dominium eminens

In the latter part of 1951, a dispute arose between steel companies including Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. and their employees represented by the United Steelworkers of America, C.I.O., over terms and conditions to be included in new collective bargaining agreements. Long-continued conferences failed to resolve the dispute. On December 18, 1951, the union gave notice of an intention to strike when the existing agreements expired on December 31. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service intervened without success. On December 22, 1951, President Truman referred the dispute to the Federal Wage Stabilization Board to investigate and make recommendations for fair and equitable terms of settlement. The Board's report resulted in no settlement. On April 4, 1952, the union gave notice of a nationwide strike to begin at 12:01 a.m. on April 9. The President believed that the proposed work stoppage would immediately jeopardize national defense because steel is an indispensable component of substantially all weapons and other war materials. A few hours before the strike was to begin, on April 8, 1952, the President issued Executive Order 10340 directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of most of the steel mills and keep them running. The Secretary immediately issued possessory orders calling upon the presidents of the seized companies to serve as operating managers for the United States. Obeying the Secretary's orders under protest, the companies brought proceedings against him in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Their complaints charged that the seizure was not authorized by an act of Congress or by any constitutional provision and asked the court to declare the orders invalid and to issue preliminary and permanent injunctions. The Government opposed the motion for a preliminary injunction, asserting that the President had inherent power supported by the Constitution, historical precedent, and court decisions. On April 30, 1952, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction restraining the Secretary from continuing the seizure and possession of the plants. On the same day the Court of Appeals stayed the District Court's injunction. Deeming it best that the issues be promptly decided by the Supreme Court, the Court granted certiorari on May 3, 1952, and set the cause for argument on May 12.

In 1878 the Pennsylvania Coal Company executed a deed that conveyed the surface of property but reserved in express terms the right to remove all the coal under the same. The grantee took the premises with the risk and waived all claim for damages that might arise from mining out the coal. The plaintiffs claim under this deed. On May 27, 1921, the Pennsylvania legislature approved the Kohler Act. The statute forbids the mining of anthracite coal in such way as to cause the subsidence of any structure used as a human habitation. The statute provides exceptions for land where the surface is owned by the owner of the underlying coal and is distant more than one hundred and fifty feet from any improved property belonging to any other person. The plaintiffs brought a bill in equity to prevent the Pennsylvania Coal Company from mining under their property in such way as to remove the supports and cause a subsidence of the surface and of their house. The Court of Common Pleas found that if not restrained the defendant would cause the damage to prevent which the bill was brought. It denied an injunction, holding that the statute if applied to this case would be unconstitutional. On appeal the Supreme Court of the State agreed that the defendant had contract and property rights protected by the Constitution of the United States. It held that the statute was a legitimate exercise of the police power and directed a decree for the plaintiffs. A writ of error was granted bringing the case to this Court. As applied to this case the statute is admitted to destroy previously existing rights of property and contract. The case involves a single private house. The statute ordinarily does not apply to land when the surface is owned by the owner of the coal. The Attorney General of the State, the City of Scranton, and the representatives of other extensive interests were allowed to take part in the argument below and have submitted their contentions here. The statute purports to abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate in land. The question presented concerns mining of coal under streets or cities in places where the right to mine such coal has been reserved.

After the appellants acquired five acres of unimproved land in the city of Tiburón, California, for residential development, the city was required by state law to prepare a general plan governing both land use and the development of open-space land. In response, the city adopted two ordinances that modified existing zoning requirements and placed the appellants’ property in an RPD-1 Residential Planned Development and Open Space Zone. Density restrictions permit the appellants to build between one and five single-family residences on their five-acre tract. The appellants never sought approval for development of their land under the zoning ordinances. Shortly after it enacted the ordinances, the city began eminent domain proceedings against the appellants’ land, but the following year the city abandoned those proceedings and its complaint was dismissed, with the appellants reimbursed for costs incurred in connection with the action. The appellants filed a two-part complaint against the city in State Superior Court. The first cause of action sought two million dollars in damages for inverse condemnation. The second cause of action requested a declaration that the zoning ordinances were facially unconstitutional. The complaint alleged that land in Tiburón has greater value than any other suburban property in the State of California. The ridge-lands that appellants own possess magnificent views of San Francisco Bay and the scenic surrounding areas and have the highest market values of all lands in Tiburón. The appellants contended that rezoning forever prevented development for residential use and completely destroyed the value of the property for any purpose or use whatsoever. The appellants also contended that the city's aborted attempt to acquire the land through eminent domain had destroyed the use of the land during the pendency of the condemnation proceedings. The city demurred, claiming that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The Superior Court sustained the demurrer, granting the appellants leave to amend the cause of action seeking a declaratory judgment, but the appellants did not avail themselves of that opportunity. The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1980.

In the early 1980s, the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency imposed two moratoria on development in the Lake Tahoe Basin. The first, Ordinance 81-5, took effect on August 24, 1981, and lasted until August 26, 1983. The second, Resolution 83-21, ran from August 27, 1983, to April 25, 1984. Together these measures prohibited virtually all development on sensitive lands for a total of 32 months while TRPA developed a comprehensive land-use plan. Lake Tahoe's exceptional water clarity had begun to deteriorate due to increased land development starting in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Runoff from impervious surfaces on steeper slopes and stream environment zones carried nutrients that promoted algae growth. In response, California and Nevada, along with the federal government, amended the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact in 1980 to require TRPA to establish environmental threshold carrying capacities and adopt a regional plan. The 1980 Compact amendment directed TRPA to adopt thresholds within 18 months and a plan within a year thereafter. It also included a finding that temporary halts on development were necessary to preserve the region's capacity for future development consistent with the ultimate plan. TRPA enacted Ordinance 81-5 in June 1981 after concluding it could not meet the original deadlines, and later adopted Resolution 83-21 when no plan was in place by August 1983. Petitioners, including the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council representing about 2,000 owners and a class of approximately 400 individual owners of vacant lots purchased before 1980 primarily for building single-family homes, filed parallel actions in federal courts in Nevada and California shortly after the 1984 plan was adopted. The suits were consolidated in the District of Nevada. The District Court found that the moratoria constituted categorical takings under Lucas because they temporarily deprived owners of all economically viable use. The Ninth Circuit reversed that determination. The Ninth Circuit held that the temporary nature of the regulations meant no categorical taking had occurred and that Penn Central analysis applied, though petitioners had not challenged the District Court's Penn Central findings. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the moratoria effected per se takings.