Also known as: docket orders · docket-order · scheduling order
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A court order recorded solely as an entry on the docket sheet.
Darrell Duncan and Duffy Construction sued each other over a supply contract. The district court entered a docket order noting that the parties had failed to confer at least twenty-one days before the scheduling conference as required by the rules. Because the order appeared only on the docket sheet, neither side received separate notice until checking the electronic filing system.
Paula Corbin Jones sued William Jefferson Clinton for alleged misconduct. The district court issued a docket order denying the sitting president's request to stay the proceedings. The entry on the docket sheet allowed the case to move forward without a separate written opinion being served on the parties.
In May 1994 Paula Corbin Jones, a California resident who had worked at the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas against William Jefferson Clinton, then President of the United States, and Danny Ferguson, a former Arkansas State Police officer. The complaint alleged that on May 8, 1991, while Clinton was Governor of Arkansas and attending an official conference at the Excelsior Hotel in Little Rock, Ferguson persuaded Jones to leave the registration desk and visit Clinton in a business suite where he made unwanted sexual advances that she rejected. Jones further alleged that after she refused the advances her superiors at the Commission treated her in a hostile and rude manner and changed her duties in retaliation. After Clinton became President, Ferguson made defamatory statements to a reporter implying she had accepted the advances, while Clinton's authorized spokespersons publicly branded her a liar by denying the incident. The four-count complaint asserted federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 plus state-law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation, seeking $75,000 in actual damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. Jurisdiction was predicated on federal-question and diversity grounds. With the exception of the defamation count, the alleged misconduct occurred before Clinton took office and was unrelated to any official presidential duties. Clinton promptly advised the District Court that he intended to file a motion to dismiss on grounds of Presidential immunity. He requested the court to defer all other pleadings and motions until after the immunity issue was resolved. Petitioner thereupon filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice and to toll any statutes of limitation until he is no longer President. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss, allowed discovery to proceed, but stayed the trial until the end of the presidency. Both parties appealed. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of dismissal on immunity grounds but reversed the stay of trial, holding that the District Court had abused its discretion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseFederal agents arrested a suspect for distributing a designer drug. The district court entered a docket order confirming that the Attorney General had temporarily scheduled the substance to avoid an imminent hazard. The notation on the docket sheet provided the only record of the scheduling action until a formal order followed.
In 1970, Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act, which establishes five schedules of controlled substances and regulates their manufacture, possession, and distribution. In 1984, Congress amended the Act to authorize the Attorney General to schedule substances temporarily when necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to public safety. The amendment allows the Attorney General to bypass several procedural requirements applicable to permanent scheduling, including the full notice-and-hearing provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act and consideration of all eight statutory factors. The Attorney General promulgated regulations delegating his powers under the Act, including temporary scheduling authority, to the Drug Enforcement Administration. Pursuant to that delegation, the DEA Administrator issued an order temporarily scheduling 4-methylaminorex, known as “Euphoria,” as a schedule I controlled substance, published in the Federal Register in 1987. The Administrator later initiated permanent scheduling procedures for the substance. While the temporary scheduling order remained in effect, DEA agents executed a search warrant at the home of Daniel and Lyrissa Touby and discovered a fully operational drug laboratory. The Toubys were indicted in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey for manufacturing and conspiring to manufacture Euphoria. They moved to dismiss the indictment, challenging the constitutionality of the temporary scheduling provision and the validity of the subdelegation to the DEA. The district court denied the motion to dismiss in 1989. Following their convictions, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the convictions in 1990. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1991 to review the case.
View caseA docket order exists only as an entry on the docket sheet. It carries the same legal effect as a written order but does not require separate service or a full opinion.
A court may use a docket order to establish deadlines for joinder, amendment, discovery, and motions under Rule 16(b)(3)(A). The entry must still comply with the timing requirements of Rule 16(b)(2).
Yes. Rule 16(b)(1) requires the court to issue a scheduling order. Recording the order on the docket sheet fulfills that obligation even without a separate document.
Parties may seek modification of a docket order only upon a showing of good cause under Rule 16(b)(4). The court retains discretion to grant or deny the request after weighing diligence and prejudice.
…reasonable determination (announced in open court) of his scheduling needs, nor could it permit the issuance of a trial scheduling order that would significantly interfere with the President's discharge of his duties—in a private civil damages action the trial of which might be postponed without the plaintiff suffering…