burden of persuasion

On December 27, 1970, Gordon Patterson shot and killed John Northrup in Glens Falls, New York. After a brief and unstable marriage, Patterson had become estranged from his wife Roberta. Roberta had resumed an association with Northrup, a neighbor to whom she had been engaged before her marriage to Patterson. Patterson borrowed a rifle from an acquaintance and went to the residence of his father-in-law. There he observed his wife through a window in a state of semiundress in Northrup's presence. He entered the house and killed Northrup by shooting him twice in the head. Patterson was charged with second-degree murder. At his jury trial in Warren County Court, Patterson raised the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance and presented psychiatric evidence tending to show that he had been extremely emotionally disturbed when he killed Northrup. The jury was instructed that the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime of murder. The defendant had the burden of proving the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury convicted Patterson of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. While appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was pending, this Court decided Mullaney v. Wilbur. The New York Court of Appeals nevertheless affirmed, distinguishing the Maine statute at issue in Mullaney and holding that New York's allocation of the burden of proof on the affirmative defense was consistent with due process. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question whether the burden of proof placed on the defendant by New York law is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Petitioner, a black man, was indicted in Jefferson Circuit Court on two counts of second-degree burglary and one count of receipt of stolen goods. On the first day of trial, the judge conducted voir dire examination of the venire. He excused certain jurors for cause and permitted the parties to exercise peremptory challenges. The prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all four black persons on the venire. A jury composed only of white persons was selected. Defense counsel moved to discharge the jury before it was sworn. The motion claimed that the prosecutor's removal of the black veniremen violated petitioner's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a jury drawn from a cross section of the community and under the Fourteenth Amendment to equal protection of the laws. Counsel requested a hearing on his motion. Without expressly ruling on the request for a hearing, the trial judge observed that the parties were entitled to use their peremptory challenges to strike anybody they wanted to. The judge denied the motion. The jury convicted petitioner on both counts. He was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment on each count with the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, petitioner argued that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges violated his right to trial by an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner also contended that the facts showed the prosecutor had engaged in a pattern of discriminatory challenges. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the conviction. It relied on Swain v. Alabama and held that petitioner had failed to show that the prosecutor had engaged in a pattern of discrimination in the selection of jurors in a series of cases. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In January 1994, James Tuerff, the president of American General, met with Richard Vie, Unitrin’s chief executive officer, to discuss American General potentially acquiring other companies including Unitrin. Vie replied that Unitrin had excellent prospects as an independent company and had never considered a merger, indicating that Unitrin was not for sale. The Unitrin Board confirmed this position at its February 1994 meeting. On July 12, 1994, American General sent a letter to Vie proposing a consensual merger transaction in which it would purchase all of Unitrin’s 51.8 million outstanding shares of common stock for $50.50 per share, in cash. The Offer price represented a 30% premium over the market price of Unitrin’s shares. The offer was conditioned on development of a merger agreement and regulatory approval. American General stated it would consider offering a higher price or tax-free alternatives if Unitrin could demonstrate additional value. Upon receiving the offer, the Unitrin Board’s Executive Committee engaged legal counsel and scheduled a telephonic Board meeting for July 18. The Unitrin Board met for seven hours on July 25, 1994, in Los Angeles with all directors present. Vie reviewed Unitrin’s financial condition and ongoing business strategies while Morgan Stanley presented its opinion that the offer was financially inadequate and legal counsel raised antitrust concerns about the combination. The Board unanimously concluded that the merger proposal was not in the best interests of Unitrin’s shareholders and voted to reject the offer. Vie sent a letter to American General stating that Unitrin was not for sale and had the financial capacity to pursue all avenues the Board considered appropriate. On August 2, 1994, American General issued a press release announcing its offer, after which trading volume and the market price of Unitrin stock increased. At its regularly scheduled meeting on August 3, the Unitrin Board viewed the public announcement as a hostile act designed to coerce a sale at an inadequate price. The Board unanimously approved a shareholder rights plan and an advance notice bylaw provision. Between August 2 and August 12, Unitrin issued a series of press releases asserting that its stock was undervalued and that the Board had adopted a poison pill. On August 11, 1994, the Unitrin Board met to consider the Repurchase Program after receiving materials from Morgan Stanley that recommended an open market stock repurchase. The Board voted to authorize the repurchase of up to ten million shares of its outstanding stock. Unitrin publicly announced the Repurchase Program on August 12, noting that the directors who owned 23 percent of the stock would not participate. The company’s certificate of incorporation included a supermajority voting provision. By noon on August 24, Morgan Stanley had purchased nearly five million shares on Unitrin’s behalf at an average price slightly above the offer price. American General and Unitrin shareholder plaintiffs filed suit in the Court of Chancery seeking to enjoin the Repurchase Program. On August 26, 1994, the Court of Chancery temporarily restrained Unitrin from making any further repurchases. After expedited discovery, briefing, and argument, the Court of Chancery entered a preliminary injunction on October 13, 1994, enjoining further repurchases on the ground that the Repurchase Program was a disproportionate response. The Court of Chancery certified an interlocutory appeal on October 24, 1994, which this Court accepted on October 27, 1994.

In September 1976, respondent David Washington committed a series of crimes over a ten-day period in the Miami area that included three brutal stabbing murders along with torture, kidnapping, severe assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and theft. After his two accomplices were arrested, Washington surrendered to police and gave a lengthy statement confessing to the third criminal episode. The State of Florida indicted him for kidnapping and murder and appointed an experienced criminal lawyer to represent him. Washington waived his right to a jury trial against counsel's advice and pleaded guilty to all charges, including the three capital murder counts. In the plea colloquy he stated that he had committed a string of burglaries but had no significant prior criminal record and that he had been under extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family. Counsel spoke with Washington about his background, contacted his wife and mother by telephone, but did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric examination. At the sentencing hearing before the trial judge, counsel's strategy relied primarily on the plea colloquy to convey remorse and emotional stress and argued that these factors justified sparing Washington the death penalty. Counsel successfully moved to exclude Washington's rap sheet and decided not to request a presentence report because it would have included his criminal history. The trial judge found multiple aggravating circumstances for each murder and no mitigating circumstances, sentencing Washington to death on each of the three murder counts. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Washington sought collateral relief in state court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on six grounds including failure to request a psychiatric report, investigate and present character witnesses, and seek a presentence investigation report. He submitted fourteen affidavits from friends, neighbors, and relatives willing to testify and two reports from a psychiatrist and psychologist. The state trial court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Washington then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. After an evidentiary hearing at which trial counsel testified, the District Court denied relief, concluding that although counsel made errors in judgment by failing to investigate mitigating evidence further, no prejudice resulted. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for application of a new framework it developed for analyzing ineffectiveness claims. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the proper standards for judging claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a capital sentencing proceeding.