domicile

Carol Sosna married Michael Sosna on September 5, 1964, in Michigan. They lived together in New York between October 1967 and August 1971, after which they separated but continued to reside there. In August 1972 Sosna moved to Iowa with her three children. The following month she petitioned the District Court of Jackson County, Iowa, for dissolution of her marriage. Michael Sosna was personally served when he visited Iowa and made a special appearance to contest jurisdiction. The Iowa court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction under Iowa Code § 598.6 because Sosna had not resided in the state for one year preceding the filing. Instead of appealing, Sosna filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on constitutional grounds. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. While the federal action was pending, the Iowa Supreme Court decided In re Marriage of Williams, 217 N.W.2d 202 (1974), and upheld the statute's constitutionality. The three-judge court upheld the residency requirement. This Court noted probable jurisdiction. During the appeal Sosna obtained a divorce in New York, though custody and support issues remained unresolved from the Iowa proceeding. She returned to Iowa to prosecute the appeal. Sosna sought class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to represent Iowa residents who had lived in the state less than one year and wished to initiate divorce actions but were barred by the residency requirement. The parties stipulated that numerous people were similarly situated, joinder was impracticable, her claims were representative, and she would adequately protect class interests. The district court approved the stipulation in a pretrial order.

In 1909 petitioner and respondent married and lived together in the District of Columbia until about the time he brought suit for limited divorce. They had a son and a daughter. On October 29, 1925, the supreme court of the District of Columbia granted petitioner a divorce a mensa et thoro on the ground of cruelty, awarded custody of the son to him and of the daughter to her, and directed him to pay $300 a month for support of wife and daughter. Petitioner brought suit in the circuit court of Arlington County, Virginia, alleging that he was a resident of that State for the requisite time. On June 26, 1929, the circuit court entered a decree granting him an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion after finding that he had been a resident of Virginia for the requisite time and that respondent had willfully deserted him since February 24, 1925. Process was served personally on respondent in the District of Columbia. She filed a plea stating she appeared specially to challenge jurisdiction, alleging that neither party had been a resident of Virginia for a year before suit and that his residence was a fraud upon the court. The Virginia court referred the cause to a commissioner in chancery who, after taking testimony pursuant to a stipulation of counsel limiting inquiry to the jurisdictional facts raised in the plea, reported that petitioner was a bona fide resident and the court had jurisdiction. Respondent filed exceptions reiterating the allegations of her plea. After a hearing the court overruled the exceptions, confirmed the report, found it had jurisdiction of the subject matter and parties, and granted respondent time to file an answer, which she did not do. The final Virginia decree granted petitioner absolute divorce, divested respondent of rights in his property, and required him to pay $150 per month for support of the daughter. On December 30, 1929, petitioner applied to the District court to set aside or modify its 1925 decree on the basis of the Virginia decree. The application was denied and affirmed on appeal without any question as to the jurisdiction of the Virginia court being considered or decided. On April 16, 1935, petitioner filed another application citing the Virginia decree, the daughter's marriage, and diminution of his income. After a hearing at which respondent sought to introduce evidence that petitioner went to Virginia solely to obtain a divorce and never became a bona fide resident there, the trial court denied relief. The court of appeals held that the Virginia court did not have full jurisdiction and its decree was not entitled to full faith and credit, and remanded for further proceedings.