A Latin maxim directing a court or lawyer to apply existing law as it stands rather than a proposed reform. The principle requires decisions to rest on the law currently in force and treats arguments for change as distinct from the governing rule itself.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Rule 11 Certification of Existing Law
Daniel Diaz filed a complaint alleging breach of a supply contract. His attorney certified under Rule 11 that the claim rested on settled precedent interpreting identical contract language. The court accepted the certification because the argument invoked only existing doctrine without proposing any modification.
Ethical Limit on Novel Claims
Denise Donovan sought to defend a client charged with securities fraud by arguing that existing precedent should be narrowed. Her supervisor reminded her that Model Rule 3.1 permits only good-faith contentions grounded in current law unless a nonfrivolous extension is explicitly identified.
Doris Duffy served responses to document requests stating that no additional records existed after a reasonable search of active files. Counsel certified under Rule 26(g) that the position was consistent with existing case law on accessibility, without advancing any argument to alter that doctrine.
Due Process Challenge Under Current Doctrine
Demetrius Douglas challenged a state criminal procedure on the ground that it violated settled due-process principles announced in prior Supreme Court decisions. The court evaluated the claim solely against those existing precedents rather than inviting legislative-style reform.
Hurtado v. California110 U.S. 516, 528 (1884)
Joseph Hurtado was charged by an information filed in the Superior Court of Sacramento County with the murder of Jose Antonio Estuardo. The information was in the usual form and charged the crime with technical precision and in due legal language. It was filed after the defendant had been examined and committed by a magistrate, as required by the statute.
The Constitution of California, adopted in 1879, provides that offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment shall be prosecuted by information, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, or by indictment. The Penal Code of the State, adopted in 1872 and in force at the time, contained provisions authorizing every person to be proceeded against criminally by indictment or by information, and specifying that an information is an accusation in writing presented by the district attorney after preliminary examination or waiver.
Hurtado moved to set aside the information on the ground that it was not found or presented by a grand jury. The motion was overruled. He was arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and was put upon his trial. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, and judgment was pronounced sentencing him to be hanged.
From this judgment Hurtado appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of California, which affirmed it. He then sued out a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Destiny Davis brought a wrongful-death action after her spouse died at sea. The court applied the existing maritime wrongful-death rule as articulated in prior decisions and declined to create a new cause of action beyond that settled framework.
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.398 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339
Edward Moragne was a longshoreman employed by Gulf Florida Terminal Company. On April 23, 1967, he was killed while working aboard the vessel Palmetto State in the Port of Miami, Florida. A beam supporting hatch covers fell on him during the stowage of a cargo of fertilizer.
Petitioner, his widow and representative of his estate, brought suit in the Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida, against respondent States Marine Lines, Inc., the vessel owner. She sought damages for wrongful death and for pain and suffering prior to death. The claims rested on theories of both negligence and unseaworthiness.
States Marine removed the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida on diversity grounds under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. It filed a third-party complaint against Gulf Florida Terminal Company. The complaint asserted that any negligence or unseaworthiness resulted from Gulf's stevedoring operations.
Both defendants moved to dismiss the wrongful-death claim based on unseaworthiness. The District Court dismissed the unseaworthiness portion of the complaint, citing The Tungus v. Skovgaard, and certified the order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether the Florida wrongful-death statute, Fla. Stat. § 768.01, encompassed unseaworthiness. The state court answered in the negative. On return to the Court of Appeals, that court affirmed the dismissal. Earlier related proceedings in state court had produced an affirmance by the Florida District Court of Appeal, 236 So. 2d 80, and denial of certiorari by the Florida Supreme Court, 239 So. 2d 829. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Dakota Industries sued foreign insurers alleging a conspiracy affecting U.S. commerce. The court resolved the jurisdictional question by applying the existing effects test from established Supreme Court authority without proposing any alteration to that standard.
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California509 U.S. 764, 817, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 125 L.Ed.2d 612 (1998)
In the late 1970s, ISO, an association of approximately 1,400 domestic property and casualty insurers that serves as the almost exclusive source of support services for CGL insurance in the United States, began revising its 1973 standard CGL policy form. The 1973 form provided occurrence-based coverage for sudden and accidental pollution and did not cap defense costs. Primary insurers including Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Allstate Insurance Company, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, and CIGNA Corporation sought four changes: a shift to claims-made coverage with a retroactive date, elimination of pollution coverage, and a legal defense cost cap.
After ISO proposed 1984 forms that omitted some of these changes, Hartford persuaded General Reinsurance Corporation, the largest American reinsurer, to procure the modifications or derail the program. The Reinsurance Association of America agreed to boycott the 1984 forms unless the changes were added, and domestic and London reinsurers informed ISO they would withhold reinsurance until the forms were altered. ISO then withdrew the 1984 forms and adopted 1986 forms containing a retroactive date and pollution exclusion; it later withdrew support services for the 1973 form.
Separate agreements among London reinsurers required primary insurers to switch to claims-made policies and excluded pollution coverage from reinsurance contracts covering North American risks. Nineteen states and many private plaintiffs filed 36 complaints alleging that these actions violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. The cases were consolidated in the Northern District of California.
The District Court granted motions to dismiss in 1989, holding the conduct fell within McCarran-Ferguson immunity and applying international comity to the foreign defendants. The Ninth Circuit reversed in 1991. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1992.
How does de lege lata differ from de lege ferenda?
De lege lata requires application of the law as it currently exists. De lege ferenda refers to arguments about how the law should be changed. Courts and lawyers must keep the two distinct when presenting contentions.
When does a lawyer violate professional-conduct rules by relying on de lege lata?
A lawyer violates the rules by asserting a position that lacks any basis in existing law and offers no good-faith argument for extension or modification. Model Rule 3.1 and Rule 11(b)(2) both enforce this limit.
Does de lege lata prevent all arguments for legal change?
No. The maxim permits a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law, but the argument must be clearly identified as such rather than presented as settled doctrine.
295 U.S. 495 (1935)
…objectives of the codes which are authorized by the National Industrial Recovery Act. The codes may, indeed, cover conduct which existing law condemns, but they are not limited to conduct of that sort. The Government does not contend that the Act contemplates such a limitation. It would be opposed both to the declared purposes of…