Also known as: bona fide residence requirements · bona fide residency requirement · bona fide residence requirement · bona fide residency req · durational residency requirements
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A requirement that a person in fact reside within the jurisdiction to receive a benefit or engage in an activity. It distinguishes residents from nonresidents on the basis of current actual residence rather than the length of time a person has lived in the state.
Belinda Baxter moved from State X to State Y and applied for general relief cash assistance. She met all financial criteria and had established a permanent home in State Y. The agency granted benefits because she satisfied the actual residence condition. The program imposed no waiting period based on when she arrived.
Brianna Burke relocated to State Y for employment and enrolled her child in public university. She proved current residence with a lease and utility bills. The university extended in-state tuition rates because she met the bona fide residency test. No durational waiting period applied to her application.
California participates in the federal AFDC program under the Social Security Act. In 1992 California enacted section 11450.03 of its Welfare and Institutions Code. That statute limited the maximum AFDC benefits payable to any family that had resided in California for less than twelve months to the amount the family would have received in its state of prior residence. In one year the AFDC program served an average of 2,645,814 persons per month at an annual state cost of $2.9 billion. The full monthly grant for a family of two was $456, compared with $275 in Arizona. Three California residents who had recently moved from Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Colorado filed suit in the Eastern District of California. They alleged that their grants would be reduced from $641 or $504 to $190, $341, or $280 for the first year. The district court issued a temporary restraining order and later a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Anderson v. Green because the Secretary of Health and Human Services had not yet determined whether the statute complied with federal requirements. After the Secretary issued a waiver the case was dismissed. In 1996 Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. That statute replaced AFDC with TANF and expressly authorized states to apply the benefit rules of a family’s prior state for the first twelve months of residence. California then announced that enforcement of section 11450.03 would begin April 1, 1997. On that date two new plaintiffs, one who had moved from Oklahoma and one from the District of Columbia, filed the present action in the Eastern District of California. They acted on behalf of a certified class of all present and future TANF applicants who would be denied full California benefits because they had not resided in the state for twelve consecutive months. The district court again issued a temporary restraining order and, after hearing evidence, a preliminary injunction. The evidence showed that California’s benefits ranked sixth highest in absolute terms but eighteenth when housing costs were considered. New residents from forty-three states would face higher living costs. The statute would save the state approximately $10.9 million annually. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction without finally deciding the merits. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The All County Letter implementing the statute provided that even lifelong California residents who left the state for part of a year would have their benefits calculated under the law of the other state for that period. The lower benefit level applied regardless of whether the family had received welfare in the prior state or the motive for moving. Families arriving from another country were exempt. The district court noted that other programs such as homeless assistance and an extra food-stamp allowance partially offset the disparity. The state did not dispute that the statute created significant differences between newcomers and longer-term residents.
View caseBrooke Bryant established a home in Maricopa County and sought free medical treatment at the county hospital. She presented proof of ongoing residence through voter registration and employment records. The hospital approved care because she satisfied the actual residency requirement. Officials did not inquire into the date she moved into the county.
In early June 1971, appellant Henry Evaro, an indigent suffering from a chronic asthmatic and bronchial illness, moved from New Mexico to Phoenix in Maricopa County, Arizona. On July 8, 1971, Evaro experienced a severe respiratory attack and was sent by his attending physician to appellant Memorial Hospital, a nonprofit private community hospital in the county. Memorial notified the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors of the indigent patient in its charge and requested Evaro's transfer to the county's public hospital facility, while also claiming reimbursement of $1,202.60 for services rendered. Arizona law imposes on each county the mandatory duty to provide necessary hospital and medical care to its indigent sick. Eligibility for free nonemergency care requires that the indigent have resided in the county for the preceding twelve months. Maricopa County refused to admit Evaro to its public hospital or to reimburse Memorial solely on the ground that he had not satisfied the one-year residence requirement. Appellees do not dispute that Evaro is indigent and a bona fide resident of the county. Appellants Memorial Hospital and Evaro then brought this action against Maricopa County to determine the county's obligation to provide care for Evaro or to reimburse the hospital for its costs. The trial court held the durational residence requirement unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. A prior federal district court decision had reached the same conclusion with respect to Pinal County, yet the Arizona Supreme Court upheld the requirement as applied to Maricopa County. To resolve the conflict between the federal court and the state supreme court, the United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseBobby Brady moved to Iowa and filed for divorce after securing local employment and housing. He demonstrated current residence with a lease and paycheck stubs. The court accepted jurisdiction because he met the bona fide residency standard. The rule required only actual presence, not a fixed period of prior stay.
Carol Sosna married Michael Sosna on September 5, 1964, in Michigan. They lived together in New York between October 1967 and August 1971, after which they separated but continued to reside there. In August 1972 Sosna moved to Iowa with her three children. The following month she petitioned the District Court of Jackson County, Iowa, for dissolution of her marriage. Michael Sosna was personally served when he visited Iowa and made a special appearance to contest jurisdiction. The Iowa court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction under Iowa Code § 598.6 because Sosna had not resided in the state for one year preceding the filing. Instead of appealing, Sosna filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on constitutional grounds. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. While the federal action was pending, the Iowa Supreme Court decided In re Marriage of Williams, 217 N.W.2d 202 (1974), and upheld the statute's constitutionality. The three-judge court upheld the residency requirement. This Court noted probable jurisdiction. During the appeal Sosna obtained a divorce in New York, though custody and support issues remained unresolved from the Iowa proceeding. She returned to Iowa to prosecute the appeal. Sosna sought class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to represent Iowa residents who had lived in the state less than one year and wished to initiate divorce actions but were barred by the residency requirement. The parties stipulated that numerous people were similarly situated, joinder was impracticable, her claims were representative, and she would adequately protect class interests. The district court approved the stipulation in a pretrial order.
View caseBianca Baker, a lawful permanent resident, settled in the state and applied for public assistance. She supplied evidence of her current address and intent to remain. The agency approved benefits because she satisfied the actual residency condition. Officials did not impose any additional durational test.
Carmen Richardson, a lawfully admitted resident alien who emigrated from Mexico in 1956, was 64 years old when she instituted suit in July 1969 after becoming permanently and totally disabled. She had resided continuously in Arizona but was denied assistance to the permanently and totally disabled under Arizona Revised Statutes section 46-233 solely due to the requirement that aliens reside in the United States for fifteen years. Similar provisions conditioned old-age assistance and aid to the needy blind on citizenship or the same durational residency. Richardson brought a class action in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona against the Commissioner of the Department of Public Welfare seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as back payments. The three-judge court upheld Mrs. Richardson's motion for summary judgment on equal protection grounds. The Commissioner appealed. Probable jurisdiction was noted. In the consolidated Pennsylvania case, Elsie Mary Jane Leger, who arrived from Scotland in 1965 and later entered a common-law marriage with a United States citizen, and Beryl Jervis, who arrived from Panama in 1968, both lawfully admitted resident aliens and taxpaying residents, were denied general assistance under Pennsylvania Public Welfare Code section 432(2) because they were not citizens. Both had become ill and unable to work, rendering them ineligible for federal programs, and Leger received a temporary restraining order allowing her to obtain benefits. The Pennsylvania plaintiffs filed class actions in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against state welfare officials. After a stipulation that denial caused undue hardship and encouraged departure from the state, the three-judge court enjoined enforcement of the citizenship restriction. The defendants appealed, with probable jurisdiction noted, and the cases reached the Supreme Court for review. The Arizona program participated in federal categorical assistance under the Social Security Act, while the Pennsylvania general assistance was state-funded only.
View caseBei Bai established residence in the City of Mobile and registered to vote. She presented a utility bill and driver's license showing her current address. Election officials accepted the registration because she met the bona fide residency requirement. The rule did not condition eligibility on length of prior residence.
The city of Mobile was incorporated in 1814. In 1866 its charter was superseded by a new one that established a three-member Board of Commissioners elected at large. One commissioner was elected to an executive position, and the other two were elected to positions with legislative and quasi-judicial responsibilities. In 1911 the Alabama Legislature authorized every large municipality to adopt a commission form of government. Mobile established its City Commission in the same year and has maintained that basic system ever since. The three commissioners jointly exercise all legislative, executive, and administrative power. In 1931 the Alabama Legislature enacted a statute authorizing voters to adopt a three-member commission form with all members elected at large for concurrent four-year terms in a single election where the top three vote-getters win. Mobile voters approved this system, which has remained in place since. Candidates run citywide for numbered posts and must win by majority vote. After election the commissioners designate one as mayor for a largely ceremonial role. Mobile's population is approximately 190,000, of whom approximately 35% are Negro. No Negro has ever been elected to the City Commission. Negro citizens of Mobile brought a class action in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Alabama against the city and its three incumbent commissioners. The complaint alleged that the at-large system unfairly diluted Negro voting strength in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Fifteenth Amendment. Following a bench trial the District Court found that the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs had been violated. It entered judgment for them and ordered that the commission be replaced by a mayor-council government with members elected from single-member districts. The District Court found that Mobile has a long history of public and private discrimination against Negroes, that Negroes register and vote in lower numbers than whites, and that Negroes and whites tend to vote as blocs. It also found that the at-large system has the effect of diluting Negro voting strength, yet found that the commission has been responsive to the needs of the Negro community and that there are no official obstacles preventing Negroes from registering, voting, or becoming candidates. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, agreeing that the at-large elections violated the Fourteenth Amendment. It did not reach the Fifteenth Amendment issue. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction. The case was originally argued in the 1978 Term and reargued in the present Term.
View caseA bona fide residency requirement insists only that a person actually reside in the state. It draws a line between residents and nonresidents. A durational requirement instead distinguishes among residents based on how long they have lived in the state and often penalizes recent arrivals.
A state may condition benefits on actual current residence because the requirement treats all residents equally once they establish residence. It does not penalize the act of moving between states. Courts uphold such rules when they serve legitimate interests such as verifying eligibility for in-state tuition or local programs.
No. Bona fide residency requirements receive rational basis review because they do not burden the right to travel. They merely confirm that the claimant is a current resident entitled to equal treatment with other residents. Strict scrutiny applies only when the rule imposes a durational waiting period that penalizes recent interstate movement.
…did not seek to intervene or to file an amicus brief. Reasoning that PRWORA permitted, but did not require, States to impose durational residency requirements, Judge Levi concluded that the existence of the federal statute did not affect the legal analysis in his prior opinion in Green . He did, however, make certain additional comments on the…