Also known as:balance of the sentence suspended · suspended sentence
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A sentencing disposition in which a criminal defendant is sentenced to jail but credited with the time already served before trial, resulting in a suspension of the remaining sentence and release of the defendant from custody.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
Misdemeanor Shoplifting Sentence
Dana, a mall kiosk clerk, was convicted of misdemeanor shoplifting. The court imposed a 60-day jail term but credited her with time served before trial and suspended the balance, releasing her immediately on conditions. If she later violates those conditions the suspended portion can be activated.
Contempt Appearance Failure
Rivera, a solo practitioner, missed multiple court dates and was convicted of misdemeanor contempt. The judge imposed a 30-day jail term, credited prior custody, suspended the balance, and released him on the condition of future appearances.
In the early morning hours, a Missouri police officer on highway patrol stopped Tyler McNeely’s truck at approximately 2:08 a.m. after observing it exceed the posted speed limit and repeatedly cross the centerline.
The officer noticed several signs that McNeely was intoxicated, including bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and the smell of alcohol on his breath. McNeely acknowledged that he had consumed a couple of beers at a bar, appeared unsteady on his feet when he exited the truck, and performed poorly on a battery of field-sobriety tests before declining to use a portable breath-test device.
The officer placed McNeely under arrest and began transporting him to the station house. When McNeely indicated that he would again refuse to provide a breath sample, the officer changed course and took him to a nearby hospital for blood testing without attempting to secure a warrant. Upon arrival at the hospital, the officer read McNeely a standard implied consent form explaining that refusal to submit voluntarily to the test would lead to immediate revocation of his driver’s license for one year and could be used against him in a future prosecution under Missouri law. McNeely nonetheless refused consent.
The officer then directed a hospital lab technician to take a blood sample, which was secured at approximately 2:35 a.m. Subsequent laboratory testing measured McNeely’s blood alcohol concentration at 0.154 percent. McNeely was charged with driving while intoxicated. He moved to suppress the blood test result, arguing that taking his blood without a warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
The trial court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that the exigency exception did not apply because, apart from the natural dissipation of blood alcohol, no circumstances suggested that the officer faced an emergency in which he could not practicably obtain a warrant. The Missouri Court of Appeals stated an intention to reverse but transferred the case directly to the Missouri Supreme Court, which affirmed the suppression order. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.
Darius, a minor league baseball player, was convicted of misdemeanor assault after an altercation with a fan. The court sentenced him to 90 days in jail, credited time served, suspended the balance, and released him conditioned on counseling and good behavior.
Taylor v. Illinois484 U.S. 400 (1988)
In August 1981 a street fight occurred on the south side of Chicago during which Jack Bridges was stabbed in the back. Kevin Taylor was charged with attempted murder and aggravated battery arising from that incident. The State’s evidence at trial included testimony from Bridges, his brother, and three other witnesses who described a twenty-minute argument earlier in the evening and a later violent encounter in which Taylor allegedly stabbed Bridges and fired a gun at him.
Well in advance of trial the prosecutor filed a discovery motion requesting a list of all defense witnesses. Taylor’s original response identified two sisters who later testified and two men who did not testify. On the first day of trial the defense was permitted to amend its answer by adding the names of Derrick Travis and a Chicago police officer, neither of whom ultimately testified.
On the second day of trial, after the prosecution’s two principal witnesses had completed their testimony, defense counsel made an oral motion to amend the answer to discovery by adding Alfred Wormley and Pam Berkhalter. Counsel represented that he had just been informed about the witnesses and that they had probably seen the entire incident. The trial judge expressed concern that witnesses were being found that really were not there and directed counsel to produce them the next day.
The following morning Wormley appeared and testified outside the presence of the jury. He stated that before the incident he saw Bridges and his brother with two guns wrapped in a blanket, heard them say they were after Taylor, and later warned Taylor to watch out. On cross-examination Wormley acknowledged that he had first met Taylor about four months earlier, more than two years after the incident, and that defense counsel had visited him at his home the week before trial. The judge found a blatant and willful discovery violation, expressed doubt about Wormley’s veracity, and excluded the testimony.
Taylor was convicted of attempted murder and aggravated battery and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, finding that counsel had acted in bad faith and that exclusion was a proper sanction. The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Compulsory Process Clause had been violated.
Bryce, an apartment complex manager, was convicted of a misdemeanor housing-code violation. The court imposed a 30-day jail term, credited time already served, suspended the balance, and released him on condition of compliance with repair orders.
State v. Miller783 S.E.2d 512 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016)
In 2012 Austin Lynn Miller was convicted of one count of possession of a methamphetamine precursor and one count of maintaining a vehicle or dwelling for sale or delivery of a controlled substance. The trial court imposed a suspended sentence of 16 to 20 months and placed him on 36 months of supervised probation.
Effective 1 January 2012 the General Assembly enacted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-113.52A, which required retailers to submit purchaser information for pseudoephedrine products to the National Precursor Log Exchange system before completing any sale and to generate stop-sale alerts when quantity limits would be exceeded. Effective 1 December 2013 the legislature added subsection (c) to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(d1)(1), making it unlawful for any person previously convicted of possession or manufacture of methamphetamine to possess a pseudoephedrine product and classifying any violation as a Class H felony.
On 7 January 2014 Miller purchased one 3.6-gram box of allergy and congestion relief medicine containing pseudoephedrine from the Boone Walmart. The transaction was recorded in the NPLEx system and no stop-sale alert was issued. Detective John Hollar of the Watauga County Sheriff's Office reviewed the weekend NPLEx logs, identified Miller's purchase, visited the store, and obtained a receipt bearing Miller's electronic signature even though the surveillance video system had not functioned. On 23 January 2014 Hollar obtained an arrest warrant that he served on Miller at his probation officer's office the following day.
On 4 August 2014 Miller was indicted under the new subsection. On 4 February 2015 he filed a motion to declare the statute unconstitutional as applied to him. The case was tried at the 2 February 2015 criminal session of Watauga County Superior Court before Judge Eric C. Morgan. After a pretrial hearing at which the State compared the statute to the felony-firearm possession law, the trial court denied the motion. The State presented testimony from Detective Hollar and the Walmart pharmacy manager. The court denied Miller's motion to dismiss at the close of the State's evidence. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the court imposed a suspended sentence of 6 to 17 months together with 24 months of supervised probation.
Miller indicated at sentencing that he wished to appeal but did not give oral notice after entry of judgment or file written notice within fourteen days as required by N.C. R. App. P. 4(a). On 5 June 2015 Miller filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals of North Carolina. The State filed a response acknowledging the court's discretion to grant the petition. By order entered 24 June 2015 the petition was referred to the panel, which allowed it and addressed the merits of the appeal.
Erin, an auto shop mechanic, was convicted of a misdemeanor safety violation. The court sentenced her to 60 days in jail, credited time served, suspended the balance, and released her conditioned on avoiding certain work and attending a seminar.
United States v. Bagley473 U.S. 667 (1985)
In October 1977 respondent Hughes Anderson Bagley was indicted in the Western District of Washington on fifteen counts of violating federal narcotics and firearms statutes.
On November 18, 1977, twenty-four days before trial, Bagley filed a discovery motion requesting the names and addresses of government witnesses, their prior criminal records, and any deals, promises or inducements made to witnesses in exchange for their testimony. The government's response identified James F. O'Connor and Donald E. Mitchell as its two principal witnesses and stated that each had been paid $250 for information and expenses. It produced forms signed by both men entitled "Contract for Purchase of Information and Payment of Cash Reward" showing the $250 payments.
O'Connor and Mitchell were state law-enforcement officers employed by the Milwaukee Railroad as private security guards. Between April and June 1977 they assisted the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in an undercover investigation of Bagley. At the December 1977 bench trial O'Connor and Mitchell testified that they had observed Bagley selling a handgun to a third person and test-firing several weapons. The district court found Bagley guilty on the narcotics charges, acquitted him on the firearms charges, and sentenced him to a total of twenty years' imprisonment, all but two years of which were suspended.
In mid-1980 Bagley filed requests under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act and received copies of additional ATF contracts that O'Connor and Mitchell had signed on May 3, 1977. Each contract was entitled "Contract for Purchase of Information and Payment of Lump Sum Therefor." The printed portion stated that the vendor would provide information to ATF and that upon accomplishment of the objective the United States would pay a sum commensurate with services and information rendered.
The typewritten description stated that each man would provide information regarding violations committed by Bagley, purchase evidence for ATF, work undercover, assist in gathering evidence, and testify against the violator in federal court. The contracts also provided for monthly payments of $300 up to a maximum of $3,000 and a $2,500 reward for information leading to arrest and conviction. On the basis of the newly obtained contracts Bagley moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence, alleging that the government's failure to disclose the contracts violated his right to due process. After an evidentiary hearing before a magistrate, the district court denied the motion, finding beyond a reasonable doubt that disclosure of the agreements would have had no effect on its finding of guilt. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Leo, a solo practitioner, was convicted of misdemeanor contempt for missing appearances. The judge imposed a 30-day jail term, credited prior custody, suspended the balance, and released him on condition of timely future appearances.
United States v. Kokinda497 U.S. 720 (1990)
Respondents Marsha B. Kokinda and Kevin E. Pearl, volunteers for the National Democratic Policy Committee, set up a table on the sidewalk near the entrance of the Bowie, Maryland Post Office to solicit contributions, sell books and subscriptions to the organization's newspaper, and distribute literature addressing a variety of political issues.
The postal sidewalk provides the sole means by which customers of the post office may travel from the parking lot to the post office building and lies entirely on Postal Service property. The District Court for the District of Maryland described the layout of the Bowie post office as a freestanding building with its own sidewalk and parking lot located on a major highway.
During the several hours that respondents were at the post office, postal employees received between 40 and 50 complaints regarding their presence. The Bowie postmaster asked respondents to leave, which they refused to do. Postal inspectors arrested respondents, seizing their table as well as their literature and other belongings.
Respondents were tried before a United States Magistrate in the District of Maryland and convicted of violating 39 CFR § 232.1(h)(1). Respondent Kokinda was fined $50 and sentenced to 10 days' imprisonment. Respondent Pearl was fined $100 and received a 30-day suspended sentence.
Respondents appealed their convictions to the District Court, which affirmed holding that the postal sidewalk was not a public forum and that the Postal Service's ban on solicitation is reasonable. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the decision below conflicts with other decisions by the Courts of Appeals.
When does imposition of a suspended sentence trigger the right to counsel?
The Sixth Amendment requires appointed counsel in a misdemeanor prosecution whenever the court imposes a suspended jail sentence because that sentence carries the possibility of actual deprivation of liberty if conditions are later violated and the suspension is revoked.
Does the right to counsel attach only when the defendant is immediately jailed?
No. The right attaches when the court imposes a term of imprisonment even if that term is suspended after crediting time served. The potential for later activation of the suspended balance creates the requisite threat of liberty deprivation.
What happens if an uncounseled defendant receives a suspended jail sentence?
The conviction and sentence violate the Sixth Amendment. The defendant may challenge the conviction on that ground because the suspended balance can be activated without a new trial, resulting in incarceration traceable to the uncounseled proceeding.
378 U.S. 1 (1964)
…record," Malloy had no record as a felon. He had engaged once in an unlawful activity—pool selling—a misdemeanor and was given a suspended sentence. He had been on probation since that time and was on probation at the time of the inquiry. Again, unlike Hoffman , nothing in these questions indicates petitioner was called because he was…
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