Also known as:disparate impact doctrine · disparate impact
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
A legal doctrine under which a facially neutral policy or practice may give rise to a discrimination claim when it produces a disproportionate adverse effect on members of a protected class. The doctrine requires more than statistical disparity alone and typically demands proof that the challenged policy caused the disparity. In constitutional equal protection claims the doctrine does not supply a violation without evidence of discriminatory purpose.
Sources & Authorities
How it applies
Common Examples
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Veterans Preference Disproportionately Affects Women
Danielle Dixon applied for a state civil-service position but lost to a less-qualified male veteran under a statute that awarded absolute hiring preference to veterans. The preference produced markedly lower success rates for women because far fewer women had served in the military. Danielle sued claiming gender discrimination. The court upheld the statute because its purpose was to reward military service rather than to disadvantage women.
Storewide Policy Class Certification Denied
Dorothy Daniels and other female employees at Dixon Foods alleged that the company's subjective promotion practices produced far fewer female managers than male managers. They sought to certify a nationwide class of all female employees. The court refused certification because the women could not show that a single common policy caused the statistical disparity across thousands of stores with different local managers.
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Cases
Casebooks
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes564 U.S. 338 (2011)
Partnership Decision Mixes Motives
Deborah Dunn, a female senior manager at Dover Bank, was denied partnership after male partners criticized her aggressive style while praising identical behavior in male candidates. Internal documents showed both legitimate performance concerns and gender stereotyping. The court held that once Dunn proved gender was a motivating factor the burden shifted to the firm to show it would have made the same decision absent the improper motive.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins490 U.S. 22 (1989)
Zoning Blocks Multifamily Housing
Daphne Doyle and the local NAACP chapter proposed a multifamily housing project in a predominantly white area of Huntington. The town zoning code confined such housing to a small urban-renewal zone that was already 52 percent minority. The court found the restriction produced a disparate racial impact and lacked a legitimate justification sufficient to overcome the Fair Housing Act claim.
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington844 F.2d 926, 937 (2d Cir.), aff’d per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988)
Common questions
Frequently Asked
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Does a statistical disparity alone prove a disparate-impact claim under the Equal Protection Clause?+
No. A facially neutral policy that produces a disproportionate effect on a protected class does not violate equal protection without proof of discriminatory purpose. The claimant must show the policy was adopted because of its adverse effect on the group rather than in spite of that effect.
Supporting sources
What additional showing is required beyond statistics in a Fair Housing Act disparate-impact case?+
A plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged policy actually caused the statistical disparity and that no less discriminatory alternative exists. Mere awareness of a racial imbalance is insufficient.
Supporting sources
How does the doctrine interact with class certification requirements in employment cases?+
Plaintiffs must identify a specific employment practice that produces the disparity and show that the practice is common to the class. Without a common policy the statistical pattern alone will not support certification.
When does evidence of mixed motives shift the burden in a disparate-impact or treatment case?+
Once a plaintiff shows that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor the burden shifts to the defendant to prove it would have reached the same decision absent the improper motive.
Supporting sources
490 U.S. 22 (1989)Constitutional Law
…7213 (1964). Last Term, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust , 487 U. S. 977 (1988), the Court unanimously concluded that the disparate impact analysis first enunciated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. , 401 U. S. 424 (1971), should be extended to subjective or discretionary selection processes. At the same time a plurality of the…