Also known as: collateral matter · collateral issue
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A fact or circumstance that does not affect the essential character of conduct or bear on any material issue in a case. Consent induced by fraud or mistake as to such a matter remains effective. Extrinsic proof contradicting a witness on such a matter is ordinarily excluded to avoid confusion and delay.
Catherine Carter agreed to let Carlos Castillo photograph her for a modeling portfolio after he assured her the images would remain private. Castillo later sold the photos to a magazine. Because the misrepresentation concerned only the subsequent use of the images and not the essential character of the photography session itself, Carter's consent barred her battery claim.
Cameron Cruz testified on direct examination that he had never possessed the drugs found in his car. The government sought to introduce his earlier statement admitting possession for impeachment. Because the prior statement directly contradicted testimony on a central fact, the court permitted its use even though the statement had been obtained in violation of Miranda.
Respondent James Havens, an attorney from Fort Wayne, Indiana, and John McLeroth boarded a flight from Lima, Peru, to Miami, Florida. Upon arrival in Miami, customs officers searched McLeroth and discovered cocaine sewn into makeshift pockets in a T-shirt he wore under his outer clothing. McLeroth implicated Havens, who had already cleared customs and was arrested. Officers seized and searched Havens' luggage without a warrant, finding a T-shirt with pieces cut out that matched those sewn onto McLeroth's T-shirt. The T-shirt and other items from the search were suppressed before trial on Havens' motion. Both men were charged in a three-count indictment. McLeroth pleaded guilty to one count and testified against Havens at trial, stating that Havens had supplied the altered T-shirt and sewed the pockets shut. Havens took the stand in his defense and denied any involvement in smuggling cocaine. On direct examination, Havens testified that he did not engage in wrapping or taping activities with McLeroth. During cross-examination, the government asked Havens whether he had a size 38-40 medium T-shirt with swatches missing in his luggage when passing through customs, and Havens denied it. On rebuttal, a government agent testified that the T-shirt had been found in Havens' suitcase and that Havens had claimed the T-shirts belonged to McLeroth. The T-shirt was admitted into evidence over objection, with the jury instructed to consider it only for impeaching Havens' credibility. Havens was convicted of importing, conspiring to import, and intentionally possessing cocaine. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseChloe Chen took the stand and denied making any incriminating statements to police. The prosecution offered her earlier statements taken without proper warnings. The court allowed the statements to impeach her testimony on the events in question because the statements bore directly on the charged conduct rather than a peripheral point.
The State of New York charged petitioner Harris in a two-count indictment with twice selling heroin to an undercover police officer on January 4 and January 6, 1966. At the jury trial, the undercover officer testified as to the details of the two sales, a second officer verified collateral details, and a third offered testimony about the chemical analysis of the heroin. Petitioner Harris took the stand in his own defense. He admitted knowing the undercover police officer but denied a sale on January 4. He admitted making a sale of the contents of a glassine bag to the officer on January 6 but claimed it was baking powder and part of a scheme to defraud the purchaser. On cross-examination, petitioner was asked whether he had made specified statements to the police immediately following his arrest on January 7 that partially contradicted his direct testimony. In response, petitioner testified that he could not remember virtually any of the questions or answers recited by the prosecutor. At the request of petitioner’s counsel, the written statement was placed in the record for possible use on appeal but was not shown to the jury. The trial judge instructed the jury that the statements attributed to petitioner could be considered only in passing on his credibility and not as evidence of guilt. The jury found petitioner guilty on the second count of the indictment. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a per curiam opinion. The prosecution made no effort in its case in chief to use the statements. The prosecution conceded they were inadmissible under Miranda because no warning of a right to appointed counsel was given before questions were put to petitioner when taken into custody. Petitioner made no claim that the statements were coerced or involuntary. The Supreme Court granted the writ to consider whether such a statement may be used to impeach the petitioner’s credibility.
View caseCecilia Cabrera testified that she had seen the defendant at the scene. The defense offered evidence that she had once misidentified a different person in an unrelated matter. The court excluded the evidence because the prior misidentification was a collateral matter bearing only on general credibility and not on any issue in the present case.
In December 1911 a federal indictment containing nine counts was returned against the defendant in the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri. The seventh count charged use of the mails to transport lottery coupons or tickets in violation of section 213 of the Criminal Code. The defendant was arrested without a warrant by a police officer at the Union Station in Kansas City, Missouri, where he was employed by an express company. On the same day other police officers went to the defendant's home at 1834 Penn Street, obtained the key from a neighbor, entered the house, searched the defendant's room, and seized papers and articles that were later turned over to the United States Marshal. Later the same day the Marshal, accompanied by police officers, returned to the house, was admitted by a boarder, searched the defendant's room, and removed letters and envelopes from a chiffonier drawer. Neither the police officers nor the Marshal possessed a search warrant. Before trial the defendant filed a verified petition seeking return of the seized property, asserting that the seizure violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The district court ordered return of property it deemed not pertinent to the charge but retained the remainder, which the government stated would be used in evidence. After the jury was sworn the defendant renewed the petition, which the court again denied. At trial the defendant objected to introduction of the retained papers on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds, the objection was overruled, and the papers—including lottery tickets seized by the police and letters seized by the Marshal—were admitted into evidence. The defendant was convicted on the seventh count and sentenced to fine and imprisonment. He then prosecuted a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States, assigning as error the refusal to return the property and the admission of the seized papers at trial.
View caseExtrinsic evidence is generally excluded when the matter is collateral because it does not bear on any material issue and risks confusing the jury or wasting time. The trial judge retains discretion under Rule 403 to exclude such proof even when the Federal Rules do not expressly codify the common-law collateral-matter bar. Direct contradiction on a fact placed in issue by the witness's own testimony is not treated as collateral.
No. Otherwise inadmissible evidence may be used to impeach a defendant on matters raised during direct testimony. The rule against collateral impeachment does not shield a defendant who opens the door by testifying about facts that can be contradicted by otherwise excludable proof.
Supporting sources
Consent induced by fraud or mistake remains valid when the misrepresentation concerns only a collateral matter that does not change the essential character of the conduct. The rule preserves the effectiveness of consent in such circumstances while allowing rescission when the fraud goes to the nature of the invasion itself.
Supporting sources
…on the Government’s disability to challenge his credibility.” 347 U. S., at 65. It is true that Walder was impeached as to collateral matters included in his direct examination, whereas petitioner here was impeached as to testimony bearing more directly on the crimes charged. We are not persuaded that there is a difference in…