doctrine of advancement

Ferdinand Straus died on July 1, 1934, leaving a last will and testament dated May 5, 1934, which contained a provision for a trust for his wife for her life of one-third of the decedent’s property both real and personal. On June 28, 1934, three days before his death, he executed trust agreements by which, in form at least, he transferred to trustees all his real and personal property. The beneficiary named in the trust agreement brought this action to compel the trustees to carry out its terms. The widow challenged the validity of the transfer to the trustees. The trial court found that the trust agreements were made, executed and delivered by said Ferdinand Straus for the purpose of evading and circumventing the laws of the State of New York, and particularly sections 18 and 83 of the Decedent Estate Law. The trial court also found that the settlor reserved the enjoyment of the entire income as long as he should live, and a right to revoke the trust at his will, and in general the powers granted to the trustees were in terms made subject to the settlor’s control during his life.

On the night of January 11, 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan lost control of her car as she traveled down Elm Road in Jasper County, Missouri. The vehicle overturned, and Cruzan was discovered lying face down in a ditch without detectable respiratory or cardiac function. Paramedics were able to restore her breathing and heartbeat at the accident site, and she was transported to a hospital in an unconscious state. An attending neurosurgeon diagnosed her as having sustained probable cerebral contusions compounded by significant anoxia. The Missouri trial court found that permanent brain damage generally results after six minutes in an anoxic state, and it was estimated that Cruzan was deprived of oxygen from twelve to fourteen minutes. She remained in a coma for approximately three weeks and then progressed to an unconscious state in which she was able to orally ingest some nutrition. Surgeons implanted a gastrostomy feeding and hydration tube in Cruzan with the consent of her then husband. Subsequent rehabilitative efforts proved unavailing. She now lies in a Missouri state hospital in what is commonly referred to as a persistent vegetative state in which a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function. The State of Missouri is bearing the cost of her care. After it had become apparent that Nancy Cruzan had virtually no chance of regaining her mental faculties, her parents Lester and Joyce Cruzan, who serve as coguardians, asked hospital employees to terminate the artificial nutrition and hydration procedures. All agree that such a removal would cause her death. The employees refused to honor the request without court approval. The parents then sought and received authorization from the state trial court for termination. The trial court found that a person in Nancy's condition had a fundamental right under the State and Federal Constitutions to refuse or direct the withdrawal of death prolonging procedures. The court also found that Nancy's expressed thoughts at age twenty-five in conversation with a housemate friend suggested that given her present condition she would not wish to continue on with her nutrition and hydration. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed by a divided vote. The court recognized a right to refuse treatment embodied in the common-law doctrine of informed consent but expressed skepticism about the application of that doctrine in the circumstances of this case. The court found that Cruzan's statements to her roommate regarding her desire to live or die under those conditions were unreliable for determining her intent and thus insufficient to support the coguardians' claim to exercise substituted judgment on Nancy's behalf. It rejected the argument that Cruzan's parents were entitled to order the termination of her medical treatment, concluding that no person can assume that choice for an incompetent in the absence of the formalities required under Missouri's Living Will statutes or the clear and convincing inherently reliable evidence absent here. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question whether Cruzan has a right under the United States Constitution which would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from her under these circumstances.

Until 1970 the Internal Revenue Service granted tax-exempt status to private schools without regard to their racial admissions policies under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. On January 12, 1970, a three-judge district court issued a preliminary injunction in Green v. Kennedy prohibiting the IRS from according tax-exempt status to private schools in Mississippi that discriminated on the basis of race. In July 1970 the IRS concluded it could no longer legally justify allowing tax-exempt status to private schools practicing racial discrimination and announced it would not treat gifts to such schools as charitable deductions. The IRS formalized its revised policy in Revenue Ruling 71-447, stating that a school not having a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students is not charitable within the common-law concepts reflected in sections 170 and 501(c)(3). Bob Jones University is a nonprofit corporation located in Greenville, South Carolina, whose purpose is to conduct an institution of learning giving special emphasis to the Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the Holy Scriptures. The university operates a school with an enrollment of approximately 5,000 students from kindergarten through college and graduate school and requires its teachers to be devout Christians while teaching all courses according to the Bible. Until 1971 the university completely excluded Negroes. From 1971 to May 1975 it accepted no applications from unmarried Negroes but did accept applications from Negroes married within their race. Following the Fourth Circuit decision in McCrary v. Runyon, the university revised its policy. Since May 1975 the university has permitted unmarried Negroes to enroll while maintaining a disciplinary rule that prohibits interracial dating and marriage and expels students who violate it. The university continues to deny admission to applicants engaged in an interracial marriage or known to advocate interracial marriage or dating. Until 1970 the IRS extended tax-exempt status to Bob Jones University under section 501(c)(3). On January 19, 1976, the IRS officially revoked the university's tax-exempt status effective December 1, 1970. The university paid a $21 federal unemployment tax for 1975, had its refund request denied, and filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina seeking recovery of that amount while the government counterclaimed for $489,675.59 in unpaid taxes for 1971 through 1975. The district court ordered the IRS to pay the refund and rejected the counterclaim, but the Fourth Circuit reversed. Goldsboro Christian Schools is a nonprofit corporation located in Goldsboro, North Carolina, established to conduct an institution of learning giving special emphasis to the Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the Holy Scriptures. Since its incorporation in 1963 the school has maintained a racially discriminatory admissions policy based upon its interpretation of the Bible. Goldsboro has for the most part accepted only Caucasians. On occasion, however, the school has accepted children from racially mixed marriages in which one of the parents is Caucasian. Upon audit the IRS determined that Goldsboro was not an organization described in section 501(c)(3) and required it to pay taxes under the Federal Insurance Contribution Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. Goldsboro paid the IRS $3,459.93 in taxes for one employee for the years 1969 through 1972 and filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina seeking a refund while the government counterclaimed for $160,073.96 in unpaid taxes. The district court granted summary judgment to the IRS on its counterclaim, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed per curiam. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases. The cases were argued on October 12, 1982. The Court decided the cases on May 24, 1983.