civil contempt proceedings

Alta Sue Adams married Phillip William Feiock in 1968, and the couple had three children. In 1973, Feiock left the family. In January 1976, a California court entered an interlocutory judgment of dissolution of marriage. The court awarded custody of the children to Mrs. Feiock and ordered Feiock to pay child support beginning February 1, 1976. The payments were set at $35 per child per month for the first four months and $75 per child per month starting June 1, 1976. After the final judgment, Mrs. Feiock and the children moved to Ohio. Respondent made child support payments only sporadically and stopped making any payments by December 1982. Mrs. Feiock filed a complaint in Ohio under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. The Ohio court transmitted the complaint to the Superior Court of California for the County of Orange. On June 22, 1984, after a hearing, the California court ordered Feiock to pay $150 per month on a temporary basis beginning July 1, 1984. Feiock made payments only for August and September 1984. In 1985, the Orange County District Attorney filed orders to show cause alleging nine counts of contempt. At the August 9, 1985 hearing, the petitioner established a prima facie case of contempt. Respondent testified about his ability to pay but was found in contempt on five counts. He received a suspended sentence of 25 days in jail and three years of probation. Probation conditions required $150 monthly support payments and $50 monthly payments on the $1,650 arrearage. Respondent petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal. The court annulled the contempt order, holding that section 1209.5 imposed an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. The California Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In January 1972 a paternity action was instituted against Roger G. Redhail in Milwaukee County Court alleging that he was the father of a baby girl born out of wedlock on July 5, 1971. After Redhail admitted paternity the court entered an order on May 12, 1972 adjudging him the father and ordering him to pay $109 per month as support until the child reached age eighteen. From May 1972 until August 1974 Redhail was unemployed and indigent and consequently was unable to make any support payments. As of December 1974 there was an arrearage in excess of $3,700. The child had been a public charge since her birth receiving benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. In September 1974 Redhail applied for a marriage license in Milwaukee County. County Clerk Thomas E. Zablocki denied the application because Redhail had not obtained a court order pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 245.10(1). Redhail would not have been able to satisfy either statutory prerequisite for permission to marry. After the license denial Redhail filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The complaint alleged that the statute violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284. The plaintiff class was certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). After the parties filed a stipulation of facts and briefs were submitted the three-judge court held the statute unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause and enjoined its enforcement. Zablocki brought a direct appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and affirmed the District Court judgment.

Maurice M. was hospitalized at three months old with a fractured left femur and other indications of severe physical abuse. Hospital personnel observed respondent Bouknight shaking Maurice and handling him improperly. This led them to notify the Baltimore City Department of Social Services of suspected child abuse. In February 1987, the Department secured a court order removing Maurice from Bouknight's control and placing him in shelter care. Several months later, the shelter care order was modified to return Maurice to Bouknight temporarily. Following a hearing, the juvenile court declared Maurice a child in need of assistance and placed him under the Department's continuing oversight pursuant to a protective supervision order. The order required Bouknight to cooperate with the Department, continue in therapy, participate in parental aid and training programs, and refrain from physically punishing Maurice. Eight months later, the Department returned to juvenile court fearing for Maurice's safety. BCDSS caseworkers related that Bouknight would not cooperate with them and had in nearly every respect violated the terms of the protective order. On April 20, 1988, the court granted BCDSS' petition to remove Maurice from Bouknight's control for placement in foster care. BCDSS officials also petitioned for judicial relief from Bouknight's failure to produce Maurice or reveal where he could be found. The court issued an order to show cause why Bouknight should not be held in civil contempt for failure to produce the child. Maurice was not produced at subsequent hearings. At a hearing one week later, Bouknight claimed that Maurice was with a relative in Dallas. Investigation revealed that the relative had not seen Maurice. The next day, following another hearing at which Bouknight again declined to produce Maurice, the juvenile court found Bouknight in contempt for failure to produce the child as ordered. The court directed that Bouknight be imprisoned until she purged herself of contempt by either producing Maurice before the court or revealing to the court his exact whereabouts. Bouknight's claim that the contempt order violated the Fifth Amendment was rejected by the juvenile court. The Court of Appeals of Maryland vacated the judgment upholding the contempt order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In January 1971, former students James Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against the Dade County School Board, principal James T. Ingraham, assistant principal Willie J. Wright, and other school officials. The action sought damages for individual paddling incidents and injunctive relief on behalf of all students in the Dade County schools under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On October 6, 1970, Ingraham was subjected to more than 20 licks with a wooden paddle while held over a table in the principal's office after being slow to respond to a teacher's instructions. The paddling caused a hematoma requiring medical attention and keeping him out of school for several days. On December 1, 1970, Andrews was paddled several times for minor infractions in the school auditorium, with strikes to his arms, back, and neck that caused him to lose the full use of his arm for a week. In the 1970-1971 school year many of the 237 schools in Dade County used corporal punishment as a means of maintaining discipline pursuant to Florida legislation and a local School Board regulation. The authorized punishment consisted of paddling the recalcitrant student on the buttocks with a flat wooden paddle measuring less than two feet long, three to four inches wide, and about one-half inch thick. The normal punishment was limited to one to five licks or blows with the paddle and resulted in no apparent physical injury to the student. Teachers often administered the punishment without first consulting the principal, contrary to the procedural requirements of the statute and regulation. The evidence, consisting mainly of the testimony of 16 students, suggests that the regime at Drew was exceptionally harsh. The District Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss after the close of the plaintiffs' case, finding no constitutional violation. A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed, but upon rehearing the en banc court affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the questions of cruel and unusual punishment and procedural due process.

Jessica Gonzales obtained a temporary restraining order against her estranged husband in May 1999 in connection with divorce proceedings in a Colorado state court. The order was served on the husband on June 4, 1999. The state trial court modified the terms of the restraining order on June 4, 1999, and made it permanent. The modified order granted the husband limited visitation rights with their three daughters on alternate weekends, for two weeks during the summer, and upon reasonable notice for a mid-week dinner visit. On the evening of June 22, 1999, the husband took the three daughters, ages 10, 9, and 7, from outside the family home without any advance arrangements for visitation that night. Gonzales contacted the Castle Rock Police Department around 7:30 p.m. She showed officers a copy of the restraining order and requested its enforcement and the immediate return of the children. The officers stated there was nothing they could do and advised her to call back if the children did not return by 10:00 p.m. Gonzales made additional calls to the police throughout the night. She called at 8:30 p.m. after speaking with her husband who was at an amusement park in Denver. She called at 10:10 p.m., at midnight, and at 12:10 a.m. when she went to his apartment. Each time she was told to wait or that no immediate action would be taken. When she filed an incident report at the police station around 12:50 a.m., the officer took the report but made no effort to locate the children before going to dinner. At approximately 3:20 a.m. on June 23, 1999, the husband arrived at the police station and opened fire with a semi-automatic handgun. Police shot back, killing him. Inside the cab of his pickup truck, they found the bodies of all three daughters, whom he had already murdered. Gonzales subsequently filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Town of Castle Rock. She alleged that the police department's policy or custom of failing to respond properly to complaints of restraining order violations deprived her of due process. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Tenth Circuit en banc reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.