484 U.S. 400 (1988)
In August 1981 a street fight occurred on the south side of Chicago during which Jack Bridges was stabbed in the back.1 Kevin Taylor was charged with attempted murder and aggravated battery arising from that incident.2 The State’s evidence at trial included testimony from Bridges, his brother, and three other witnesses who described a twenty-minute argument earlier in the evening and a later violent encounter in which Taylor allegedly stabbed Bridges and fired a gun at him.3
Well in advance of trial the prosecutor filed a discovery motion requesting a list of all defense witnesses.4 Taylor’s original response identified two sisters who later testified and two men who did not testify.5 On the first day of trial the defense was permitted to amend its answer by adding the names of Derrick Travis and a Chicago police officer, neither of whom ultimately testified.6
On the second day of trial, after the prosecution’s two principal witnesses had completed their testimony, defense counsel made an oral motion to amend the answer to discovery by adding Alfred Wormley and Pam Berkhalter.7 Counsel represented that he had just been informed about the witnesses and that they had probably seen the entire incident.8 The trial judge expressed concern that witnesses were being found that really were not there and directed counsel to produce them the next day.9
The following morning Wormley appeared and testified outside the presence of the jury.10 He stated that before the incident he saw Bridges and his brother with two guns wrapped in a blanket, heard them say they were after Taylor, and later warned Taylor to watch out.11 On cross-examination Wormley acknowledged that he had first met Taylor about four months earlier, more than two years after the incident, and that defense counsel had visited him at his home the week before trial.12 The judge found a blatant and willful discovery violation, expressed doubt about Wormley’s veracity, and excluded the testimony.13
Taylor was convicted of attempted murder and aggravated battery and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment.14 The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, finding that counsel had acted in bad faith and that exclusion was a proper sanction.15 The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.16 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Compulsory Process Clause had been violated.17
Whether the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment is violated when a trial court excludes the testimony of a defense witness as a sanction for the defendant’s failure to comply with a discovery request or order?18
The Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to call witnesses in his favor, but that right is not absolute.19 The Clause does not create a right to present evidence that is irrelevant or inadmissible under standard rules of evidence, nor does it require that a defendant be allowed to introduce any evidence he chooses.20 The Clause is subject to the legitimate interests of the government in the criminal trial process, including the interest in preventing the introduction of fabricated evidence.21 Rules that provide for pretrial discovery of an opponent's witnesses serve the same high purpose as the Clause itself.22 The sanction of excluding a witness is not per se unconstitutional, and the question is whether the exclusion in a particular case is arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes of the discovery rule that was violated.23
No. The Compulsory Process Clause does not bar the use of the preclusion sanction for discovery violations.24 The right to present witnesses must be exercised in compliance with established rules of procedure that govern the orderly presentation of facts and arguments.25 The defense counsel's failure to disclose Wormley until after the prosecution's principal witnesses had testified, despite having interviewed him the week before trial, constituted a willful and blatant violation.26 The trial judge was justified in concluding that the violation was motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage.27
He was also justified in expressing concern about the possibility of fabrication, as Wormley's testimony contradicted the representations made by counsel to the court.28
The Compulsory Process Clause is not violated by the exclusion of a defense witness’s testimony as a discovery sanction when the defense has failed to make timely disclosure of the witness.29
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall And Justice Blackmun
Justice Brennan dissented from the majority's holding.30 He argued that the preclusion sanction violates the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment because it distorts the truthseeking process by excluding material evidence of innocence.31 He contended that alternative sanctions such as a continuance or jury instructions are adequate to correct and deter discovery violations without imposing the arbitrary and disproportionate penalty of exclusion.32
This is especially so where there is no evidence that the defendant was personally responsible for the violation.33 In his view, the majority's balancing approach creates a conflict of interest for defense counsel in every case involving a discovery violation.34 It also sacrifices the paramount values of the criminal justice system by allowing convictions based on a partial presentation of the facts.35
Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion.36 He joined Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion on the understanding that it is confined in its reach to general reciprocal-discovery rules.37 He did not wish the opinion to express for him any position as to permissible sanctions for noncompliance with rules designed for specific kinds of evidence.38
An example is a notice-of-alibi rule.39 In a case such as that, the State's legitimate interests might well occasion a result different from what should obtain in the factual context of the present case.40
Whether the exclusion of Alfred Wormley’s testimony violated the petitioner’s rights under the Compulsory Process Clause on the facts of this case?41
The Compulsory Process Clause does not bar the use of the preclusion sanction for discovery violations when the violation is willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage.42 The exclusion must not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes of the discovery rule, and the trial judge may consider the risk of fabrication and the impact on the integrity of the judicial process.43
No. On the facts of this case, the exclusion of Wormley's testimony was not arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes of the discovery rule.44 The record supports the conclusion that defense counsel acted willfully and in bad faith by failing to disclose the witness until the second day of trial after having interviewed him the previous week.45 The judge heard the proposed testimony, noted the contradiction with counsel's earlier representations, and considered the risk of fabrication before imposing the sanction.46 The exclusion did not preclude the defendant from introducing other evidence or cross-examining the State's witnesses.47
The exclusion of Alfred Wormley’s testimony did not violate the petitioner’s rights under the Compulsory Process Clause on the facts of this case.48
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall And Justice Blackmun
Justice Brennan would have held the exclusion unconstitutional on these facts.49 There was no evidence that Taylor personally participated in the discovery violation.50 Alternative sanctions could have vindicated the interests of discovery without distorting the truthseeking process by excluding evidence that would have placed guns in the hands of the prosecution's key witnesses.51
He emphasized that the trial court excluded the testimony in response to actions of other defense attorneys in other cases.52 Direct sanctions against the attorney would have been more appropriate and effective.53
Justice Blackmun joined Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion.54 He limited his joinder to the understanding that the opinion is confined to general reciprocal-discovery rules.55 He reserved judgment on permissible sanctions for noncompliance with rules designed for specific kinds of evidence such as a notice-of-alibi rule.56
In such a case the State's legitimate interests might well occasion a result different from what should obtain in the factual context of the present case.57