Also known as:appellate reviews · review on appeal
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Examination of a lower court's decision by a higher court that can affirm, reverse, or modify the decision. The process requires the appellant to identify specific errors in the record and demonstrate that those errors affected substantial rights or produced an unjust result.
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Common Examples
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Statutory Limit on Supreme Court Review
Alan Ackerman files a constitutional challenge in district court and loses. While his certiorari petition is pending, Congress enacts a statute declaring that category of cases final and unreviewable by the Supreme Court. The Court dismisses the petition because the statute validly withdraws that avenue of review without eliminating all federal judicial review of constitutional claims.
Harmless Error Analysis on Appeal
Arthur Abrams is convicted after the trial court gives an erroneous jury instruction. On appeal he argues the instruction misled the jury. The court of appeals examines the entire record and concludes the error did not affect substantial rights, so the conviction stands.
Kotteakos v. United States328 U.S. 750, 764–65 (1946)
In 1939 and 1940, petitioners Kotteakos, Lekacos, Regenbogen and other defendants obtained loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration by submitting applications through Simon Brown, president of the Brownie Lumber Company, that contained false statements about the purpose of the loans, property ownership, purchase prices, and financial details. Brown prepared the applications, received the loan proceeds from lending institutions, paid the sellers, and divided the difference with the defendants who had procured each application. Each petitioner or small group of defendants dealt exclusively with Brown on distinct transactions and had no knowledge of or connection to the activities of any other group.
The indictment named thirty-two defendants and charged them with one conspiracy to defraud the United States by making false statements and representations to the Federal Housing Administration for the purpose of obtaining credit. Nineteen defendants were brought to trial, and the jury acquitted seven, disagreed as to four, and convicted the remaining twelve petitioners. The Government's evidence established at least eight separate and independent groups of defendants, each acting independently with Brown as the sole common link and without any agreement or communication among the groups. Brown pleaded guilty and testified at trial. No evidence showed that any defendant knew of or participated in the transactions of defendants outside his own group.
The trial court instructed the jury that the indictment charged a single conspiracy, that the jury must find each defendant was a member of that conspiracy to convict, and that the acts or statements of any conspirator could be considered against all defendants once membership was established. The court did not instruct the jury that it could convict only upon finding the single conspiracy charged or that it must keep evidence of separate transactions separate. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, recognizing that the proof showed multiple conspiracies rather than the single conspiracy alleged but concluding that the variance and instructional error were not prejudicial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance of the issues for the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts.
Anita Ali moves to suppress evidence obtained after an unlawful interrogation. The trial court denies the motion and she is convicted. On appeal the court applies the inevitable discovery exception and affirms because the evidence would have been found through lawful means regardless of the violation.
Nix v. Williams (Williams II)467 U.S. 431 (1984)
On December 24, 1968, ten-year-old Pamela Powers disappeared from a YMCA building in Des Moines, Iowa, where she had accompanied her parents to watch an athletic contest.
Williams was seen leaving the YMCA carrying a large bundle wrapped in a blanket. A fourteen-year-old boy who helped open his car door reported seeing two skinny white legs inside it.
Williams' car was found the next day 160 miles east in Davenport, Iowa. Items of the child's clothing along with an army blanket were recovered at a rest stop on Interstate 80 near Grinnell between Des Moines and Davenport.
A warrant issued for Williams' arrest. On December 26 the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation organized a search with two hundred volunteers divided into teams that began twenty-one miles east of Grinnell and moved westward through Poweshiek County into Jasper County. Searchers checked all roads, ditches, culverts, abandoned farm buildings, and other places where a small child's body could be hidden. The search area was marked off in grids on highway maps.
Williams surrendered to police in Davenport and was arraigned. After his attorneys arranged for no questioning during transport, two Des Moines detectives took him into custody for the return drive.
During the trip Detective Leaming spoke to Williams about predicted snow and the parents' right to a Christian burial. Williams then directed the officers to the child's shoes, the blanket, and ultimately the body itself.
The body lay next to a culvert in a ditch beside a gravel road in Polk County. It was roughly two and one-half miles from where one search team had stopped when the search was suspended at 3 p.m.
Williams was indicted for first-degree murder. At his first trial the evidence of the body was admitted over objection. He was convicted. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court reversed in Brewer v. Williams on the ground that the statements were obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
At the second trial in 1977 the prosecution introduced evidence of the condition of the body, articles and photographs of clothing, and autopsy results without offering Williams' statements or showing that he had directed police to the body. The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the body would have been discovered within a short time in essentially the same condition by the continuing search. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed.
On federal habeas corpus the District Court denied relief after an independent review. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Abigail Alvarez is convicted of murder. She appeals arguing the evidence was insufficient. The reviewing court examines whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt and affirms the conviction.
Jackson v. Virginia443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979)
On July 29, 1972, the body of Mary Houston Cole was discovered in a secluded church parking lot in Chesterfield County, Virginia. She had been shot twice at close range with a .38-caliber pistol. The victim had last been seen alive the previous evening in the company of petitioner Hugh Jackson, who was carrying a .38-caliber pistol.
Jackson had befriended Cole while he was imprisoned on a disorderly conduct charge at the local county jail. After his release she arranged for him to live in the home of her son and daughter-in-law. On the day of the killing Jackson had been drinking and had spent considerable time shooting at targets with his revolver. Late in the afternoon he unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Cole to drive him to North Carolina. She instead drove him to a local diner where both were observed by several police officers.
A deputy sheriff later observed Jackson and Cole preparing to leave the diner in her car. Jackson was in possession of his revolver and a kitchen knife was visible in the vehicle. Cole's body was found the following day and a half later, naked from the waist down with her slacks beneath her body. Six cartridge cases fired from Jackson's gun were recovered nearby. Jackson drove the victim's car to North Carolina, made a short trip to Florida, and was arrested several days later.
In a post-arrest statement introduced at trial, Jackson admitted shooting Cole but claimed the shooting occurred accidentally during a struggle. He said the victim had attacked him with a knife when he resisted her sexual advances. He stated he had first fired warning shots into the ground and reloaded before the fatal shots. At trial he asserted self-defense or, alternatively, that intoxication had prevented him from forming the specific intent required for first-degree murder under Virginia law.
The trial judge, sitting as factfinder, convicted Jackson of first-degree murder and sentenced him to thirty years in prison. Jackson's motion to set aside the judgment was denied. The Virginia Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of error alleging insufficient evidence.
Jackson then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The District Court applied the Thompson v. Louisville no-evidence standard and granted relief after finding insufficient proof of premeditation. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed that judgment.
Alice Atkins, a special prosecutor, obtains a subpoena for presidential tapes. The district court orders production. The President appeals asserting executive privilege. The reviewing court balances the need for evidence against the privilege claim and affirms the production order.
United States v. Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)
On March 1, 1974, a grand jury returned an indictment charging seven named individuals with offenses including conspiracy to defraud the United States and to obstruct justice. Although not designated in the indictment, the grand jury named President Richard M. Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator. On April 18, 1974, upon motion of the Special Prosecutor, a subpoena duces tecum was issued to the President requiring production of tapes, memoranda, papers, transcripts, or other writings relating to precisely identified meetings between the President and others.
The President publicly released edited transcripts of 43 conversations on April 30, 1974, including 20 subject to the subpoena. On May 1, 1974, the President's counsel filed a motion to quash the subpoena under Rule 17(c) along with a claim of privilege. At a subsequent hearing, further motions to expunge the grand jury's action naming the President as an unindicted co-conspirator and for protective orders were filed by counsel for the President.
On May 20, 1974, the District Court denied the motion to quash and ordered production of the materials by May 31, 1974. The court rejected claims that the dispute was a nonjusticiable intra-executive conflict and that the Judiciary lacked authority to review executive privilege. On May 24, 1974, the President appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the Special Prosecutor petitioned for certiorari before judgment, which was granted.
The case was set for argument on July 8, 1974. The proceeding is a pending federal criminal prosecution in United States v. Mitchell et al. set for trial on September 9, 1974.
Aaron Adams challenges a state durational residency requirement for divorce. By the time the case reaches the appellate court he has satisfied the requirement and obtained a divorce elsewhere. The court dismisses the appeal as moot because the residency barrier no longer affects him.
Sosna v. Iowa419 U.S. 393 (1975)
Carol Sosna married Michael Sosna on September 5, 1964, in Michigan. They lived together in New York between October 1967 and August 1971, after which they separated but continued to reside there. In August 1972 Sosna moved to Iowa with her three children. The following month she petitioned the District Court of Jackson County, Iowa, for dissolution of her marriage.
Michael Sosna was personally served when he visited Iowa and made a special appearance to contest jurisdiction. The Iowa court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction under Iowa Code § 598.6 because Sosna had not resided in the state for one year preceding the filing.
Instead of appealing, Sosna filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on constitutional grounds. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. While the federal action was pending, the Iowa Supreme Court decided In re Marriage of Williams, 217 N.W.2d 202 (1974), and upheld the statute's constitutionality. The three-judge court upheld the residency requirement. This Court noted probable jurisdiction. During the appeal Sosna obtained a divorce in New York, though custody and support issues remained unresolved from the Iowa proceeding. She returned to Iowa to prosecute the appeal.
Sosna sought class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to represent Iowa residents who had lived in the state less than one year and wished to initiate divorce actions but were barred by the residency requirement. The parties stipulated that numerous people were similarly situated, joinder was impracticable, her claims were representative, and she would adequately protect class interests. The district court approved the stipulation in a pretrial order.
What standard does an appellate court apply when reviewing a district court's interpretation of state law in a diversity case?
Federal courts of appeals review a district court's determination of state law de novo. The appellate court owes no deference to the lower court's reading of state law.
When may a court of appeals review a remand order despite the general bar in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)?
A remand order may be reviewed through mandamus when the district court remands on grounds not authorized by the removal statutes. This occurs when the district court refuses to exercise plainly proper federal jurisdiction.
Does an indigent defendant who pleaded guilty have a right to appointed counsel for first-tier appellate review?
Indigent defendants who plead guilty or nolo contendere are entitled to appointed counsel on their first-tier appellate review when that review functions as an appeal of right. The label the state places on the review does not control the right to counsel.
What must a state provide to an indigent parent seeking appellate review of a termination of parental rights order?
The state must waive transcript costs if those costs would effectively bar the appeal. Conditioning appeal on the ability to pay for a transcript violates due process and equal protection when a fundamental interest is at stake.
appellate review
of factual as well as legal determination in cases raising constitutional challenges. See, e. g. , Armento v. Baughman , 290 N. W. 2d 11, 15 (Iowa 1980); State v. Ege , 274 N. W. 2d 350,…