Also known as: civil processes · service of process
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A formal document or writ issued by a court to initiate or compel action in a civil lawsuit. It encompasses summonses, complaints, subpoenas, and other instruments used to secure jurisdiction or enforce judgments.
Camila Cervantes filed suit against Crown Pharmaceuticals in federal court. Her process server left the summons and complaint with a receptionist who lacked authority to accept service for the registered agent. Crown moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5). The court granted the motion because the delivery failed to satisfy the requirements for proper service on the corporation.
Carmen Choi negotiated the sale of her business to Citadel Security. When talks stalled, Citadel's counsel threatened to file a civil action alleging breach of prior warranties even though internal records showed no defects. Choi signed the revised contract under protest. A court later found the threat constituted bad-faith use of civil process that rendered the agreement voidable.
Cade Carpenter sought to adopt a child and terminate the rights of the child's father. The father had timely registered under the state parentage registry. Carpenter served the adoption petition on the father by the method prescribed for civil process in the state. Proper service satisfied the statutory notice requirement and allowed the proceeding to advance.
Craig Caldwell petitioned to terminate parental rights of an alleged genetic father of a two-year-old child. The man had not registered with the parentage registry. Caldwell served notice of the proceeding on the alleged father using the state's civil-process rules. Because the child was over one year old, service was required regardless of registration status.
Colin Chambers, a Black homebuyer, was refused the opportunity to purchase a home from Cobalt Energy. He sued under federal civil-rights statutes alleging denial of equal rights to hold property. The complaint sought injunctive relief and damages through ordinary civil process. The suit proceeded on the theory that the refusal constituted prohibited discrimination enforceable by civil action.
In September 1965 Joseph Lee Jones and his wife, who are Negroes, sought to purchase a home in the Paddock Woods subdivision of St. Louis County, Missouri, from the Alfred H. Mayer Company and one of its officers. The company refused to sell them a house solely because the Joneses are Negroes. Subsequently, on September 2, 1965, the Joneses filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The complaint alleged the refusal to sell and sought injunctive relief together with damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1982. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the questions presented. While the case was pending, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1968 containing a Fair Housing Title, but that statute did not cover the respondents' development until January 1, 1969, and had no effect on the pending litigation. The provision invoked by the petitioners originated as section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and was re-enacted in 1870.
View caseCurtis Cannon, on behalf of Cypress Technologies, refused to comply with a state-court order requiring production of membership lists. The state sought the lists through civil process in an investigation of the organization's activities. The organization challenged the order as violating due-process protections against compelled disclosure of private affiliations.
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People is a nonprofit membership corporation organized under the laws of New York. Its first Alabama affiliates were chartered in 1918, and in 1951 the Association opened a regional office in Alabama employing two supervisory persons and one clerical worker. The Association has never complied with Alabama's foreign corporation qualification statute. In 1956 the Attorney General of Alabama brought an equity suit in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County to enjoin the Association from further activities within the state and to oust it from Alabama. The bill alleged that the Association had opened a regional office, organized affiliates, recruited members, solicited contributions, given financial support and legal assistance to Negro students seeking admission to the state university, and supported a Negro boycott of Montgomery bus lines. On the day the complaint was filed the Circuit Court issued an ex parte order restraining the Association pendente lite from engaging in further activities within the state and from taking steps to qualify to do business. The State moved for production of a large number of records including bank statements, leases, deeds, and records containing the names and addresses of all Alabama members and agents. Over the Association's objections the Circuit Court ordered production of a substantial part of the requested records including the membership lists and postponed the hearing on the restraining order. The Association answered the bill, admitted its Alabama activities substantially as alleged, and offered to qualify if the bar from qualification were lifted, but it did not produce the membership lists. For its failure to comply the Association was adjudged in civil contempt and fined $10,000, with the fine subject to increase to $100,000 if compliance was not forthcoming within five days. After the five-day period the Association produced substantially all requested data except the membership lists, and the Circuit Court increased the fine to $100,000. The Alabama Supreme Court twice dismissed petitions for certiorari to review the final contempt judgment, the first time for insufficiency of the petition's allegations and the second time on procedural grounds. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance of the constitutional questions presented.
View caseCivil process issues in lawsuits between private parties or government civil actions. Criminal process compels appearance to answer for alleged crimes. The distinction determines which rules of service and compulsion apply.
A threat to use civil process is improper when made in bad faith. Courts examine whether the threatened action lacks any reasonable basis or is deployed solely to extract contractual concessions. Bad-faith use renders the resulting agreement voidable.
Notice must be given in the manner prescribed for service of process in a civil proceeding in the state. Both registered and unregistered alleged fathers receive notice when the child is at least one year old. Proper civil-process service ensures due process before termination of rights.
…but also give rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to an agent to accept service of process has been given. St. Clair v. Cox , 106 U. S. 350, 355; Connecticut Mutual Co. v. Spratley , 172 U. S. 602, 610-611; Pennsylvania Lumbermen’s Ins. Co. v. Meyer , 197 U. S. 407, 414-415;…