Also known as: matter of course · routinely · pro forma
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A routine entitlement or practice that occurs automatically without requiring leave, approval, or additional justification.
Aether Technologies regularly hires outside counsel for regulatory compliance work. A lawyer who handles that type of matter sends the company a targeted letter offering services. The contact is permitted because the recipient routinely uses the offered legal services for business purposes.
The Senate remains in session through daily pro forma meetings even while members are away. The President attempts to fill a vacant agency post without confirmation. The appointment fails because the Senate has not formally declared a recess of sufficient length.
Adam Anderson serves his answer on Monday. Within twenty-one days he files an amended answer adding an affirmative defense. The court accepts the filing because the amendment occurs as a matter of course under the timing rule.
During a lawful traffic stop an officer approaches the driver. Without additional suspicion the officer orders the driver to exit the vehicle. The order is permitted as a matter of course for officer safety.
The Florida Constitution, Article I, Section 16, secures the right of trial by jury to all and provides that in all criminal prosecutions the jury shall consist of twelve men, except in prosecutions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for not more than six months, in which case the jury shall consist of six men. Petitioner Williams faced charges of robbery, a felony carrying a potential sentence of life imprisonment. Williams filed a timely motion requesting a jury of twelve persons, which the trial court denied in accordance with state law. The case proceeded to trial before a jury composed of six members. Following the presentation of evidence, the six-person jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. Williams appealed his conviction to the Florida District Court of Appeal. The appellate court rejected his constitutional claim and affirmed the judgment. The United States Supreme Court thereafter granted a writ of certiorari, restricting its inquiry to the issues of jury size and the necessity of a unanimous verdict in state criminal prosecutions for serious offenses.
View caseA neighborhood association sues to enforce a racial restriction in a deed. The state court orders specific performance as a matter of course under existing property law. The Supreme Court later holds that judicial enforcement constitutes state action subject to equal-protection limits.
In February 1911, thirty out of thirty-nine owners of property fronting both sides of Labadie Avenue between Taylor Avenue and Cora Avenue in St. Louis signed a recorded agreement. The agreement restricted the use and occupancy of the properties for fifty years to persons of the Caucasian race. It excluded occupancy by people of the Negro or Mongolian race. The district included fifty-seven parcels of land. The signers held title to forty-seven parcels. At the time, five parcels were owned by Negroes, with one occupied by Negro families since 1882. On August 11, 1945, the Shelley petitioners, who are Negroes, purchased one parcel from Fitzgerald by warranty deed for valuable consideration without knowledge of the restriction. On October 9, 1945, respondents sued in the Circuit Court of St. Louis to restrain the Shelleys and divest title. The trial court denied relief, but the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and directed enforcement. In June 1934, Ferguson and his wife executed a contract restricting their Detroit property to Caucasian occupancy. The restriction was effective only if at least eighty percent of the lots in the block were subjected to similar restrictions. The restrictions were to remain in effect until January 1, 1960. Similar agreements covered eighty percent of the lots. By deed dated November 30, 1944, the McGhee petitioners, who were Negroes, acquired and occupied the Detroit property. On January 30, 1945, respondents sued in Wayne County Circuit Court. The court ordered them to move within ninety days and enjoined future occupancy. The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed. Petitioners claimed that judicial enforcement violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
View caseA terminally ill patient seeks a physician's assistance to end life. The state statute prohibits the assistance. The court upholds the ban because no fundamental right to assisted suicide exists that would trigger heightened scrutiny.
Washington has prohibited assisting suicide since its territorial days. In 1854, the first Territorial Legislature outlawed assisting another in the commission of self-murder. The current statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060, provides that a person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide, and classifies it as a class C felony punishable by up to five years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. Washington's Natural Death Act, enacted in 1979, states that the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment at a patient's direction shall not constitute a suicide, but the state has consistently rejected efforts to legalize physician-assisted suicide, including a 1991 ballot initiative defeated by voters. The respondents in this case are four physicians who practice in Washington and treat terminally ill patients, three terminally ill patients who sought to end their lives with physician assistance and have since died, and Compassion in Dying, a nonprofit organization that counsels people considering physician-assisted suicide. The physicians declared that they would assist their patients in ending their lives if not for the assisted-suicide ban. Petitioners are the State of Washington and its Attorney General. In January 1994, the respondents filed this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. They sought a declaration that Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060 is unconstitutional on its face and an injunction against its enforcement. The District Court held that the statute was unconstitutional. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed that decision, but the full court sitting en banc reversed the panel and affirmed the District Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseA party may amend once as a matter of course within twenty-one days after serving the pleading or within twenty-one days after service of a responsive pleading or Rule 12 motion, whichever is earlier.
No. The Senate must formally declare a recess of sufficient duration. Pro forma sessions prevent the Senate from being treated as in recess even if members are away.
No. Solicitation is permitted as a matter of course only when the recipient routinely uses the offered legal services for business purposes or has a family, close personal, or prior professional relationship with the lawyer.
No. An injunction is not issued as a matter of course. The court must balance the relative hardships to the parties and consider the interests of third parties and the public.