clear abuse of discretion

In 1972, respondents, representing all persons involuntarily confined at the Forensic Unit of the Fulton State Hospital in Fulton, Missouri, filed a three-count complaint in the District Court for the Western District of Missouri against petitioners, who are officials at the Forensic Unit and members of the Missouri Mental Health Commission. Count I challenged the constitutionality of treatment and conditions at the Forensic Unit. Count II challenged the placement of patients in the Biggs Building without procedural due process. Count III sought compensation for patients who performed institution-maintaining labor. Count II was resolved by a consent decree in December 1973. Count III largely was mooted in August 1974 when petitioners began compensating patients for labor pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act. In April 1975 respondents voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit and filed a new two-count complaint. Count I again related to the constitutionality of treatment and conditions at the Forensic Unit. Count II sought damages based on the Thirteenth Amendment for the value of past patient labor. In July 1976 respondents voluntarily dismissed this backpay count. Finally, in August 1977 respondents filed an amended one-count complaint specifying the conditions that allegedly violated their constitutional right to treatment. In August 1979, following a three-week trial, the District Court held that an involuntarily committed patient has a constitutional right to minimally adequate treatment and found constitutional violations in five of six general areas, including physical environment, individual treatment plans, least restrictive environment, visitation, telephone, and mail privileges, and seclusion and restraint. With respect to staffing, the sixth general area, the District Court found that the Forensic Unit's staffing levels, which had increased during the litigation, were minimally adequate. Petitioners did not appeal the District Court's decision on the merits. In February 1980 respondents filed a request for attorney's fees for the period from January 1975 through the end of the litigation. Their four attorneys claimed 2,985 hours worked and sought payment at rates varying from $40 to $65 per hour, amounting to approximately $150,000, and also requested that the fee be enhanced by 30 to 50 percent. The District Court determined that respondents were prevailing parties and awarded a fee of $133,332.25 after reducing the number of hours claimed by one attorney by 30 percent and declining to adopt an enhancement factor. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed on the basis of the District Court's memorandum opinion and order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In a New York state court, a jury found the appellant guilty of murder in the first degree. The trial lasted more than two weeks. The appellant was represented by three appointed lawyers who conducted his defense with fidelity and zeal. The jury recommended life imprisonment, but the trial judge imposed a sentence of death. About five weeks after the verdict, a statutory pre-sentence investigation report was submitted to the judge. The defendant was brought to court for sentencing. He protested his innocence. After his three lawyers appealed to the court to accept the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment, the judge gave reasons for imposing death. The judge referred to the pre-sentence investigation revealing the appellant's involvement in thirty other burglaries in the same vicinity. Some of these the appellant had confessed to, and he had been identified as the perpetrator of others. The judge also noted activities indicating a morbid sexuality and classification as a menace to society. The accuracy of these statements was not challenged by the appellant or his counsel. The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the conviction and sentence. The affirmation was over the contention that the death sentence was based upon information supplied by witnesses with whom the accused had not been confronted and as to whom he had no opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal. The case reached the Supreme Court of the United States on appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).

The United States brought suit against the New York Times Company and the Washington Post Company seeking to enjoin publication of material from a classified government study on the history of United States decision-making regarding Vietnam policy. The newspapers had come into possession of the classified documents and had already begun publishing excerpts from the study in their respective newspapers before the government filed for injunctive relief. The District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in the New York Times case that the government had not satisfied the requirements for imposing a prior restraint. In the parallel Washington Post litigation, the District Court for the District of Columbia and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit both determined that the government had not met its burden. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the matters on an expedited schedule. Stays had been entered by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on June 23, 1971, and by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on June 24, 1971.

In September 1995, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging petitioner, Hugo Almendarez-Torres, with having been found in the United States after being deported without the permission and consent of the Attorney General in violation of Section 1326. In December 1995, Almendarez-Torres entered a plea of guilty. At a hearing before the District Court accepted his plea, Almendarez-Torres admitted that he had been deported, that he had later unlawfully returned to the United States, and that the earlier deportation had taken place pursuant to three earlier convictions for aggravated felonies. In March 1996, the District Court held a sentencing hearing. Almendarez-Torres argued that his indictment had not mentioned his earlier aggravated felony convictions and that the court therefore could not sentence him to more than two years' imprisonment. The District Court rejected this argument, found applicable a Sentencing Guideline range of 77 to 96 months, and imposed a sentence of 85 months' imprisonment. On appeal the Fifth Circuit rejected Almendarez-Torres's argument and affirmed the sentence. Like seven other circuits, the Fifth Circuit held that subsection (b)(2) is a penalty provision. It simply permits a sentencing judge to impose a higher sentence when the unlawfully returning alien also has a record of prior convictions. The Ninth Circuit had reached the opposite conclusion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the difference among the circuits.