Also known as: actual malice · New York Times standard · Sullivan standard
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional fault standard requiring a plaintiff to prove that a defendant published a defamatory statement with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The standard applies to public officials and public figures in defamation and related tort claims arising from speech on matters of public concern. It bars recovery of presumed or punitive damages by private plaintiffs absent the same showing.
Alfred Ashford, a prominent senator, gave an interview to a national magazine. The reporter rearranged his words into a single quotation that reversed the senator's position on a pending bill. Ashford sued for defamation. The alteration created a materially different meaning from the original statements.
Amelia Amari owned a small private consulting firm. A credit reporting service sent a confidential memo to five subscribers stating that the firm faced imminent insolvency. Amari sued for defamation and sought presumed damages. The memo addressed only the firm's private financial condition.
Andre Antoine operated a neighborhood hardware store. A local blog accused him of overcharging customers on routine repairs. Antoine sued for defamation without proving actual malice. The blog post concerned a private commercial matter rather than official conduct.
Arthur Abrams, the well-known governor, appeared as the subject of a late-night comedy sketch. The sketch portrayed him accepting bribes in exaggerated fashion. Abrams sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The segment contained no statement a reasonable viewer would take as literal fact.
Angela Acosta served as the state health commissioner. A newspaper editorial accused her of ignoring inspection reports on a major hospital. Acosta sued for defamation over the editorial statements about her official duties. The editorial rested on unverified tips from a single source.
Amber Alonzo received federal research grants for behavioral studies. A senator issued a press release labeling her project a waste of taxpayer funds. Alonzo sued the senator for defamation. The statements appeared in newsletters distributed beyond the Senate floor.
In March 1975, United States Senator William Proxmire from Wisconsin established the Golden Fleece of the Month Award to highlight examples of what he viewed as wasteful federal spending. The second award, announced in April 1975, targeted grants totaling approximately half a million dollars over seven years from the National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Office of Naval Research to support research by Ronald Hutchinson, a behavioral scientist. At the time, Hutchinson served as director of research at the Kalamazoo State Mental Hospital, operated by the Michigan State Department of Mental Health, after holding a similar position at the Ft. Custer State Home. He also acted as an adjunct professor at Western Michigan University and later became research director at the Foundation for Behavioral Research when the hospital department closed in June 1975. His work focused on developing an objective measure of aggression through studies of animal behavior patterns, such as jaw clenching in response to stress, with potential applications for human confinement in space and undersea environments. Proxmire's legislative assistant Morton Schwartz prepared the award materials after reviewing Hutchinson's grant reports and contacting federal agencies. On April 18, 1975, Proxmire presented a speech in the Senate, which was distributed via an advance press release to 275 media outlets, describing the research in critical terms including references to monkey business and taxpayer waste. The speech text appeared in a May 1975 newsletter sent to about 100,000 recipients, and Proxmire referenced similar research on a television program; a February 1976 newsletter summarized the award without naming Hutchinson. Schwartz telephoned Hutchinson prior to the release to inform him of the award, and Hutchinson objected to the summary's accuracy. Following the announcement, Schwartz contacted sponsoring federal agencies to discuss the funding. Hutchinson filed suit on April 16, 1976, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, alleging defamation that damaged his professional reputation and income, interference with contractual relations, and later infringement of privacy rights. The District Court granted summary judgment to Proxmire and Schwartz. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1979.
A public official must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant published the statement with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. This requirement protects robust public debate by shielding the press from liability for honest mistakes. The standard applies directly when the statements concern the official's governmental duties.
…award of punitive damagesas distinguished from "general" damages, which are compensatory in natureapparently requires proof of actual malice under Alabama law, and the judge charged that "mere negligence or carelessness is not evidence of actual malice or malice in fact, and does not justify an award of exemplary or punitive…
…the press from the chilling effect of libel suits brought by public officials. The rule requires that a public official prove “actual malice”—that the defendant published the defamatory statement with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The rule was extended to public figures in…
…nowhere appear in the Constitution's text . . . . The Constitution makes no mention, for example, of the First Amendment's 'actual malice
…the one here at issue without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with ‘actual malice,’” as defined by New York
…(2) whether petitioner Hutchinson is either a “public figure” or a “public official,” thereby making applicable the “actual malice” standard
Yes. A public figure cannot recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on a publication absent a false statement of fact made with actual malice. Outrageous parody or opinion that no reasonable person would interpret as stating actual facts does not give rise to liability. The same constitutional protection applies to privacy-related claims arising from expressive publications about public figures.
No. Private plaintiffs may not recover presumed or punitive damages without showing actual malice when the speech involves a matter of public concern. States may define a negligence standard for compensatory damages to private figures, but the actual malice requirement remains for presumed or punitive awards. The restriction applies only to speech on matters of public concern.
Deliberate alteration establishes actual malice only if the change results in a material change in the meaning conveyed by the statement. Trivial or non-material changes will not suffice. The plaintiff must show that the published quotation is not a substantially accurate representation of the plaintiff's actual statements.