A doctrine permitting warrantless searches of vehicles when officers have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of crime. The doctrine rests on the vehicle's inherent mobility and the reduced expectation of privacy associated with it compared to fixed structures. Officers may search the vehicle and any containers that could hold the object of the search either at the scene or after the vehicle has been impounded.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Vehicle Towed Before Search
Officers stopped Catherine Carter after observing her load large duffel bags into her sedan following a meeting with a known drug associate. They had probable cause to believe the bags held proceeds from illegal activity. The officers seized the car, towed it to the station, and searched the bags three hours later without a warrant.
Driveway Search Blocked
Officers received a tip that Craig Caldwell was storing stolen equipment in his truck parked in the driveway next to his house. They entered the driveway without a warrant or consent and searched the truck bed. The search yielded no admissible evidence because the driveway formed part of the home's protected curtilage.
During a traffic stop of Carmen Choi's van, officers developed probable cause to believe the vehicle contained narcotics. They opened a passenger's purse found on the back seat and discovered controlled substances. The search of the purse was upheld even though the passenger was not the target of the investigation.
Trunk And Containers Searched
Officers stopped Christian Coleman's car after an informant described him transporting narcotics in a specific leather pouch. They searched the trunk and opened a zippered bag inside it, recovering heroin. The search extended to every container that could have held the suspected contraband.
United States v. Ross456 U.S. 798 (1982)
In the evening of November 27, 1978, an informant who had previously proved to be reliable telephoned Detective Marcum of the District of Columbia Police Department and told him that an individual known as "Bandit" was selling narcotics kept in the trunk of a car parked at 439 Ridge Street. The informant stated that he had just observed "Bandit" complete a sale and that "Bandit" had told him that additional narcotics were in the trunk. The informant gave Marcum a detailed description of "Bandit" and stated that the car was a "purplish maroon" Chevrolet Malibu with District of Columbia license plates.
Accompanied by Detective Cassidy and Sergeant Gonzales, Marcum immediately drove to the area and found a maroon Malibu parked in front of 439 Ridge Street. A license check disclosed that the car was registered to Albert Ross; a computer check on Ross revealed that he fit the informant's description and used the alias "Bandit." The officers returned five minutes later and observed the maroon Malibu turning off Ridge Street onto Fourth Street. They pulled alongside the Malibu, noticed that the driver matched the informant's description, and stopped the car.
Marcum and Cassidy told the driver — later identified as Albert Ross, the respondent in this action — to get out of the vehicle. While they searched Ross, Sergeant Gonzales discovered a bullet on the car's front seat. He searched the interior of the car and found a pistol in the glove compartment. Ross then was arrested and handcuffed. Detective Cassidy took Ross' keys and opened the trunk, where he found a closed brown paper bag. He opened the bag and discovered several glassine bags containing a white powder. Cassidy replaced the bag, closed the trunk, and drove the car to headquarters.
At the police station Cassidy thoroughly searched the car. In addition to the "lunch-type" brown paper bag, Cassidy found in the trunk a zippered red leather pouch. He unzipped the pouch and discovered $3,200 in cash. The police laboratory later determined that the powder in the paper bag was heroin. No warrant was obtained. Ross was charged with possession of heroin with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). Prior to trial, he moved to suppress the heroin found in the paper bag and the currency found in the leather pouch. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied the motion to suppress. The heroin and currency were introduced in evidence at trial and Ross was convicted. A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction in part. The entire Court of Appeals then voted to rehear the case en banc and held that the police should not have opened either container without first obtaining a warrant. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
While searching Caleb Chang's truck for a stolen firearm under the automobile exception, officers discovered a box of illegal ammunition in plain view inside a toolbox. They seized the ammunition even though they had not anticipated finding it during the initial search for the firearm.
Horton v. California496 U.S. 128 (1990)
Petitioner Terry Brice Horton was convicted of the armed robbery of Erwin Wallaker, the treasurer of the San Jose Coin Club. When Wallaker returned to his home after the Club's annual show, he entered his garage and was accosted by two masked men, one armed with a machine gun and the other with an electrical shocking device. The two men shocked Wallaker, bound and handcuffed him, and robbed him of jewelry and cash. During the encounter sufficient conversation took place to enable Wallaker subsequently to identify petitioner's distinctive voice.
Sergeant LaRault, an experienced police officer, investigated the crime and determined that there was probable cause to search petitioner's home for the proceeds of the robbery and for the weapons used by the robbers. His affidavit for a search warrant referred to police reports that described the weapons as well as the proceeds, but the warrant issued by the Magistrate only authorized a search for the proceeds, including three specifically described rings.
Pursuant to the warrant, LaRault searched petitioner's residence, but he did not find the stolen property. During the course of the search, however, he discovered the weapons in plain view and seized them. Specifically, he seized an Uzi machine gun, a .38-caliber revolver, two stun guns, a handcuff key, a San Jose Coin Club advertising brochure, and a few items of clothing identified by the victim. LaRault testified that while he was searching for the rings, he also was interested in finding other evidence connecting petitioner to the robbery.
The trial court refused to suppress the evidence found in petitioner's home and, after a jury trial, petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to prison. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. It rejected petitioner's argument that the decision in Coolidge required suppression of the seized evidence that had not been listed in the warrant because its discovery was not inadvertent. The California Supreme Court denied petitioner's request for review. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Officers stopped Christopher Collins in his motor home on a highway after receiving a reliable tip that it contained marijuana. They searched the living quarters without a warrant and found the drugs. The search was valid because the motor home was readily mobile and not parked at a fixed residential site.
California v. Carney471 U.S. 386 (1985)
On May 31, 1979, Drug Enforcement Agency Agent Robert Williams watched respondent Charles Carney approach a youth in downtown San Diego. The youth accompanied Carney to a Dodge Mini Motor Home parked in a nearby lot. Carney and the youth closed the window shades in the motor home, including one across the front window. Agent Williams had previously received uncorroborated information that the same motor home was used by another person who was exchanging marihuana for sex. Williams, with assistance from other agents, kept the motor home under surveillance for the entire one and one-quarter hours that Carney and the youth remained inside.
When the youth left the motor home, the agents followed and stopped him. The youth told the agents that he had received marihuana in return for allowing Carney sexual contacts. At the agents’ request, the youth returned to the motor home and knocked on its door; Carney stepped out. The agents identified themselves as law enforcement officers. Without a warrant or consent, one agent entered the motor home and observed marihuana, plastic bags, and a scale of the kind used in weighing drugs on a table. Agent Williams took Carney into custody and took possession of the motor home. A subsequent search of the motor home at the police station revealed additional marihuana in the cupboards and refrigerator.
Respondent was charged with possession of marihuana for sale. At a preliminary hearing, he moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the motor home. The Magistrate denied the motion. Respondent renewed his suppression motion in the Superior Court. The Superior Court also rejected the claim. Respondent then pleaded nolo contendere to the charges against him, and was placed on probation for three years.
Respondent appealed from the order placing him on probation. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court reversed the conviction. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.
Does the Carroll doctrine allow officers to search a vehicle after it has been towed to the station?
Yes. When probable cause exists at the time of the stop, officers may seize the vehicle and conduct the search later at the station without obtaining a warrant.
Supporting sources
Can officers rely on the Carroll doctrine to enter a home's driveway to search a parked vehicle?
No. The automobile exception does not authorize entry onto the curtilage of a home. Officers need separate justification, such as a warrant or exigent circumstances, to enter the driveway area.
Supporting sources
Does the Carroll doctrine permit searches of a passenger's personal containers inside the vehicle?
Yes. Once probable cause supports searching the vehicle, officers may open containers belonging to passengers that could hold the object of the search.
Supporting sources
Does the Carroll doctrine apply to motor homes that are readily mobile?
Yes. The exception covers vehicles with the attributes of mobility and reduced privacy expectations, including motor homes not located at a fixed residential site.
Supporting sources
Carroll
, supra , at 153, and the "
automobile exception
," despite its label, is simply irrelevant. Since
Carroll
would not have justified a warrantless search of the Pontiac at the time Coolidge was arrested, the later search at the…