/dih-SENT and dis-truh-BYOO-shun STAT-shoots/·statute
Also known as:descent and distribution statute · descent and distribution · statutes of descent and distribution · intestacy statutes · intestate succession laws
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A statutory scheme that determines how a decedent's property passes to heirs when the decedent dies without a valid will. The scheme identifies classes of takers such as a surviving spouse, descendants, parents, and more remote kindred under a parentelic system of priority. Title to real property passes by operation of law at death without any deed from the decedent.
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Common Examples
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Intestate Rental House Title
Elias died intestate owning a rental house in his own name. Horizon Property Services had managed the leases but held no deed. Carla, Elias's niece and sole heir under the intestacy statute, claims title in a quiet title action. Title passed to Carla by operation of law upon Elias's death.
Spouse Takes Entire Estate
Diego died intestate survived only by his husband Aaron. Diego had no children and his parents had predeceased him. His niece Lila claimed an informal adoption but none occurred. Aaron receives the entire estate under the governing intestacy statute.
Ferdinand Straus died on July 1, 1934, leaving a last will and testament dated May 5, 1934, which contained a provision for a trust for his wife for her life of one-third of the decedent’s property both real and personal. On June 28, 1934, three days before his death, he executed trust agreements by which, in form at least, he transferred to trustees all his real and personal property.
The beneficiary named in the trust agreement brought this action to compel the trustees to carry out its terms. The widow challenged the validity of the transfer to the trustees.
The trial court found that the trust agreements were made, executed and delivered by said Ferdinand Straus for the purpose of evading and circumventing the laws of the State of New York, and particularly sections 18 and 83 of the Decedent Estate Law. The trial court also found that the settlor reserved the enjoyment of the entire income as long as he should live, and a right to revoke the trust at his will, and in general the powers granted to the trustees were in terms made subject to the settlor’s control during his life.
A bank executive devised her condo to Park Fund by will. Unpaid taxes created a lien before death. After death the city sold the condo at tax sale to Blake who recorded the deed. Blake holds superior title because the tax sale transferred ownership by operation of law.
Estate of Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co.524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)
In 1902, a trust indenture established Kingsbury Place as a private subdivision in St. Louis, with covenants requiring maintenance as desirable residence property of the highest class. The indenture empowers trustees and property owners to enforce its provisions against encroachment or injury. Except for one vacant lot, the subdivision features spacious two and three-story homes used exclusively as private residences.
Louise Woodruff Johnston, owner of the house at #4 Kingsbury Place, died on January 14, 1973. Her will directed the executor, Mercantile Trust Co., to cause the home to be razed and the land sold, with proceeds transferred to the residue of the estate.
Following Johnston's death, neighboring property owners and trustees for the Kingsbury Place Subdivision filed suit against the executor seeking an injunction to prevent demolition of the house. The plaintiffs contended that razing the home would adversely affect their property rights and the community.
During trial, uncontradicted testimony established that the current value of the house and land totaled $40,000, while the empty lot would fetch no more than $5,000 after $4,350 in demolition costs. The St. Louis Commission on Landmarks and Urban Design had designated Kingsbury Place as a city landmark due to its architectural significance. Witnesses testified that demolition would depreciate adjoining property values by an estimated $10,000 and create a break in the urban design continuity.
The trial court dissolved the temporary restraining order and ruled against the plaintiffs on all issues. The plaintiffs then appealed the denial of their petition to the Missouri Court of Appeals.
Decedent died intestate survived by his nonmarital daughter Roger and his marital son Ian. State statute barred nonmarital children from inheriting. Roger managed a dealership profitably and was publicly acknowledged but the statute prevented her from taking any share.
Lalli v. Lalli439 U.S. 259 (1978)
Robert Lalli claims to be the illegitimate son of Mario Lalli, who died intestate on January 7, 1973, in New York. Robert’s mother, who died in 1968, was never married to Mario. After Mario’s widow, Rosamond Lalli, was appointed administratrix of the estate, Robert and his sister Maureen petitioned the Surrogate’s Court for Westchester County for a compulsory accounting, asserting their entitlement to inherit as Mario’s children.
Rosamond Lalli opposed the petition. She argued that Robert and Maureen had not obtained an order of filiation during Mario’s lifetime as required by New York Estates, Powers, and Trusts Law § 4-1.2. Robert conceded the absence of such an order. He presented evidence. This included a notarized document in which Mario referred to him as “my son” when consenting to his marriage. There were also affidavits from individuals stating that Mario had openly acknowledged Robert and Maureen as his children.
The Surrogate’s Court ruled that Robert and Maureen were excluded as distributees. On direct appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. While the case was pending before the United States Supreme Court, the Court decided Trimble v. Gordon and vacated and remanded for further consideration.
On remand, the New York Court of Appeals adhered to its prior disposition. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and heard the case.
Priya died intestate survived by her husband Daniel. Her mother had disappeared years earlier with no death decree. No descendants survived. Daniel takes the entire estate because the missing mother is not treated as a surviving parent.
Mahoney, In re Estate of220 A.2d 475 (Vt. 1966)
Howard Mahoney died intestate on May 6, 1961, of gunshot wounds. His wife, Charlotte Mahoney, was tried for the murder of Howard Mahoney in the Addison County Court and was convicted by jury of the crime of manslaughter in March, 1962. She is presently serving a sentence of not less than 12 nor more than 15 years at the Women’s Reformatory in Rutland.
Howard Mahoney left no issue, and was survived by his wife and his father and mother. His father, Mark Mahoney, was appointed administrator of his estate which at the present time amounts to $3,885.89. After due notice and hearing, the Probate Court for the District of Franklin entered a judgment order decreeing the residue of the Estate of Howard Mahoney, in equal shares, to the father and mother of the decedent. An appeal from the judgment order and decree has been taken here by the appellant widow.
The cause now before us is here on a direct appeal from the Probate Court. Findings of fact were made below from which it appears that the judgment of the probate court decreeing the estate of Howard Mahoney to his parents, rather than to his widow, was based upon a finding of the felonious killing of her husband by Mrs. Mahoney. The Probate Court used the record of the conviction of the appellant for manslaughter for its determination that the appellant had feloniously killed her husband.
In Vermont, an indictment for murder can result in a jury conviction on either voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. The legislature has provided the sentences that may be passed upon a person convicted of manslaughter, but provides no definition of that offense, nor any statutory distinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.
Leo died intestate survived by his second spouse Maria and his nephew Carl. Leo had no living children or parents. Carl claimed an informal adoption but none was formalized. Maria receives the entire estate under the intestacy rules.
Trimble v. Gordon430 U.S. 762, 775 n.16 (1977)
Deta Mona Trimble is the illegitimate daughter of Jessie Trimble and Sherman Gordon. Trimble and Gordon lived together in Chicago with Deta Mona from 1970 until Gordon died in 1974 as the victim of a homicide. On January 2, 1973, the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, entered a paternity order finding Gordon to be the father of Deta Mona and ordering him to pay fifteen dollars per week for her support. Gordon thereafter supported Deta Mona in accordance with the paternity order and openly acknowledged her as his child.
Gordon died intestate at the age of twenty-eight, leaving an estate consisting only of a 1974 Plymouth automobile worth approximately twenty-five hundred dollars. Shortly after Gordon's death, Trimble, as the mother and next friend of Deta Mona, filed a petition for letters of administration, determination of heirship, and declaratory relief in the Probate Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County. That court entered an order determining heirship, identifying as the only heirs of Gordon his father Joseph Gordon, his mother Ethel King, and his brother, two sisters, and a half brother. The Circuit Court excluded Deta Mona on the authority of section twelve of the Illinois Probate Act.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court on the authority of its earlier decision in In re Estate of Karas. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to consider the arguments that section twelve violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by invidiously discriminating on the basis of illegitimacy and sex.
When does a surviving spouse take the entire intestate estate?
A surviving spouse takes the entire intestate estate when the decedent leaves no surviving descendants and no surviving parents. The statute looks to legally recognized relationships rather than informal family ties. A niece or nephew therefore receives nothing under these facts.
Supporting sources
How do intestacy statutes treat adopted children?
An adopted child is treated as a full member of the adoptive family for inheritance purposes. Most statutes including the UPC treat the child as a descendant of the adoptive parents and cut off inheritance from genetic parents when the adoption removes the child from both genetic families.
Supporting sources
What system determines heirs beyond the surviving spouse?
Most intestacy statutes use the parentelic system. The first parentela consists of the decedent's own descendants. If none survive the second parentela of the decedent's parents and their descendants takes next followed by grandparents and their descendants.
Supporting sources
Does a tax sale after death defeat a specific devise?
A tax sale conducted pursuant to statute transfers title by operation of law and can confer superior title even after death but before distribution. The preexisting lien gives the sale priority over interests arising under the will.
Supporting sources
430 U.S. 762 (1977)
…to their illegitimate children. To the extent that other policies are not considered more important, legislators enacting state intestate succession laws probably are influenced by the desire to reflect the natural affinities of decedents in the allocation of estates among the categories of heirs. See Mathews v. Lucas , 427 U. S., at…