Also known as: attendant circumstance
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A category of material elements in a criminal offense definition consisting of facts or conditions that must exist alongside conduct or results for liability to attach. These elements are distinct from the prohibited act and any required consequence. Culpability standards such as purpose or knowledge apply separately to them under provisions that define mental states with respect to attendant circumstances.
Atlas Ventures employee Anita Ali submits a forged claim using what she believes is an active client policy number. The number actually belongs to a canceled contract. Under the governing rule for purposeful conduct regarding attendant circumstances, her awareness or belief that the policy remained active satisfies the mental state for attempt liability.
Adjuster Arthur Abrams forges and submits a medical bill using a policy number he believes belongs to an active contract held by Claudia. The policy had been canceled months earlier. The unknown cancellation is treated as a factual condition about an attendant circumstance, so it supplies no defense to common-law attempt.
Dispatcher Audrey Ashton reviews a map showing a red truck-restricted symbol and its legend listing low-clearance bridges. She directs driver Adrian Aguilar onto the route anyway. Her actual awareness that the attendant circumstance of a height restriction exists meets the knowing mental state for the offense.
Stagehand Aaron Adams cuts what he believes is the sole support cable for a spotlight above performer Alfred Ashford. Redundant safety lines actually prevent any fall. Because Adams purposely engages in conduct that would constitute battery if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be, attempt liability attaches.
Anita Ali aims and pulls the trigger of a gun she believes is loaded at a target she intends to shoot. The gun is unloaded. The unknown status of the firearm is an attendant circumstance that does not prevent attempt liability when the facts are assessed as she believed them to be.
Gregory Smith was committed to the Camden County jail on April 14, 1989, for trial on robbery charges. In September 1988 he had tested positive for HIV and knew of his infection. Jailers placed him in a special blood alert area. Before June 11, 1989, Smith repeatedly threatened corrections officers that he would bite or spit on them to kill them or give them AIDS. He had discussed his HIV status with guards and a local reporter while seeking transfer to a state prison for better medical care. On May 5, 1989, Smith kicked his cell door. After officers restrained him, he threatened to bite and spit while showing his teeth. On May 17 he again resisted officers. He threatened to take one of us the fuck out. He promised to have an officer killed by his brothers. He later spat at another officer while trying to bite him. On June 11 officers escorted Smith to Cooper Hospital after he claimed a fall. At the hospital he became disruptive. He grabbed a metal cylinder. During the struggle he bit Officer Waddington's hand, causing puncture wounds visible in photographs taken days later. Throughout the incident Smith repeatedly threatened to bite and give the officers AIDS so they would die. Waddington was treated by Dr. Zimmerman who prescribed an oral antibiotic and administered hepatitis B immunoglobulin. Since the incident, Waddington has undergone continued testing for HIV. As of the time of trial in April 1990, the tests had been negative. Additional incidents occurred on June 12 and October 17, 1989, in which Smith again threatened officers with his HIV status while resisting restraint. At the April 1990 trial the State presented Dr. Porwancher, who testified that transmission of HIV by bite was possible on rare occasions based on case reports in Lancet and a Soviet study. Defendant's expert Dr. Condoluci testified that the chance was extremely remote and cited studies showing no transmissions in documented bite cases. Smith testified that he knew HIV could be transmitted only sexually, by transfusion, or by needles. He believed transmission by bite was impossible. Mental health worker Eugene Niblack confirmed he had told Smith biting was extremely difficult if not impossible. Smith denied biting or threatening the officers and claimed the officers lied. The jury convicted Smith on April 11, 1990, of attempted murder of Waddington, aggravated assault on both officers, and terroristic threats. Judge Mariano imposed an aggregate twenty-five-year term with twelve-and-one-half years of parole ineligibility. Smith appealed to the Superior Court, Appellate Division.
View caseAaron Adams makes statements to officers after being placed in custody but before receiving warnings. He believes the attendant circumstance of custodial interrogation requiring warnings is present. The actual legal status of the interrogation setting does not alter the analysis of whether the circumstance element is satisfied under the applicable standard.
Petitioner Dickerson was indicted for bank robbery, conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and using a firearm in the course of committing a crime of violence. Before trial, Dickerson moved to suppress a statement he had made at a Federal Bureau of Investigation field office on the grounds that he had not received Miranda warnings before being interrogated. The District Court granted his motion to suppress, and the Government took an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. That court reversed the District Court's suppression order. It agreed that petitioner had not received Miranda warnings before making his statement but held that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 governed the admissibility of the statement. The Fourth Circuit concluded that Miranda was not a constitutional holding and that Congress could therefore have the final say on admissibility. Two years after Miranda was decided, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501, which provides that a confession shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given and directs the trial judge to consider specified factors in determining voluntariness. Because of the importance of the questions raised by the Court of Appeals' decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseAttendant circumstances are facts or conditions that must accompany the conduct or result for the offense to be complete. They are treated as a separate category of material elements to which distinct culpability standards apply.
No. A mistake about an attendant circumstance is treated as factual impossibility. When the facts had been as the defendant believed them to be, the conduct would have constituted the completed crime, so no defense arises.
The actor must be aware of the existence of the circumstance or believe or hope that it exists. This standard is applied separately from the mental state required for conduct or results.
The actor must be aware that the circumstance exists. Actual awareness is required. It is not enough that a reasonable person would have known or that the circumstance was probable.
…as well as fact. . . . The law involved is not the law defining the offense; it is some other legal rule that characterizes the attendant circumstances that are material to the offense.” Model Penal Code § 2.02, Comment 131 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). Therefore, as with the first two elements, the question is solely one of congressional…