Also known as: dangerous drugs
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A drug that has potential for abuse or injury, usu. requiring a label warning that it cannot be dispensed without a prescription.
Dominic Drake received prescriptions for high-dose pain medication from his physician. The state health department required clinics to report his name and address into a centralized database with access limited to designated officials and logged queries. Drake challenged the collection as an invasion of privacy. The court upheld the program because reasonable safeguards protected the information about patients using dangerous drugs.
Derek Douglas tried out for the high school football team. The district policy required testing for substances including amphetamines and marijuana that pose substantial physical risks during exercise. Douglas refused the test and was barred from play. The court sustained the policy because the dangers of these drugs justified the testing program for student athletes.
Vernonia School District 47J operates one high school and three grade schools in the logging community of Vernonia, Oregon. In the mid-to-late 1980s, teachers and administrators observed a sharp increase in drug use among students. Between 1988 and 1989 the number of disciplinary referrals in Vernonia schools rose to more than twice the number reported in the early 1980's. A Vernonia high school football coach had observed suspicious steroid use by his athletes. The District's wrestling coach had witnessed students sharing steroids and had discovered steroids in a school locker. The District had a drug testing policy for student athletes since before 1989, but it had not been enforced for lack of funding. In the fall of 1989, the District received funds for a drug testing program and approved a Student Athlete Drug Policy. The Policy authorized random urinalysis drug testing of students who participated in the District's athletic programs. The Policy applied to all students participating in interscholastic athletics. It required students and their parents to sign a consent form agreeing to drug testing as a condition of participation. Athletes were tested at the beginning of the season and then randomly throughout the season. The testing procedure required students to provide a urine sample in a bathroom stall with an adult monitor of the same sex standing outside the stall. The monitor listened for normal sounds of urination. The samples were sent to a laboratory for analysis. A positive test result led to a meeting with the student and his or her parents. The student was given the option of participating in a drug assistance program or being suspended from athletics for the remainder of the season and the next season. In the fall of 1991, respondent James Acton, who was then a seventh grader, signed up to play football at the District's middle school. He was denied participation because he and his parents refused to sign the consent form for drug testing. They then filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from enforcement of the Policy on the grounds that it violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 9, of the Oregon Constitution. After a bench trial, the District Court dismissed the suit on the merits. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the Policy violated both the Federal and the State Constitutions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseDustin Donovan and his associates were charged under RICO with a pattern of racketeering that included repeated dealings in dangerous drugs. The indictment listed multiple state-law felonies involving distribution of controlled substances. Donovan moved to dismiss the civil RICO claims. The court held that dealing in dangerous drugs qualified as racketeering activity supporting the enterprise allegations.
In 1979, petitioner Sedima, a Belgian corporation, entered into a joint venture with respondent Imrex Co. to provide electronic components to a Belgian firm. The buyer was to order parts through Sedima. Imrex was to obtain the parts in this country and ship them to Europe. The agreement called for Sedima and Imrex to split the net proceeds. Imrex filled roughly $8 million in orders placed with it through Sedima. Sedima became convinced that Imrex was presenting inflated bills, cheating Sedima out of a portion of its proceeds by collecting for nonexistent expenses. In 1982, Sedima filed this action in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The complaint set out common-law claims of unjust enrichment, conversion, and breach of contract, fiduciary duty, and a constructive trust. In addition, it asserted RICO claims under § 1964(c) against Imrex and two of its officers. Two counts alleged violations of § 1962(c), based on predicate acts of mail and wire fraud. A third count alleged a conspiracy to violate § 1962(c). Claiming injury of at least $175,000, the amount of the alleged overbilling, Sedima sought treble damages and attorney's fees. The District Court held that for an injury to be "by reason of a violation of section 1962," as required by § 1964(c), it must be somehow different in kind from the direct injury resulting from the predicate acts of racketeering activity. It found no allegation here of any injury apart from that which would result directly from the alleged predicate acts of mail fraud and wire fraud. Accordingly, it dismissed the RICO counts for failure to state a claim. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. After a lengthy review of the legislative history, the Court of Appeals held that Sedima's complaint was defective in two ways. It failed to allege an injury "by reason of a violation of section 1962." It also failed to allege that the defendants had already been criminally convicted of the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, or of a RICO violation. In light of the variety of approaches taken by the lower courts and the importance of the issues, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseDaniel Diaz and three passengers were stopped in a car containing hidden packages of a dangerous drug. The quantity was large enough that occupants would almost certainly know of its presence. Prosecutors relied on a statutory presumption that all occupants knowingly possessed the substance. The court permitted the presumption because the facts made it rational to infer collective awareness of the dangerous drug.
In March 1973, three adult male respondents and a sixteen-year-old girl were traveling in a Chevrolet on the New York State Thruway when the car was stopped for speeding. Police observed two loaded handguns weighing approximately six pounds in an open handbag on the front floor or seat beside the girl, who admitted the bag belonged to her. A machinegun and heroin were discovered in the trunk after it was pried open. The four were tried together in Ulster County Court for possession of the handguns and trunk items. The trial judge instructed the jury regarding the statutory presumption that the presence of firearms in the automobile constituted evidence of possession by all occupants. The jury found the three adult males guilty of handgun possession but acquitted everyone of the trunk charges. The convictions were affirmed by the Appellate Division without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed. The respondents sought federal habeas corpus relief in the Southern District of New York. The district court granted the writ on the ground that the presumption could not support the convictions on these facts. The Second Circuit affirmed the grant of the writ, though on the basis that the statute was unconstitutional on its face. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the procedural and substantive issues raised by the lower federal courts' decisions.
View caseDiana Delgado and other members of a Native American church ingested peyote during a religious ceremony. State officials denied unemployment benefits after the ingestion because peyote is classified as a dangerous drug. Delgado claimed the denial violated free exercise rights. The court held that the state could enforce its dangerous-drug laws without creating a religious exemption.
Alfred Smith and Galen Black were members of the Native American Church employed at a private drug rehabilitation organization in Oregon. They ingested peyote for sacramental purposes during a church ceremony. Their employer fired them for this conduct, treating it as work-related misconduct. Smith and Black applied to the Employment Division of the Oregon Department of Human Resources for unemployment compensation benefits, but the Division denied the claims on the ground that the firings constituted misconduct. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the denials, holding that they violated the respondents' free exercise rights under the First Amendment. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that respondents were entitled to payment of unemployment benefits. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded for a determination whether Oregon law prohibited the sacramental use of peyote. On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the statute made no exception for sacramental use and reaffirmed its conclusion that denying benefits violated the respondents' constitutional rights. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari a second time. Oregon law prohibits knowing or intentional possession of peyote, a Schedule I controlled substance, making it a Class B felony. The respondents' peyote use occurred at a Native American Church ceremony and formed the sole basis for their terminations and benefit denials.
View caseDiane Dawson grew marijuana plants on her property for personal medical use. Federal agents seized the crop under the Controlled Substances Act treating marijuana as a dangerous drug. Dawson argued the activity was local and noncommercial. The court upheld federal authority because regulation of dangerous drugs falls within Congress commerce power even for intrastate cultivation.
In 1996 California voters enacted the Compassionate Use Act authorizing limited marijuana use for medicinal purposes by seriously ill state residents upon a physician’s recommendation or approval. Angel Raich and Diane Monson, California residents suffering from serious medical conditions, began using marijuana after their licensed physicians determined that conventional medicines failed to provide relief and that marijuana was the only effective treatment available. Raich, unable to cultivate her own supply, relies on two caregivers who grow and provide locally grown marijuana at no charge, which she then processes into oils, balms, and foods. Monson cultivates her own marijuana plants and ingests the drug by smoking or vaporization. On August 15, 2002, county deputy sheriffs and federal Drug Enforcement Administration agents arrived at Monson’s home. County officials concluded after investigation that Monson’s use complied with California law, but after a three-hour standoff the federal agents seized and destroyed all six of her cannabis plants. Raich and Monson filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against the Attorney General of the United States and the Administrator of the DEA. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief barring enforcement of the federal Controlled Substances Act to the extent it prevented them from possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing cannabis for personal medical use, and they submitted affidavits describing their medical conditions, failed conventional treatments, and physicians’ recommendations. The district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and ordered the district court to enter the injunction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA drug qualifies as dangerous when it carries potential for abuse or injury. The classification usually triggers a prescription requirement and warning labels. Courts and regulators apply this label to substances like certain pain medications and controlled substances that require oversight.
No. The Constitution permits states to collect and computerize names and addresses of patients prescribed dangerous drugs when reasonable safeguards are in place. Limited access and audit logs prevent impermissible invasions of privacy.
Supporting sources
The high-risk character of a dangerous drug heightens the standard of care. A nurse or physician must discover readily available information such as contraindications listed in patient charts before administration. Failure to investigate smudged labels or electronic records can support a finding of negligence.
Supporting sources
…that these States, and the Federal Government, all find their (presumably compelling) interests in controlling the use of dangerous drugs compatible with an exemption for religious use of peyote. Cf. Boos v. Barry , 485 U. S. 312, 329 (1988) (finding that an ordinance restricting picketing near a foreign embassy was not…