Also known as: comfortable enjoyments · quiet enjoyment
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A protected interest in land use that permits an owner or possessor to occupy and utilize property without substantial interference from noise, odors, vibrations, or similar annoyances that impair ordinary residential or commercial activities.
Sterling LLP purchased a townhouse from Amy via general warranty deed and began renovations for law offices. Adjacent industrial activity produced ongoing vibrations and chemical odors. Sterling sued the neighboring operator for nuisance. The interference substantially impaired Sterling's comfortable enjoyment of the premises.
The Johnsons operated an organic farm next to Paynesville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Co. Pesticide drift from the cooperative's operations contaminated their fields and prevented organic certification. The Johnsons sued for nuisance. The interference with their ability to market crops as organic impaired the comfortable enjoyment of their land.
Oluf and Debra Johnson are organic farmers in central Minnesota whose fields are certified under the National Organic Program. Paynesville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Company is a member-owned provider that applies pesticides to conventional farm fields adjacent to the Johnsons' property. In June 2007 the Johnsons filed a complaint with the Minnesota Department of Agriculture alleging pesticide drift onto one of their transitional soybean fields. On June 15, 2007, winds of 9 to 21 miles per hour carried Status (diflufenzopyr and dicamba) and Roundup Original (glyphosate) from the Cooperative's spraying of a neighboring conventional field onto the Johnsons' soybeans. MDA testing detected dicamba below detection levels but no diflufenzopyr or glyphosate. The MDA nevertheless directed the Johnsons to plow down approximately 10 acres of the crop because of visual damage and the presence of dicamba. The Johnsons also notified their certifying agent, the Organic Crop Improvement Association. An August 27, 2007 OCIA letter stated that chemical drift may have occurred and that, if contamination were confirmed, the field would have to return to the beginning of the 36-month transition period. The Johnsons therefore restarted the three-year transition for that soybean field. In July 2008 the Johnsons reported a second incident in which Roundup Power Max and Select Max (glyphosate and clethodim) drifted onto a transitional alfalfa field. MDA testing found minimal glyphosate. On August 1, 2008, they reported a third incident involving Lorsban Advanced (chlorpyrifos) on the same alfalfa field. Testing again showed minimal residue. The MDA concluded that drift from the Cooperative's applications caused both positive results. The Johnsons took the alfalfa field out of organic production for an additional three years. The Johnsons sued the Cooperative for trespass, nuisance, negligence per se, and battery, claiming economic losses from the three-year transition periods, destruction of the soybean crop, increased weeding and reporting burdens, and adverse health effects to Oluf Johnson. They also sought a permanent injunction barring spraying within a half mile of their fields. The district court granted summary judgment to the Cooperative on all claims and denied the Johnsons' motion to amend the complaint to add the 2008 incidents. The court of appeals reversed in part. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted the Cooperative's petition for review.
View caseTenants leased apartments above a building that the landlords later rented as a cocktail lounge. Loud music and disturbances from the lounge continued late into the night. The tenants withheld rent and raised constructive eviction. The music substantially deprived them of quiet enjoyment of their leased premises for a substantial time.
The landlords leased apartments to the defendants for residential use in a building they owned. They also leased nearby premises to third parties for operation as a bar or cocktail lounge. The lease for the lounge required that entertainment be conducted so that it could not be heard outside the building and would not disturb the apartment residents. The landlords introduced this commercial activity into an area leased for residential purposes. The lounge presented amplified music from electric musical instruments and singing starting at 9:30 P.M. and continuing until 1:30 A.M. or 2 A.M. on Tuesdays through Sundays. The music penetrated the granite walls of the residential building and was described as unbelievably loud, incessant, raucous, and penetrating. Noise from patrons yelling and fighting also occurred, interfering with conversation and preventing sleep for the tenants. The residential tenants made numerous objections to the landlords about the disturbances. The landlords promised each tenant to correct the situation and complained to the lounge tenants from time to time. Although the noise would abate in response to the landlords' complaints, their attempts to remedy the problem were unsuccessful. Each tenant vacated his apartment within a reasonable time. The landlords brought consolidated actions for rent against the tenants. The trial judge found that the tenants were very substantially deprived of quiet enjoyment of their leased premises for a substantial time. The trial judge further found that the landlords had it within their control to correct the conditions which amounted to a constructive eviction of each tenant. Following entry of judgment for the tenants, the landlords appealed and the Supreme Judicial Court transferred the appeals for its review.
View caseJavins rented an apartment from First National Realty Corp. The unit suffered from multiple defects including faulty plumbing and heating that the landlord failed to repair. Javins withheld rent. The conditions substantially interfered with the tenants' use of the premises for ordinary residential living.
Several tenants rented apartments in Clifton Terrace, a three-building apartment complex in Northwest Washington, by separate written leases with First National Realty Corporation. On April 8, 1968, the landlord filed separate actions in the Landlord and Tenant Branch of the Court of General Sessions seeking possession on the ground that each tenant had defaulted in the payment of rent due for the month of April. The tenants admitted that they had not paid the landlord any rent for April but alleged numerous violations of the Housing Regulations as an equitable defense or claim by way of recoupment or set-off. The tenants offered to prove that there are approximately 1500 violations of the Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia in the building at Clifton Terrace, where the defendant resides, some affecting the premises of the defendant directly, others indirectly, and all tending to establish a course of conduct of violation of the Housing Regulations to the damage of defendants. They conceded at trial that this offer of proof reached only violations which had arisen since the term of the lease had commenced. The Court of General Sessions refused the offer of proof and entered judgment for the landlord. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the argument that the landlord was under a contractual duty to maintain the premises in compliance with the Housing Regulations. Because of the importance of the question presented, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the tenants' petitions for leave to appeal.
View caseNahrstedt owned a condominium unit in Lakeside Village and kept three cats in violation of the association's no-pet rule. The association sought to enforce the restriction. The cats caused no noise or odor affecting other owners. The rule did not impair any owner's comfortable enjoyment of neighboring units.
Lakeside Village is a 530-unit condominium development in Culver City consisting of 12 separate three-story buildings whose residents share common lobbies, hallways, laundry, and trash facilities. In April 1978 the developer recorded a declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions that included the provision that no animals, defined to mean dogs and cats, livestock, reptiles, or poultry, shall be kept in any unit. Plaintiff Natore Nahrstedt purchased a unit in January 1988 and moved in with her three cats, which she kept entirely inside the unit. When the Lakeside Village Condominium Association learned of the cats it demanded their removal and levied successive monthly fines against Nahrstedt. Nahrstedt then filed suit against the Association, its officers, and two employees seeking declaratory relief that the pet restriction was unreasonable as applied to her indoor cats, invalidation of the assessments, damages for invasion of privacy and emotional distress, and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged that the cats were noiseless, created no nuisance, and had not damaged any portion of her unit or the common areas, and it incorporated by reference the grant deed, the declaration, and the condominium plan. The Association demurred to the complaint on the ground that the restriction was reasonable as a matter of law. The trial court sustained the demurrer as to every cause of action and dismissed the complaint. A divided Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of dismissal, concluding that Nahrstedt had stated a claim for declaratory relief because the reasonableness of enforcing the restriction against her particular cats presented a factual question. The dissenting justice in the Court of Appeal maintained that the recorded restriction should be treated as presumptively valid under the law of equitable servitudes. On the Association's petition the Supreme Court granted review.
View caseCooper leased commercial space from Reste Realty Corp. Recurrent flooding from defective drainage repeatedly disrupted operations. Cooper vacated after the landlord failed to correct the condition. The flooding substantially interfered with Cooper's use of the premises for its intended business purpose.
In May 1958, Joy M. Cooper leased a portion of the ground floor of a commercial building at 207 Union Street, Hackensack, New Jersey, from the predecessor in title to Reste Realty Corp. After about a year of occupancy, the parties executed a new five-year lease in April 1959 covering the entire ground floor except the furnace room for use as commercial offices in connection with a jewelry firm's sales training and meetings. A driveway ran along the north side of the building. During the first year of occupancy, rainwater ran off the driveway into the leased offices whenever it rained. Arthur A. Donigian, an officer and resident manager of the corporate owner who also maintained an office in the building, was notified of the flooding and took steps to remove the water. Before signing the second lease, Donigian promised to remedy the problem by resurfacing the driveway, and the work was performed. Donigian died on March 30, 1961. Thereafter, when flooding occurred, the lessor ignored Cooper's complaints, and she and her employees removed the water themselves. On multiple occasions, including after heavy rainstorms that left up to two inches of water, sales meetings with as many as fifty attendees had to be relocated or adjourned, sometimes requiring rental of other quarters. On December 20, 1961, five inches of water flooded the premises during a meeting of sales representatives from four states, forcing the meeting to be moved to a nearby inn. Cooper consulted an attorney that evening and, after notifying the lessor, vacated the premises on December 30, 1961. Reste Realty Corp. acquired the building and the lease assignment on January 19, 1962. On November 9, 1964, it sued Cooper to recover rent for the unexpired term through March 31, 1964. The trial court entered judgment for Cooper on her constructive eviction defense. The Appellate Division reversed, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification.
View caseThe plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct substantially and unreasonably interferes with the ordinary use and enjoyment of the land. Courts assess the social value of the invaded use, such as quiet residential living, along with the extent, duration, and character of the harm.
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A tenant may terminate when the landlord or a party attributable to the landlord substantially interferes with a permissible use of the leased property and fails to cease after notice. Repeated unauthorized intrusions that disrupt operations support termination and damages.
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