Also known as: arbitrarily · arbitrariness
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An adjective describing governmental or judicial action that rests on individual discretion or preference rather than fixed rules or reasoned analysis. In constitutional and property contexts the term identifies restrictions or decisions lacking a substantial relation to public health, safety, or welfare and therefore vulnerable to invalidation under due process or equal protection principles.
Ariana Azizi purchased a corner parcel zoned for commercial use. The city later redrew the zoning map so that only her lot fell into a newly created residential district while every surrounding parcel remained commercial. Because the reclassification bore no relation to traffic, health, or safety concerns and left Azizi unable to develop the land for its highest-value use, the restriction operated arbitrarily.
Amelia Amari owned one acre inside a large agricultural zone. After she petitioned the county, the board amended the map to permit a shopping center on her parcel alone while leaving every neighboring farm under agricultural restrictions. The change advanced no community-wide planning goal and functioned as an arbitrary favor to one landowner.
Aaron Adams faced trial on a felony charge. The court applied a state evidentiary rule that categorically barred any defendant previously convicted of perjury from testifying, even though Adams's proposed testimony directly addressed the charged conduct. The rule operated arbitrarily by preventing Adams from exercising his constitutional right to present a defense.
Alice Atkins owned a single residential lot surrounded by commercial properties. The city council rezoned only her lot to allow a gas station, citing no change in surrounding uses or traffic patterns. The isolated amendment advanced no legitimate public purpose and amounted to arbitrary treatment of one owner.
Antonio Alvarado and his granddaughter sought to share a single-family home. A city ordinance defined family so narrowly that their arrangement was prohibited even though the household created no additional traffic or safety burdens. The restriction intruded on family autonomy without any rational connection to the city's stated goals and therefore operated arbitrarily.
In March 1970, Jane Roe, a single woman residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted a federal action against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face. She also sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the statutes. Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant. She wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. She was unable to obtain a legal abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by continuation of the pregnancy. She could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal abortion. James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes. Two such prosecutions were pending against him in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions. He claimed that for many cases he was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code. John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint also naming the District Attorney as defendant. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple. Mrs. Doe was suffering from a neural-chemical disorder. Her physician had advised her to avoid pregnancy until her condition materially improved. She had discontinued use of birth control pills pursuant to medical advice. If she should become pregnant she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court for the Northern District of Texas. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class and Dr. Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. The Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have standing. It concluded that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face. The court dismissed the Does' complaint while denying injunctive relief. The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford appealed to the Supreme Court from that part of the District Court's judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District Attorney cross-appealed from the grant of declaratory relief. Both sides also took protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision by the Supreme Court.
View caseAbigail Alvarez lived with her two grandchildren in a home zoned for single-family occupancy. The ordinance defined family to exclude this arrangement despite the absence of any demonstrated overcrowding or parking problem. The rule lacked a rational relationship to legitimate land-use objectives and therefore constituted an arbitrary intrusion on protected family choices.
In early 1973, Mrs. Inez Moore received a notice of violation from the city of East Cleveland. The notice stated that her grandson John Moore, Jr., was an illegal occupant of her home. It directed her to comply with the housing ordinance. Mrs. Moore lived in her East Cleveland home together with her son Dale Moore, Sr., and her two grandsons Dale Moore, Jr., and John Moore, Jr. John came to live with her after his mother's death when he was less than one year old. When she failed to remove John from the home, the city filed a criminal charge against her. Mrs. Moore moved to dismiss the charge. She claimed that the ordinance was constitutionally invalid on its face. Her motion was overruled. Upon conviction she was sentenced to five days in jail and a $25 fine. The East Cleveland ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. The ordinance defined family to include only a husband or wife of the nominal head of the household, unmarried children of the head or spouse provided they have no children residing with them, a parent of the head or spouse, or not more than one dependent child of the head or spouse along with that child's spouse and dependent children. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction after giving full consideration to her constitutional claims. The Ohio Supreme Court denied review of the case. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of her appeal.
View caseA zoning amendment is arbitrary when it singles out one parcel or small area for treatment inconsistent with the surrounding zone and the comprehensive plan without advancing a legitimate public purpose. Courts examine whether the change bears a substantial relation to health, safety, or welfare. Spot zoning that merely favors one owner fails this test.
Government action is arbitrary under due process when it lacks any rational connection to a legitimate objective and therefore deprives a person of property or liberty without sufficient justification. Courts scrutinize whether the restriction is reasonable as applied to the particular facts. Irrational classifications or unexplained differential treatment trigger invalidation.
Supporting sources
Yes. Evidentiary rules that categorically or disproportionately prevent a criminal defendant from presenting a defense violate due process and compulsory process when the restriction lacks a sufficient justification. The rule must not arbitrarily or disproportionately impair the right to testify.
…be sufficient there is an end, if not a peremptory mandamus is awarded. The discretion of a court is a legal discretion, not arbitrary; if the applicant makes out a proper case the court are bound to grant it. Mr. Lee read the affidavit of Hazen Kimball stating that on 3 March 1801 he was a clerk in the Department of…