Also known as: captures · captured · prize capture · maritime seizure
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
A method of acquiring ownership of unowned resources by reducing them to possession. The first person to capture a fugitive resource such as a wild animal obtains title.
A doctrine under which a donee of a general power of appointment who blends the appointive property with the donee's own property in a will is treated as having appointed failed gifts to the donee or the donee's estate.
A method of acquiring ownership of unowned resources by reducing them to possession. The first person to capture a fugitive resource such as a wild animal obtains title.
Clifford Cox, commanding a privateer commissioned by Congress, seized an enemy merchant vessel on the high seas and brought it into port. The vessel's cargo was sold at auction under federal prize proceedings. Because Congress had authorized rules for captures, the proceeds were distributed according to statute rather than reverting to the original owners.
Christian Coleman, a U.S. soldier, took possession of cotton bales belonging to a British subject during the War of 1812. The bales were later condemned by a federal court. Title vested in the captor because the seizure occurred under lawful authority and reduced the goods to possession.
A doctrine under which a donee of a general power of appointment who blends the appointive property with the donee's own property in a will is treated as having appointed failed gifts to the donee or the donee's estate.
Charlotte Chung, donee of a general power, executed a will that blended appointive property with her own estate and made several residuary gifts. Two of the gifts later failed. The court applied capture and directed the failed portions to Charlotte's estate rather than to the takers in default.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Open the case page for the full write-up.
View caseCameron Cole found a herd of unbranded cattle wandering on open range after a storm. He drove the animals into a corral, fed and branded them. Because he reduced the fugitive livestock to possession, a court awarded him ownership under the rule of capture.
In 2001, three current or former female employees of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.—Betty Dukes, Christine Kwapnoski, and Edith Arana—filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of California alleging that the company had discriminated against them and other women in pay and promotions. Wal-Mart, the nation’s largest private employer with approximately 3,400 stores across the country and more than one million employees, delegated pay and promotion decisions to local store managers who exercised broad discretion in a largely subjective manner. The plaintiffs claimed that this discretion was exercised disproportionately in favor of men, resulting in lower pay and fewer promotions for female employees. They sought to represent a class of approximately 1.5 million current and former female employees who had worked at any Wal-Mart domestic retail store since December 26, 1998. To support their motion for class certification, the plaintiffs presented statistical evidence from experts Dr. Richard Drogin and Dr. Marc Bendick showing pay and promotion disparities between men and women, anecdotal evidence consisting of about 120 affidavits from female employees describing discriminatory experiences at only 235 of the company's 3,400 stores, and the testimony of sociologist Dr. William Bielby who analyzed Wal-Mart’s corporate culture. Betty Dukes began working at a Pittsburg, California store in 1994 as a cashier and was later promoted to customer service manager before being demoted; she alleged retaliation and that male greeters were paid more. Christine Kwapnoski worked at Sam’s Club stores and claimed a male manager yelled at female employees and told her to “doll up.” Edith Arana worked at a Duarte, California store from 1995 to 2001. She was denied opportunities for management training despite repeated requests. The District Court certified the class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), finding that the plaintiffs had presented significant evidence of a company-wide pattern of discrimination. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, substantially affirmed the certification order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether the class certification was consistent with Rule 23(a) and (b)(2).
View caseCynthia Carter drilled a well on her land that tapped a common underground reservoir. The extracted oil flowed into her storage tanks. Title to the oil vested in Cynthia once she reduced it to possession even though the pool extended under neighboring tracts.
In July 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building at 201 Featherston Street in Cleburne, Texas. Hannah intended to lease the property to Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC) for use as a group home. The home would house thirteen mentally retarded men and women under constant staff supervision. The building contained four bedrooms and two baths, and CLC planned to add a half bath while complying with all applicable state and federal regulations for an Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded. The site lay in an R-3 Apartment House District. The city's zoning ordinance permitted apartment houses, boarding houses, hospitals, and nursing homes in that district without special permission. However, the ordinance required a special use permit, renewable annually after a public hearing, for hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded. The city classified the proposed group home as a hospital for the feeble-minded and informed CLC that a permit was required. After a public hearing, the City Council voted three to one to deny the application. CLC and its prospective residents filed suit in federal district court against the city and its officials. They alleged that the ordinance and its application discriminated against the mentally retarded in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court upheld the ordinance and the denial. It found that the council's decision was motivated by the residents' mental retardation yet rationally related to legitimate interests such as neighborhood safety and property values. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that mental retardation is a quasi-suspect class and that the ordinance was invalid both facially and as applied. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the equal protection issues raised by the zoning ordinance and its application to the proposed group home.
View caseCarlton Cruz recaptured an escaped convict after the prisoner fled a work detail. He delivered the prisoner to authorities and claimed the posted reward. The court held that Carlton obtained the reward by successfully reducing the fugitive to custody.
On May 22, 1990, at approximately 8:30 p.m., Sacramento County sheriff’s deputy James Everett Smith responded to a call to break up a fight along with another officer, Murray Stapp. Upon returning to his patrol car, Stapp saw a motorcycle operated by 18-year-old Brian Willard carrying 16-year-old Philip Lewis as a passenger approaching at high speed. Neither boy had been involved in the fight that prompted the call. Stapp turned on his overhead rotating lights, yelled to the boys to stop, and pulled his patrol car closer to Smith’s in an attempt to pen the motorcycle in. Instead of pulling over, Willard slowly maneuvered the motorcycle between the two police cars and sped off. Smith immediately switched on his own emergency lights and siren, made a quick turn, and began pursuit at high speed. For 75 seconds over a course of 1.3 miles in a residential neighborhood, the motorcycle wove in and out of oncoming traffic, forcing two cars and a bicycle to swerve off the road, while the vehicles reached speeds up to 100 miles per hour with Smith following at a distance as short as 100 feet. The chase ended after the motorcycle tipped over as Willard tried a sharp left turn. By the time Smith slammed on his brakes, Willard was out of the way, but Lewis was not. The patrol car skidded into him at 40 miles per hour, propelling him some 70 feet down the road and inflicting massive injuries from which Lewis was pronounced dead at the scene. The District Court granted summary judgment for Smith. It reasoned that he was entitled to qualified immunity. Respondents could point to no state or federal opinion published before May 1990 supporting their view of a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right in the context of high-speed police pursuits. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that the appropriate degree of fault to be applied to high-speed police pursuits is deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for a person’s right to life and personal security. The court concluded that the law regarding police liability for death or injury caused by an officer during the course of a high-speed chase was clearly established at the time of Philip Lewis’s death. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits over the standard of culpability on the part of a law enforcement officer for violating substantive due process in a pursuit case.
View case2 common questions
The claimant must reduce the animal to possession through physical capture or mortal wounding that deprives it of its natural liberty. Mere pursuit or proximity is insufficient.
Article I, Section 8 grants Congress power to make rules concerning captures on land and water, confirming that title to seized property vests according to federal statute once possession is obtained.
Walter L. Nixon, Jr., served as Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. A federal grand jury investigated reports that Nixon had accepted a gratuity from a Mississippi businessman in exchange for influencing a local prosecution. Nixon was convicted by a jury of two counts of making false statements before the grand jury and sentenced to prison. He refused to resign his judicial office and continued to receive his salary during his incarceration. On May 10, 1989, the House of Representatives adopted three articles of impeachment against Nixon. The first two articles charged him with giving false testimony before the grand jury, and the third charged him with bringing disrepute on the Federal Judiciary. The Senate then invoked its Impeachment Rule XI, which permits a committee of Senators to receive evidence and take testimony and report to the full Senate. The committee held four days of hearings at which ten witnesses, including Nixon, testified. It submitted a complete transcript and a report summarizing the evidence to the full Senate. Nixon and the House managers submitted briefs and presented oral arguments to the Senate. The Senate convicted Nixon on the first two articles by the required two-thirds majority and removed him from office. Nixon filed suit in federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment that his conviction was void and that his salary and privileges should be reinstated. The district court dismissed the action as nonjusticiable. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View case2 common questions
No. Capture applies only to general powers. Special powers trigger the allocation doctrine instead, which unblends the property and directs it only to permissible appointees.
A blending clause triggers capture when the donee holds a general power and one or more appointed gifts fail. The failed portions are then treated as appointed to the donee or the donee's estate.
…said that somebody "led a good life." They may also mean to refer to the practical manifestation of the human spirit, a meaning captured by the familiar observation that somebody "added life" to an assembly. If there is a shared thread among the various opinions on this subject, it may be that life is an activity which is at…