Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989, established several requirements governing the performance of abortions within the Commonwealth. The Act required a woman seeking an abortion to provide informed consent after receiving specific information from a physician or counselor at least twenty-four hours before the procedure. It mandated that a minor obtain the informed consent of one parent, subject to a judicial bypass option. It further required a married woman to sign a statement confirming that she had notified her husband of her planned abortion, unless certain exceptions applied. The Act also imposed reporting obligations on facilities providing abortion services and defined a medical emergency exception to the various requirements. Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The petitioners were five abortion clinics and one physician representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provide abortion services. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and challenged each provision as unconstitutional on its face. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction. After conducting a three-day bench trial, the District Court held all the provisions unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against their enforcement by Pennsylvania. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It adopted the District Court's factual findings and legal analysis except with respect to the spousal notification requirement. The Court of Appeals upheld the spousal notification requirement as constitutional and applied the undue burden standard in evaluating the provisions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.

James Dale entered scouting in 1978 at the age of eight by joining Monmouth Council’s Cub Scout Pack 142. He became a Boy Scout in 1981. Dale achieved the rank of Eagle Scout in 1988 after earning 25 merit badges and being inducted into the Order of the Arrow. In 1989, Dale applied for and received approval for adult membership in the Boy Scouts. He served as an assistant scoutmaster for Troop 73 in Matawan, New Jersey. Around the same time, Dale’s position as co-president of the Lesbian/Gay Alliance at Rutgers University was publicized in a July 1990 newspaper interview. Later that month, the Boy Scouts sent Dale a letter revoking his adult membership. The letter stated that his membership was inconsistent with the values and standards of the Boy Scouts of America. It explained that the organization specifically forbids membership to homosexuals. Dale responded by filing a complaint in New Jersey Superior Court against the Boy Scouts and the Monmouth Council. He alleged that the revocation violated the New Jersey public accommodations statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Boy Scouts. The New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately held that the Boy Scouts is a place of public accommodation subject to the law and that Dale’s expulsion violated the statute. The Boy Scouts petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The United States Supreme Court granted the petition to determine whether the application of New Jersey’s public accommodations law in this case violates the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of expressive association.

In August 1981, a confidential informant of unproven reliability informed an officer of the Burbank Police Department that two persons known to him as Armando and Patsy were selling large quantities of cocaine and methaqualone from their residence at 620 Price Drive in Burbank, Cal. The informant also indicated that he had witnessed a sale of methaqualone by Patsy at the residence approximately five months earlier. He had observed at that time a shoebox containing a large amount of cash that belonged to Patsy. He further declared that Armando and Patsy generally kept only small quantities of drugs at their residence and stored the remainder at another location in Burbank. On the basis of this information, the Burbank police initiated an extensive investigation focusing first on the Price Drive residence and later on two other residences as well. Cars parked at the Price Drive residence were determined to belong to respondents Armando Sanchez, who had previously been arrested for possession of marihuana, and Patsy Stewart, who had no criminal record. During the course of the investigation, officers observed an automobile belonging to respondent Ricardo Del Castillo, who had previously been arrested for possession of 50 pounds of marihuana, arrive at the Price Drive residence. The driver of that car entered the house, exited shortly thereafter carrying a small paper sack, and drove away. A check of Del Castillo's probation records led the officers to respondent Alberto Leon, whose telephone number Del Castillo had listed as his employer's. Leon had been arrested in 1980 on drug charges, and a companion had informed the police at that time that Leon was heavily involved in the importation of drugs into this country. Before the current investigation began, the Burbank officers had learned that an informant had told a Glendale police officer that Leon stored a large quantity of methaqualone at his residence in Glendale. During the course of this investigation, the Burbank officers learned that Leon was living at 716 South Sunset Canyon in Burbank. Subsequently, the officers observed several persons, at least one of whom had prior drug involvement, arriving at the Price Drive residence and leaving with small packages. They observed a variety of other material activity at the two residences as well as at a condominium at 7902 Via Magdalena. They witnessed a variety of relevant activity involving respondents' automobiles. The officers also observed respondents Sanchez and Stewart board separate flights for Miami. The pair later returned to Los Angeles together, consented to a search of their luggage that revealed only a small amount of marihuana, and left the airport. Based on these and other observations summarized in the affidavit, App. 34, Officer Cyril Rombach of the Burbank Police Department, an experienced and well-trained narcotics investigator, prepared an application for a warrant to search 620 Price Drive, 716 South Sunset Canyon, 7902 Via Magdalena, and automobiles registered to each of the respondents for an extensive list of items believed to be related to respondents' drug-trafficking activities. Officer Rombach's extensive application was reviewed by several Deputy District Attorneys. A facially valid search warrant was issued in September 1981 by a State Superior Court Judge. The ensuing searches produced large quantities of drugs at the Via Magdalena and Sunset Canyon addresses and a small quantity at the Price Drive residence. Other evidence was discovered at each of the residences and in Stewart's and Del Castillo's automobiles. Respondents were indicted by a grand jury in the District Court for the Central District of California and charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and a variety of substantive counts. The respondents then filed motions to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing and, while recognizing that the case was a close one, see id., at 131, granted the motions to suppress in part. It concluded that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause. It did not suppress all of the evidence as to all of the respondents because none of the respondents had standing to challenge all of the searches. In response to a request from the Government, the court made clear that Officer Rombach had acted in good faith, but it rejected the Government's suggestion that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not apply where evidence is seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant. The District Court denied the Government's motion for reconsideration, id., at 147, and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, judgt. order reported at 701 F. 2d 187 (1983). The Court of Appeals first concluded that Officer Rombach's affidavit could not establish probable cause to search the Price Drive residence. To the extent that the affidavit set forth facts demonstrating the basis of the informant's knowledge of criminal activity, the information included was fatally stale. The affidavit, moreover, failed to establish the informant's credibility. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that the information provided by the informant was inadequate under both prongs of the two-part test established in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969). The officers' independent investigation neither cured the staleness nor corroborated the details of the informant's declarations. The Court of Appeals then considered whether the affidavit formed a proper basis for the search of the Sunset Canyon residence. In its view, the affidavit included no facts indicating the basis for the informants' statements concerning respondent Leon's criminal activities and was devoid of information establishing the informants' reliability. Because these deficiencies had not been cured by the police investigation, the District Court properly suppressed the fruits of the search. The Court of Appeals refused the Government's invitation to recognize a good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a. The Government's petition for certiorari expressly declined to seek review of the lower courts' determinations that the search warrant was unsupported by probable cause. It presented only the question whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the propriety of such a modification. 463 U. S. 1206 (1983). Although it undoubtedly is within our power to consider the question whether probable cause existed under the totality of the circumstances test announced last Term in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (1983), that question has not been briefed or argued. It is also within our authority, which we choose to exercise, to take the case as it comes to us, accepting the Court of Appeals' conclusion that probable cause was lacking under the prevailing legal standards. See this Court's Rule 21.1(a).

Washington allows citizens to challenge state laws by referendum. Roughly four percent of Washington voters must sign a petition to place a referendum on the ballot, and each signature must include the signer's address and county of registration. The secretary of state verifies and canvasses the petitions to ensure only lawful signatures are counted. The Washington Public Records Act authorizes private parties to obtain copies of government documents, and the state treats submitted referendum petitions as public records subject to disclosure. In May 2009 Governor Christine Gregoire signed Senate Bill 5688, which expanded the rights and responsibilities of state-registered domestic partners, including same-sex domestic partners. That same month Protect Marriage Washington organized as a state political committee to collect signatures for a referendum on the bill. On July 25, 2009, Protect Marriage Washington submitted a petition containing over 137,000 signatures. The secretary of state determined the petition contained enough valid signatures, the referendum known as R-71 appeared on the November 2009 ballot, and voters approved the bill by a margin of 53 percent to 47 percent. By August 20, 2009, the secretary of state had received requests for copies of the R-71 petition from an individual and four entities, including Washington Coalition for Open Government and Washington Families Standing Together. Two entities issued a joint press release stating their intention to post the names of the R-71 petition signers online in a searchable format. The referendum petition sponsor and signers filed a complaint and motion for preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Count I of the complaint alleged the Public Records Act is unconstitutional as applied to referendum petitions generally. Count II alleged the Act is unconstitutional as applied to the Referendum 71 petition because signatories faced a reasonable probability of threats, harassment, and reprisals. The district court granted a preliminary injunction on Count I. The Ninth Circuit reversed that decision on Count I. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.