amended complaint

In January 1970 respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost his job as a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force when his position was eliminated during a departmental reorganization and reduction in force. One year earlier, on November 13, 1968, Fitzgerald had testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee that cost overruns on the C-5A transport plane could approximate $2 billion. Concerned that the dismissal might constitute retaliation for the congressional testimony, the subcommittee held public hearings. At a December 8, 1969 news conference President Richard Nixon promised to look into the matter and directed White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman to arrange for Fitzgerald's reassignment to another administration position. An internal White House memorandum from aide Alexander Butterfield recommended that Fitzgerald "bleed, for a while at least" because of perceived disloyalty, and no further White House efforts to reemploy him occurred. Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission alleging unlawful retaliation. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable civil service regulations based on a finding that the departmental reorganization was motivated by reasons purely personal to respondent. The Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. The Commission explicitly found that the evidence did not support Fitzgerald's allegation of retaliation for his 1968 testimony. At a January 31, 1973 news conference President Nixon stated that he had approved Fitzgerald's dismissal. A day later the White House press office issued a retraction of the President's statement. In 1978 Fitzgerald filed a second amended complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia naming Nixon as a defendant and alleging violations of the First Amendment and two federal statutes. The District Court denied Nixon's motion for summary judgment on absolute immunity grounds. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed the collateral appeal. Shortly after Nixon petitioned for certiorari the parties agreed that Nixon would pay Fitzgerald $142,000 immediately and an additional $28,000 if the Supreme Court ruled he was not entitled to absolute immunity.

In 1984 the divestiture of AT&T's local telephone business created seven regional service monopolies known as Regional Bell Operating Companies or Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers. More than a decade later Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 which restructured local telephone markets and imposed duties on the ILECs to facilitate entry by competitive local exchange carriers through resale of services at wholesale rates, leasing of unbundled network elements, or interconnection of facilities. William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of a putative class of all subscribers of local telephone and high-speed internet services from February 8, 1996 to the present. They named as defendants four consolidated ILECs: BellSouth Corporation, Qwest Communications International Inc., SBC Communications Inc., and Verizon Communications Inc. The complaint alleged that these ILECs conspired to restrain trade by engaging in parallel conduct to inhibit CLECs, including unfair agreements for network access, inferior connections, overcharging, and billing practices designed to sabotage CLEC customer relations. The complaint further alleged that the ILECs agreed not to compete against one another in their respective territories. This agreement was inferred from their common failure to pursue business opportunities in contiguous markets and from a statement by Qwest CEO Richard Notebaert that competing in another ILEC's territory might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but that does not make it right. The complaint asserted that in light of the absence of meaningful competition among the ILECs and their parallel course of conduct the defendants had entered into a contract combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry and to allocate customers and markets. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. It concluded that the alleged parallel behavior was fully explained by each ILEC's independent interest in defending its own territory and that the complaint did not allege facts suggesting the decision to refrain from competing elsewhere was contrary to the ILECs' apparent economic interests. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that plus factors need not be pleaded and that allegations of parallel conduct suffice if they leave open the possibility of collusion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct.

Basic Incorporated was a publicly traded company primarily engaged in manufacturing chemical refractories for the steel industry. As early as 1965 or 1966 Combustion Engineering expressed interest in acquiring Basic but was deterred by antitrust concerns. In 1976 regulatory action removed the antitrust barrier and Combustion's strategic plan listed an objective to acquire Basic for thirty million dollars. Beginning in September 1976 Combustion representatives met and spoke by telephone with Basic officers and directors about a possible merger. During 1977 and 1978 Basic issued three public statements denying that merger negotiations were under way. On December 18 1978 Basic asked the New York Stock Exchange to suspend trading in its shares and announced it had been approached by another company concerning a merger. The next day Basic's board endorsed Combustion's offer of forty-six dollars per share. On December 20 1978 Basic publicly announced approval of Combustion's tender offer for all outstanding shares. Respondents are former Basic shareholders who sold their stock after Basic's October 21 1977 public statement and before the December 1978 trading suspension. Respondents brought a class action against Basic and its directors alleging that the three statements violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by misleading the market and causing sales at artificially depressed prices. The District Court certified the class under a presumption of reliance but granted summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that any misstatements were immaterial. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed class certification reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In 1901 the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a statute apportioning the Senate with thirty-three members and the House of Representatives with ninety-nine members among the state's ninety-five counties. The Tennessee Constitution required a decennial enumeration of qualified voters and reapportionment of both houses on that basis. The General Assembly performed reapportionments after the enumerations of 1871, 1881, and 1891. After 1901 every proposal for reapportionment failed to pass. Between 1901 and 1960 the state's population grew from 2,020,616 to 3,567,089. The number of persons eligible to vote rose from 487,380 to 2,092,891. Substantial redistribution occurred from rural to urban counties. Appellants were residents and qualified voters of the urban counties of Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Montgomery, and Shelby. They brought a civil action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the Secretary of State, Attorney General, Coordinator of Elections, and members of the State Board of Elections. The complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. It alleged that continued application of the 1901 statute debased their votes and denied equal protection of the laws. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional. It also sought an injunction against conducting further elections under the statute. Alternative relief included at-large elections or a court-ordered reapportionment. A three-judge district court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 dismissed the complaint. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court characterized the controversy as a nonjusticiable political question. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The case was argued in April 1961, set for reargument, reargued in October 1961, and decided on March 26, 1962.

On October 27, 1969, Prosenjit Poddar killed Tatiana Tarasoff. Two months earlier, Poddar, a voluntary outpatient receiving therapy at Cowell Memorial Hospital at the University of California at Berkeley, confided his intention to kill an unnamed girl, readily identifiable as Tatiana, to his therapist Dr. Lawrence Moore. Moore, with the concurrence of Dr. Gold who had initially examined Poddar and Dr. Yandell, assistant to the director of the department of psychiatry, decided that Poddar should be committed for observation in a mental hospital. Moore orally notified Officers Atkinson and Teel of the campus police that he would request commitment. He then sent a letter to Police Chief William Beall requesting assistance in securing Poddar's confinement. Officers Atkinson, Brownrigg, and Halleran took Poddar into custody but released him after determining he was rational on his promise to stay away from Tatiana. Dr. Harvey Powelson, director of the department of psychiatry at Cowell Memorial Hospital, then asked the police to return Moore's letter, directed that all copies of the letter and notes Moore had taken as therapist be destroyed, and ordered no action to place Poddar in a 72-hour treatment and evaluation facility. Poddar persuaded Tatiana's brother to share an apartment with him near Tatiana's residence. Shortly after her return from spending the summer in Brazil, Poddar went to her residence and killed her. Plaintiffs, Tatiana's mother and father, filed separate but virtually identical second amended complaints against the therapists Moore, Powelson, Gold, and Yandell, the police defendants Atkinson, Beall, Brownrigg, Halleran, and Teel, and the Regents of the University of California as their employer. The first cause of action alleged failure to detain a dangerous patient. The second cause of action alleged failure to warn on a dangerous patient. The third cause of action sought punitive damages against Powelson for abandonment of a dangerous patient. The fourth cause of action alleged breach of primary duty to patient and the public. The superior court sustained defendants' demurrers to the second amended complaints without leave to amend. The case reached the Supreme Court of California on appeal from the judgment of the superior court.