335 U.S. 1 (1948)
The petitioner was a wholesaler of fruit and produce.1 On September 29, 1944, he was served with a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum issued by the Price Administrator under authority of the Emergency Price Control Act.2 The subpoena directed him to appear before designated enforcement attorneys of the Office of Price Administration and to produce all duplicate sales invoices, sales books, ledgers, inventory records, contracts and records relating to the sale of all commodities from September 1, 1944 to September 28, 1944.3
In compliance with the subpoena, the petitioner appeared and, after being sworn, was requested to turn over the subpoenaed records.4 Petitioner's counsel inquired whether the petitioner was being granted immunity as to any and all matters for information obtained as a result of the investigation and examination of these records.5 The presiding official stated that the witness is entitled to whatever immunity which flows as a matter of law from the production of these books and records which are required to be kept pursuant to MPRs 271 and 426.6 The petitioner thereupon produced the records but claimed constitutional privilege.7
The petitioner was tried on charges of having made tie-in sales in violation of regulations under the Emergency Price Control Act.8 A plea in bar claiming immunity from prosecution based on § 202(g) of the Act was overruled by the trial judge.9 The plea alleged that the name of the purchaser in the transactions involved in the information appeared in the subpoenaed sales invoices and other similar documents.10 The Office of Price Administration had used the name and other unspecified leads obtained from these documents to search out evidence of the violations which had occurred in the preceding year.11 Judgment of conviction followed and was affirmed on appeal by the Circuit Court of Appeals.12
A contrary conclusion was reached by the district judge in United States v. Hoffman.13 Because this conflict involves an important question of statutory construction, these cases were brought to the Supreme Court and heard together.14
Whether the immunity provision of § 202(g) of the Emergency Price Control Act applies to the production of records required to be kept pursuant to regulations under the Act?15
The immunity granted by § 202(g) is coterminous with the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, and records required to be kept by valid regulation for governmental enforcement purposes are not privileged documents.16
No. The petitioner, a wholesaler of fruit and produce, received a subpoena duces tecum directing production of sales invoices, ledgers, and related records for a one-month period.17 These records were required to be kept under Maximum Price Regulations 271 and 426 issued pursuant to the Emergency Price Control Act.18 The petitioner produced the records after being advised that immunity would flow only as a matter of law from their production and after claiming constitutional privilege.19 Because the records were validly required to be kept to enable the Administrator to enforce the statute, they fall within the required-records doctrine and carry no Fifth Amendment privilege.20
The statutory prerequisite for immunity, an otherwise valid claim of privilege, is therefore absent, and the trial court properly overruled the plea in bar.21
The immunity provision of § 202(g) does not apply to the production of the required records, and the judgment of conviction is affirmed.22
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Murphy
Justice Frankfurter dissented on the ground that the Court should have avoided the constitutional question by construing § 202(g) to grant immunity whenever records are produced in response to a subpoena.23 This approach would fulfill Congress's purpose of securing prompt disclosure without litigation over privilege.24 He argued that the statutory text and the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 promise immunity coextensive with the command to produce.25
The majority's narrowing construction frustrates the Act's enforcement goals while needlessly deciding a grave constitutional issue.26 Congress designed the investigatory powers to obtain information swiftly, and forcing litigation over uncertain privilege claims would contradict that aim.
Justice Jackson dissented.27 He maintained that the protection against compulsory self-incrimination is nullified when Congress may require a citizen to keep an account of his deeds and misdeeds and turn over the record on demand of government inspectors who then use it to convict him.28 Today's decision introduces a principle of considerable moment that strips protection from business records.29
The plain language of the immunity provision should be given its ordinary meaning rather than being restricted by judicial construction to the uncertain limits of constitutional privilege.30 Congress guarded the immunity scrupulously, and the Court should not attribute an intent to narrow it unless the language is unmistakable.
Whether the scope of the immunity under the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 as incorporated in § 202(g) extends to the production of non-privileged required records by an individual engaged in non-corporate business?31
Because the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 supplies immunity only when a witness could otherwise have been excused by a valid claim of constitutional privilege.32 The required-records doctrine removes any such privilege for both corporate and non-corporate custodians.33 Therefore the statutory immunity does not extend to production of non-privileged required records by an individual engaged in non-corporate business.34
No. The petitioner operated an unincorporated wholesale business and was compelled to produce records that the Price Control Act and its regulations required him to maintain.35 The Court has long held that the privilege against self-incrimination does not attach to records validly required to be kept for public regulatory purposes, whether the enterprise is corporate or unincorporated.36 The text of § 202(g) expressly conditions immunity on the existence of a genuine privilege that the witness could have asserted.37 Because no privilege existed here, the mere assertion of a claim conferred no statutory immunity.38
The legislative history confirms that Congress intended the immunity provision to be no broader than the constitutional privilege it replaced.39
The scope of immunity under the incorporated Compulsory Testimony Act does not extend to the production of non-privileged required records by an individual engaged in non-corporate business.40
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Rutledge dissented with reservations.41 He agreed with Justices Frankfurter and Jackson that the statutory immunity is broader than the Fifth Amendment privilege.42 He concluded that the explicit promise of immunity for any transaction concerning which evidence is produced in obedience to the subpoena cannot be judicially narrowed to the uncertain boundaries of constitutional privilege without rewriting the statute.43
The wording compels testimony and production of evidence regardless of any claim of constitutional immunity. The judgment should therefore be reversed on statutory grounds alone.44 Restricting the statute's immunity by excluding only frivolous claims would still give broader protection than the Amendment itself.