Also known as: armorum · armis · arms · weapons
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Instruments used for offense or defense. In constitutional law the term encompasses firearms and similar weapons that individuals may keep and bear for lawful purposes including self-defense.
Antonio Alvarado, a Chicago resident, kept a loaded handgun in his home for protection after repeated burglaries. City police seized the weapon under a local ordinance banning most handguns. Alvarado sued, claiming the ordinance violated his right to keep arms. The court applied the Second Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment and struck down the ban.
Aaron Adams faced an attacker swinging a metal pipe in a parking lot. Adams grabbed a nearby baseball bat and struck the assailant once in the arm, breaking it. The attacker sued for battery. Adams raised self-defense. The court examined whether the bat was used in a manner intended or likely to cause serious bodily harm and found the force privileged.
Audrey Ashton, a member of her state's organized militia, stored a semiautomatic rifle at home. State legislation later required registration and restricted certain features. Ashton refused to comply and was charged. She defended on the ground that the Second Amendment protects the right of the people to keep and bear arms.
Anita Ali lived with her extended family in a single-family home. The city cited her for violating an ordinance limiting occupancy to nuclear families. Ali argued the restriction interfered with her liberty to maintain a household. The court analyzed whether the zoning rule violated substantive due process protections for family living arrangements.
In early 1973, Mrs. Inez Moore received a notice of violation from the city of East Cleveland. The notice stated that her grandson John Moore, Jr., was an illegal occupant of her home. It directed her to comply with the housing ordinance. Mrs. Moore lived in her East Cleveland home together with her son Dale Moore, Sr., and her two grandsons Dale Moore, Jr., and John Moore, Jr. John came to live with her after his mother's death when he was less than one year old. When she failed to remove John from the home, the city filed a criminal charge against her. Mrs. Moore moved to dismiss the charge. She claimed that the ordinance was constitutionally invalid on its face. Her motion was overruled. Upon conviction she was sentenced to five days in jail and a $25 fine. The East Cleveland ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. The ordinance defined family to include only a husband or wife of the nominal head of the household, unmarried children of the head or spouse provided they have no children residing with them, a parent of the head or spouse, or not more than one dependent child of the head or spouse along with that child's spouse and dependent children. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction after giving full consideration to her constitutional claims. The Ohio Supreme Court denied review of the case. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of her appeal.
View caseAlexis Archer, a pregnant resident, sought an abortion at a clinic after the state enacted a near-total ban. The clinic refused service. Archer sued, asserting a constitutional right to choose. The court considered whether the statute violated substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In March 1970, Jane Roe, a single woman residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted a federal action against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face. She also sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the statutes. Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant. She wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. She was unable to obtain a legal abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by continuation of the pregnancy. She could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal abortion. James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes. Two such prosecutions were pending against him in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions. He claimed that for many cases he was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code. John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint also naming the District Attorney as defendant. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple. Mrs. Doe was suffering from a neural-chemical disorder. Her physician had advised her to avoid pregnancy until her condition materially improved. She had discontinued use of birth control pills pursuant to medical advice. If she should become pregnant she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court for the Northern District of Texas. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class and Dr. Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. The Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have standing. It concluded that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face. The court dismissed the Does' complaint while denying injunctive relief. The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford appealed to the Supreme Court from that part of the District Court's judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District Attorney cross-appealed from the grant of declaratory relief. Both sides also took protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision by the Supreme Court.
View caseAnthony Arnold was indicted for possessing a short-barreled shotgun. He argued the weapon was protected because it could be used in a militia context. The court examined whether the Second Amendment extended to that type of firearm when not shown to have a reasonable relationship to militia service.
In 1995 Samuel Mullet purchased land in Jefferson County, Ohio. That land became the Bergholz Amish community in 2001 when a sufficient number of ordained ministers qualified it as a separate Amish church district. The new community appointed Mullet as its bishop. As bishop, Mullet controlled all aspects of life in the Bergholz compound and had the ability to order the shunning of community members who failed to follow the tenets of their Amish faith. In 2006 Mullet excommunicated several church members who questioned Bergholz community practices and his leadership. Included in the group were Lavern and Mattie Troyer, whose son Aden was married to Mullet's daughter Wilma, as well as Melvin and Anna Shrock, whose son Emanuel was married to Mullet's daughter Linda. The excommunications led to family divisions, including a divorce and a custody dispute. Amish bishops from across the country met and voted unanimously to reverse the excommunications. From September 6 to November 9, 2011, several Bergholz community members committed five separate attacks on nine different individuals connected to the community by family or religious ties. The assailants sliced off the men's beards and cut the women's hair. The victims were seen as Amish hypocrites by the assailants. A federal grand jury indicted sixteen members of the Bergholz community for violating and conspiring to violate the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, as well as other charges. At trial, the government presented evidence that the assaults were motivated by the victims' religion, while the defendants presented evidence of personal and family disputes as alternative motives. The jury convicted all sixteen defendants of at least one hate-crime violation. The district court instructed the jury that the victims' religion need only be a significant motivating factor even if other reasons existed. The defendants twice requested a but-for causation instruction, which the court rejected. The defendants appealed their convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
View caseYes. The Second Amendment secures an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense that applies against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
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Serious bodily harm is injury whose consequences differ in kind from ordinary harm. It includes harm creating a substantial risk of death, permanent loss of an important bodily function, or conduct amounting to mayhem.
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Statements describing an assailant's location and armament are nontestimonial when made to resolve an ongoing emergency. They remain admissible even without cross-examination because the primary purpose was to address an immediate threat rather than to create evidence for trial.
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…points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and…