Also known as:de facto parenthood · de facto parent · psychological parent
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A legal status recognizing a nonbiological and nonadoptive individual as a parent of a child when that individual has formed a parental relationship through sustained co-residence, consistent caretaking, assumption of full parental responsibilities without expectation of compensation, public holding out of the child as one's own, establishment of a bonded and dependent relationship, fostering of that relationship by a legal parent, and a determination that continuation serves the child's best interests.
See Our Sources· 8 primary sources
Uniform Acts
How its tested
Common Examples
4
Probate Recognition of Caregiver Bond
Margaret housed her deceased son's child Jared, enrolled him in private sports academies, and managed his junior contracts for several years after the biological mother's surrogacy arrangement ended. Upon Mark's death, Margaret petitioned the probate court for appointment as personal representative and sought a determination that she stood in a parent-child relationship with Jared. The court applied the statutory rule establishing a parent-child relationship with a de facto parent and recognized Margaret's status for purposes of heirship and estate administration.
Standing to Initiate Parentage Action
Ethan raised his ex-girlfriend Mia's daughter from birth, appeared as a parent on school and daycare records, and filed a verified petition asserting de facto parent status after the relationship ended. Mia moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that Ethan lacked standing because he was not a biological parent. The court denied the motion because Ethan was alive at commencement and claimed de facto parent status, satisfying the threshold requirements to begin the proceeding.
Functional Parent in Same-Sex Relationship
Bani Chatterjee and Taya King lived together in a committed domestic relationship when King adopted a child from Russia with Chatterjee's financial and emotional support. Chatterjee co-parented the child for several years until the relationship dissolved. Chatterjee petitioned for recognition as a de facto parent entitled to custody and visitation rights.
Elisa B. v. Superior Court117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005)
Elisa B. and Emily B. entered into a lesbian relationship in 1993 and began living together six months later. They introduced each other to friends as their partner, exchanged rings, opened a joint bank account, and believed they were in a committed relationship. They discussed having children and decided that they both wished to give birth, with Emily as the stay-at-home mother and Elisa as the primary breadwinner because Elisa earned more than twice as much money as Emily.
They chose a donor at a sperm bank so the children would be biological brothers and sisters. Elisa became pregnant in February 1997 and gave birth to Chance in November 1997. Emily began the insemination process in June of 1997 and became pregnant in August 1997, giving birth prematurely in March 1998 to twins Ry and Kaia. Ry had medical problems including Down’s syndrome and required heart surgery. Elisa was present when Emily was inseminated and picked up additional sperm to inseminate Emily at their home.
They jointly selected the children’s names, joining their surnames with a hyphen. They each breast-fed all of the children. Elisa claimed all three children as her dependents on her tax returns and obtained a life insurance policy on herself naming Emily as the beneficiary. Elisa’s parents referred to the twins as their grandchildren, and her sister referred to Elisa as the twins’ mother. Elisa treated all of the children as hers and told a prospective employer that she had triplets. Elisa and Emily identified themselves as coparents of Ry at an organization arranging care for his Down’s syndrome.
Elisa and Emily separated in November 1999. Elisa promised to support Emily and the twins as much as she possibly could and initially paid the mortgage payments of approximately $1,500 per month on the house in which Emily and the twins continued to live, as well as other expenses. When they sold the house and Emily and the twins moved into an apartment in November 2000, Elisa paid Emily $1,000 a month. In early 2001, Elisa stated she lost her position as a full-time employee and told Emily she no longer could support her and the twins. At the time of trial, Elisa was earning $95,000 a year. Emily applied for aid.
On June 7, 2001, the El Dorado County District Attorney filed a complaint in superior court to establish that Elisa B. is a parent of two-year-old twins Kaia B. and Ry B., who were born to Emily B., and to order Elisa to pay child support. After a hearing, the superior court rendered a written decision on July 11, 2002, ordering Elisa to pay child support in the amount of $907.50 per child for a total of $1815 per month. Elisa petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate, and the court directed the superior court to vacate its order and dismiss the action. The Supreme Court granted review.
Temporary Foster Care Relationship Limits
Foster parents provided daily care to a child placed in their home under a state contract that reserved the agency's discretion to remove the child at any time and return the child to the natural family. The foster parents sought constitutional protection for their relationship when removal was threatened. The Court held that the temporary nature of the foster arrangement and the state's retained authority prevented recognition of a protected de facto parent status.
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality and Reform (OFFER)431 U.S. 816, 862-863
In 1976 appellees consisting of individual foster parents and the Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform filed a civil rights class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They acted on behalf of themselves and foster children who had resided in their homes for a year or more.
They named as defendants various New York State and New York City child welfare officials. The suit sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the pre-removal procedures provided in state statutes and regulations.
The District Court appointed independent counsel to represent the foster children to forestall conflicts. It also granted leave to natural mothers to intervene as defendants. The court certified a class of foster parents and children who had lived together for more than one year.
A divided three-judge District Court held the existing pre-removal procedures constitutionally defective. It permanently enjoined their enforcement. Four appeals reached the Supreme Court from the New York City officials, New York State officials, independent counsel for the children, and intervening natural mothers.
Under New York's foster care system most placements occur through voluntary written agreements. Natural parents and authorized agencies execute these agreements to transfer care and custody of the child to the agency. The agency then places the child in a licensed foster home under a contract allowing either party to terminate at will. Natural parents retain legal guardianship and an obligation to visit and plan for the child's future. Children may also enter foster care by court order following findings of abuse, neglect, or delinquency.
When an agency decides to remove a child, state regulations require ten days' written notice to foster parents except in emergencies. Opportunities exist for conference and fair hearing. Additional procedures apply in New York City. Judicial review is available under § 392 after eighteen months. The record showed that the median duration of foster care in New York exceeded four years. Many children experienced multiple placements and limited contact with natural parents.
4 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What must a claimant prove to be adjudicated a de facto parent under the Uniform Parentage Act?
The claimant must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence seven statutory elements, including residence with the child as a regular household member for a significant period, consistent caretaking, assumption of full parental responsibilities without expectation of compensation, holding the child out as one's own, a bonded and dependent parental relationship fostered by a legal parent, and that continuation of the relationship serves the child's best interests.
Does filing a verified pleading alleging de facto parent status automatically confer standing?
Yes. An individual who is alive when the proceeding commences and who claims to be a de facto parent satisfies the statutory standing requirements to initiate the action. Questions about whether the claimant ultimately meets the substantive elements are addressed at the adjudication stage rather than at the threshold standing inquiry.
Supporting sources
How does de facto parent status affect intestate succession under the Uniform Probate Code?
A parent-child relationship exists between an individual and the individual's de facto parent. Recognition of de facto parent status therefore permits the child to inherit from the de facto parent by intestate succession and allows the de facto parent to serve in fiduciary roles such as personal representative.
Supporting sources
When must a de facto parent claim be commenced?
The proceeding must be commenced before the child attains eighteen years of age and while the child is alive. The claimant must also file an initial verified pleading alleging specific facts supporting the claim, which is then served on all parents and legal guardians.
Supporting sources
Family LawRights of unmarried cohabitants · Unmarried parents and their children: illegitimacyUBEFoundational