. (ADT), Holmes Electric Protective Co., and Automatic Fire Alarm Co. of Delaware (AFA). Grinnell held 76 percent of ADT's stock, 89 percent of AFA's stock, and 100 percent of Holmes's stock. ADT operated 121 central stations in 115 cities and provided both burglary and fire protection services. Holmes operated 12 stations in three cities offering only burglary protection. AFA operated three stations in three cities providing only fire protection. In 1961 these three companies accounted for more than 87 percent of the accredited central station service business in the United States, with ADT alone holding 73 percent. Over the years ADT acquired the stock or assets of 27 companies engaged in burglar or fire alarm services. Holmes acquired three such companies in New York City. Officials of seven of the acquired companies agreed not to engage in the protective service business in the area for periods ranging from five years to permanently. In 1906, prior to their affiliation with Grinnell, ADT and Holmes entered a written agreement allocating territories for their respective services and restricting competition between them. In 1907 Grinnell entered into a series of agreements with the other defendant companies and with Automatic Fire Protection Co. to the following effect. These agreements continued in substantial effect until 1954, after which the companies honored the territorial divisions through new contracts. Between 1955 and 1961 the defendants made offers to acquire at least eight additional central station companies, including four of the five largest nondefendant firms in the business. When the suit was filed each defendant had an outstanding offer to purchase one of the four largest nondefendant companies. ADT reduced its minimum basic rates to meet competition in some cities while renewing contracts at substantially increased rates in cities where it held a monopoly. It threatened retaliation against firms that contemplated entering the central station service business. The District Court held a trial beginning in June 1964 after pretrial conferences in which the parties invited the court to review documents and consider relief issues. All parties appealed from the District Court's judgment and decree. The United States appealed on the ground that the relief was inadequate. The defendants appealed on the merits, on the relief granted, and on the ground that the District Court denied them a fair trial before Judge Wyzanski. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction over the consolidated appeals.