capacity to sue

In February 1819 the Ohio legislature enacted a statute imposing an annual tax of fifty thousand dollars on each office of discount and deposit maintained by any bank transacting business in the state without authorization under Ohio law. The statute authorized the state auditor to issue warrants for collection of the tax. Those warrants permitted entry into banking houses and seizure of money or goods to satisfy the levy. The Bank of the United States filed a bill in equity in the circuit court for the district of Ohio at the September term 1819. The bill named Ralph Osborn, the state auditor, as defendant and sought an injunction to restrain enforcement of the tax statute against its operations. On September 14, 1819, the circuit court awarded a preliminary injunction upon the posting of a one hundred thousand dollar bond. Subpoena and injunction writs were served on Osborn and on John L. Harper, whom Osborn had employed to collect the tax. On September 17, 1819, after service of the writs, Harper forcibly entered the Bank's office in Chillicothe and seized one hundred thousand dollars in specie and notes. The funds were delivered to H. M. Curry, then treasurer of Ohio. Curry held them separately until his resignation in early 1820, at which point the money passed to his successor, S. Sullivan. An amended bill added Curry, Sullivan, and Harper as defendants. It sought discovery, restoration of the funds, and further injunctive relief. Curry answered admitting receipt of approximately ninety-eight thousand dollars from Harper. He credited the sum to the state but kept it separate. Sullivan, after initially failing to answer and being held in contempt, admitted finding the separate sum upon taking office and holding it untouched. The circuit court entered decrees against Osborn and Harper and directed restoration of the funds with interest on a portion of the specie. The defendants appealed the decree to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court requested argument on whether the Bank's charter conferred jurisdiction on the federal circuit courts and whether Congress possessed constitutional authority to grant such jurisdiction.

On October 4, 1960, a commercial airliner scheduled to fly from Boston to Philadelphia plunged into Boston Harbor shortly after departing from a Boston airport. This crash led to the institution of over 150 actions for personal injury and wrongful death against the airline, manufacturers of the aircraft, the United States, and in some cases the Massachusetts Port Authority. More than 100 of these actions were brought in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. More than 45 actions were instituted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The present case involves 40 wrongful death actions brought in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by personal representatives of victims of the crash. These plaintiffs are described as Pennsylvania fiduciaries representing the estates of Pennsylvania decedents. The defendants moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer these actions to the District of Massachusetts. The defendants alleged that most of the witnesses resided there and that over 100 other actions were already pending in that district. The District Court granted the defendants' motion to transfer the actions. The plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had erred and should vacate its transfer order. The Court of Appeals concluded that a transfer could be granted only if the plaintiffs had qualified to sue in Massachusetts at the time the suits were brought in Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review important questions concerning the construction and operation of § 1404(a). Prior citations in the case include the District Court decision at 204 F. Supp. 426 and the Court of Appeals decision at 309 F. 2d 953.

In this personal injury action, plaintiff Marilyn S. White alleged that she was a passenger in a truck driven by defendant Robert W. White. They were traveling south on Interstate 35 near the city of Louisville, Texas, when the defendant lost control of his truck, overturning it and causing injury to her body. The petition alleged that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by negligent acts of the defendant. He failed to keep a proper lookout for vehicles properly on the highway. He followed the vehicle in front of him too closely in violation of specific Texas statutes which were pleaded and attached. Robert White drove his vehicle into a space between the divided roadway and failed to keep his vehicle only upon the righthand roadway in violation of another specific Texas statute which was pleaded. He drove his vehicle at a speed that was greater than reasonable and prudent under the circumstances in violation of another specific Texas statute which was also pleaded and attached. The plaintiff pleaded that as a result of said negligent actions she suffered broken bones and other injuries to the body resulting in permanent disability, medical expenses, and lost income with her damages totaling some $200,000.00. The petition further alleged that at the time of the accident the defendants Robert W. White and Edward White were engaged in a joint venture or partnership operating a long-haul truck tractor-trailer. The plaintiff was employed by the defendants to help operate the truck. At the time of the accident she was within the scope of her employment. The defendants failed to carry Workmen’s Compensation Insurance, and that she has elected to proceed in the District Court. Attached to the petition and made a part thereof was the Motor Carrier Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability Certificate of Insurance. The Corporation Commission of Oklahoma certified that Employers Casualty Corporation had issued to Edward White of Fort Cobb, Oklahoma an insurance policy covering the obligations imposed upon the insured by the Oklahoma Motor Vehicle provisions. Employers Casualty Corporation is not a party to this appeal because the cause against it was dismissed without prejudice by the plaintiff. In response to the petition the defendants Robert W. White and Edward White filed special demurrers. They demurred to the petition on the grounds that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue and that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. In arguing that the demurrers should be sustained both Robert and Edward White argued that the plaintiff Marilyn S. White lacks the capacity to sue because she is the wife of Robert W. White and under the laws of Texas one spouse may not bring a personal injury action against the other. This fact does not appear on the face of the petition. The defendants also argued that in fact the plaintiff was not their employee but was a co-employer. They relied upon facts which do not appear upon the face of the petition. The trial court sustained the demurrers to the petition and dismissed the case with prejudice. The plaintiff appealed, and the matter came before the Supreme Court of Oklahoma for review.