adversary judicial criminal proceedings

Anthony Faretta was charged with grand theft in an information filed in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California. At the arraignment, the Superior Court Judge assigned to preside over the case appointed the public defender to represent him. Two and a half months later, Faretta requested that the judge allow him to represent himself. The judge questioned him about his ability to conduct his own defense. Faretta replied that he had some experience with the law. He had once represented himself in a criminal prosecution. He had a high school education. The judge initially accepted Faretta's waiver of the assistance of counsel in a preliminary ruling. The judge indicated that he might reverse this ruling if it later appeared that Faretta was unable adequately to represent himself. Several weeks thereafter, the judge sua sponte held a hearing to inquire into Faretta's ability to conduct his own defense. The judge questioned him specifically about both the hearsay rule and the state law governing the challenge of potential jurors. After consideration of Faretta's answers, the judge observed his demeanor. The judge ruled that Faretta had not made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his right to the assistance of counsel. The judge also ruled that Faretta had no constitutional right to conduct his own defense. The judge reversed his earlier ruling and appointed the public defender to represent Faretta. Faretta's subsequent request for leave to act as cocounsel was rejected. His efforts to make motions on his own behalf were rejected. Throughout the subsequent trial, the judge required that Faretta's defense be conducted only through the appointed lawyer from the public defender's office. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Faretta guilty as charged. The judge sentenced him to prison. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's ruling that Faretta had no federal or state constitutional right to represent himself. A petition for rehearing was denied without opinion. The California Supreme Court denied review. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

On the afternoon of September 13, 1965, three police officers arrived at the Santa Ana, California home of Ted Steven Chimel with a warrant authorizing his arrest for the burglary of a coin shop. The officers knocked on the door, identified themselves to Chimel's wife, and asked if they might come inside. She admitted the officers, who waited ten to fifteen minutes until Chimel returned from work. When Chimel entered, an officer handed him the arrest warrant and asked if he had any coins or medals. Chimel replied that he did not. The officers then asked if he minded if they looked around. Chimel objected, but the officers advised him that on the basis of the lawful arrest they would conduct a search anyway. No search warrant had been issued. The officers looked through the entire three-bedroom house, including the attic, the garage, and a small workshop. In the master bedroom and sewing room the officers directed Chimel's wife to open drawers and move their contents so the officers could view any items. The search lasted between forty-five minutes and one hour and yielded numerous coins, medals, tokens, and other objects. At Chimel's subsequent state trial on two charges of burglary, the seized items were admitted into evidence over his objection that they had been unconstitutionally seized. He was convicted. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of conviction, and the California Supreme Court denied review. Both lower courts held that the arrest was lawful and that the search was justified as incident to that arrest. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the petitioner's constitutional claims regarding the scope of the search.

On August 5, 1999, Michael Crawford stabbed Kenneth Lee in the torso during a confrontation at Lee's apartment. Crawford and his wife Sylvia had gone there after Sylvia alleged that Lee had attempted to rape her several weeks earlier. Lee was taken to the hospital and later died from his wounds. Police arrested both Crawford and Sylvia that night. Detectives gave Miranda warnings and interrogated Sylvia twice at the station house. In her recorded statement Sylvia initially denied involvement but eventually admitted she had led Crawford to Lee's apartment and had seen the stabbing. Crawford also gave police a statement describing the events and his belief that Lee may have reached for something before the stabbing. At trial Crawford asserted self-defense, but Sylvia did not testify because of Washington's marital privilege. The State offered Sylvia's tape-recorded statement as evidence that the stabbing was not in self-defense and invoked the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. The trial court admitted the statement after finding it bore particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. The jury convicted Crawford of assault. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed after applying a nine-factor test and concluding the statement lacked sufficient indicia of reliability. The Washington Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. It determined that Sylvia's statement interlocked with Crawford's statement and therefore bore adequate guarantees of trustworthiness, noting that both accounts were ambiguous on whether Lee had possessed a weapon. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

On February 20, 1968, Willie Shard was robbed on a Chicago street of a wallet containing traveler's checks and a Social Security card. The following day Shard reported the robbery to Chicago police. On February 22 two officers stopped petitioner Thomas Kirby and Ralph Bean on West Madison Street. Kirby produced a wallet holding three traveler's checks and a Social Security card in Shard's name, and papers bearing Shard's name were found on Bean. The officers arrested both men and took them to a police station. Only after arrival at the station and checking records did the officers learn of the Shard robbery. A police car was sent to Shard's place of employment and brought him to the station. Immediately upon entering the room where Kirby and Bean sat at a table, Shard identified them as the robbers from two days earlier. No lawyer was present and neither man had requested or been advised of any right to counsel. More than six weeks later Kirby and Bean were indicted for the robbery. A pretrial motion to suppress Shard's identification testimony was denied. At trial Shard described his station-house identification and again identified the defendants in court. The jury convicted both men. The Illinois appellate court affirmed Kirby's conviction, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the applicability of Wade and Gilbert to pre-indictment confrontations.