12 A.3d 783 (Conn. 2011)
Anthony Raftopol and Shawn Hargon were domestic partners living in Bucharest, Romania.1 They entered into a written gestational agreement dated July 29, 2007, with Karma A. Ramey under which Ramey agreed to act as gestational carrier for the plaintiffs.2 Eggs were recovered from a third-party egg donor and fertilized with sperm contributed by Raftopol.3 Three of the resulting frozen embryos were subsequently implanted in Ramey's uterus.4
Ramey gave birth to two children on April 19, 2008.5 DNA testing confirmed that Raftopol was the biological father of the children.6 Pursuant to the gestational agreement, Ramey had agreed to terminate her parental rights to any children resulting from the procedures.7 Ramey also had agreed to sign any forms necessary for the issuance of a replacement birth certificate naming the plaintiffs as the parents of such children.8 Ramey further had agreed to consent to the adoption of any such children by Hargon and to cooperate fully to obtain this goal.9
Prior to the expected delivery date, the plaintiffs brought this action in the Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the gestational agreement was valid.10 The plaintiffs also sought a declaration that they were the legal parents of the children.11 They requested that the court order the department of public health to issue a replacement birth certificate reflecting that they, and not Ramey, were parents of the children.12 The department responded that the court lacked jurisdiction over the matter because Hargon did not allege that he had conceived the children.13 The department also argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of the gestational carrier, the egg donor, and any husbands either may have.14
Following a hearing, the trial court on July 24, 2008, issued a ruling declaring that the gestational agreement is valid.15 The trial court declared that Raftopol is the genetic and legal father of the children.16 The trial court declared that Hargon is the legal father of the children.17 The trial court declared that Ramey is not the genetic or legal mother of the children.18 The court therefore ordered the department to issue a replacement birth certificate pursuant to General Statutes § 7-48a.19 The department appealed from the judgment to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, which heard argument on March 16, 2010.20
Whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to declare Hargon a legal parent of the children because he was not biologically related to them and did not adopt them?21
The Superior Court possesses general jurisdiction under the Connecticut constitution and General Statutes § 51-164s over all causes of action except those expressly assigned to probate courts.22 General Statutes § 52-29 authorizes declaratory judgments to determine legal parentage without requiring an adoption proceeding.23
No. The plaintiffs Anthony Raftopol and Shawn Hargon filed their action in Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the gestational agreement was valid and that Hargon was a legal parent under § 7-48a.24 The department argued lack of jurisdiction because Hargon lacked a biological relationship and had not adopted the children.25 The Superior Court is a court of general jurisdiction that may interpret § 7-48a to determine whether it creates an additional avenue to parentage separate from conception, adoption, or artificial insemination statutes.26
The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to declare Hargon a legal parent of the children.27
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Vertefeuille
Justice Zarella agreed with the majority's resolution of the jurisdictional claim in part I.28 He concluded that the Superior Court had authority to issue the declaratory judgment regarding Hargon's parental status under the gestational agreement.29 Zarella emphasized that the trial court properly exercised its general jurisdiction to interpret the statute without any need for prior termination proceedings.30
Whether termination of Ramey's parental rights was a necessary prerequisite to a determination of Hargon's parental status?31
Under General Statutes § 45a-707(5) and (8), only a biological or adoptive parent possesses parental rights that can be terminated, and a gestational carrier who bears no biological relationship to the child has no parental rights under Connecticut statutes or case law.32
No. Ramey was neither the biological nor the adoptive mother of the children, nor did she qualify under the artificial insemination statutes.33 DNA testing confirmed Raftopol as the biological father, and the gestational agreement provided that Ramey would terminate any rights she might claim.34 Because Ramey possessed no parental rights, no termination proceeding was required before declaring Hargon's status.35
Termination of Ramey's parental rights was not a necessary prerequisite to declaring Hargon a legal parent.36
Whether General Statutes § 7-48a confers parental status on an intended parent who is a party to a valid gestational agreement without regard to that parent's genetic relationship to the children?37
General Statutes § 7-48a authorizes a court of competent jurisdiction to order the department of public health to issue a replacement birth certificate naming intended parents under a valid gestational agreement, thereby conferring legal parentage without adoption and without regard to genetic relationship, as confirmed by the statute's text, related provisions in §§ 19a-42 and 7-36, and legislative history.38
Yes. The trial court found the gestational agreement valid.39 Raftopol and Hargon were the intended parents under the July 29, 2007 agreement with Ramey.40 The children were born April 19, 2008, after implantation of embryos created with Raftopol's sperm and donor eggs.41 Section 7-48a requires the department to issue a replacement certificate upon court order, and the statute creates a fourth avenue to parentage for intended parents irrespective of biology.42
General Statutes § 7-48a confers parental status on an intended parent who is a party to a valid gestational agreement without regard to genetic relationship.43
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Vertefeuille
Justice Zarella concluded that the plain language of § 7-48a, read with §§ 19a-42 and 7-36, unambiguously permits naming a non-biological intended parent on the replacement certificate.44 The statute contains no biological limitation whatsoever.45 Gestational agreements exist precisely to address infertility, and the definitions in related vital records statutes confirm that parentage amendments encompass such arrangements without genetic prerequisites.46
Justice Palmer concurred in the result.47 He agreed that § 7-48a permits an intended parent without a biological relationship to be named on the replacement birth certificate.48 Palmer examined the full legislative history, including the 2008 amendment and earlier related changes to §§ 19a-42 and 7-36.49 That history showed no restriction based on biology was ever imposed.50
Whether the trial court properly ordered the department of public health to issue a replacement birth certificate naming Hargon as a parent?51
Once a court of competent jurisdiction declares an intended parent under a valid gestational agreement to be a legal parent pursuant to § 7-48a, the department must issue a replacement birth certificate accurately reflecting that legal relationship.52
Yes. The trial court properly declared Hargon a legal parent under the valid gestational agreement and § 7-48a.53 The order to the department followed directly from that declaration.54 A birth certificate must accurately record legal parentage, and the department's role is ministerial once the court order issues.55
The trial court properly ordered the department of public health to issue a replacement birth certificate naming Hargon as a parent.56
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Vertefeuille
Justice Zarella agreed that the trial court's order directing issuance of the replacement birth certificate was correct.57 The statute requires the department to act in accordance with a valid court order naming the intended parents.58 Zarella noted that the department's role is purely ministerial once parentage has been declared by the Superior Court.59