Concept
Weighing the Factors Together
Improper interference: § 767 factors and privileges
Weighing the Factors Together
The seven factors of § 767 do not add up to an answer, and the Restatement does not pretend they do. The lead-in tells a court to give them consideration and says no more: it assigns no weights, sets no ranking, and requires no minimum number in the plaintiff's favor.1 Courts therefore describe the work as balancing. The Iowa court in Roberts River Rides v. Steamboat Development Corp. recited the seven factors and added that the determination “necessarily involves a balancing process.”2 Comment b names what goes on the scale. The question in each case is whether, “upon a consideration of the relative significance of the factors involved, the conduct should be permitted without liability, despite its effect of harm to another,” and the answer “depends upon a judgment and choice of values in each situation.”3
A weighing of significance cannot be reduced to a count. A plaintiff need not win all seven factors, and a defendant who wins four has not necessarily won. One heavily weighted factor, such as deceit, can carry a case, while several weak ones may not. A tally would give the relations between the parties the same weight as fraud.
The factors also act on one another, so a court cannot score them on seven separate sheets. The comment on motive, which a Maryland court quoted before observing that Maryland law makes the same distinction, shows two factors trading off. If the conduct is independently wrongful, as when it is illegal because it restrains trade or tortious toward the third person whose conduct is influenced, the desire to interfere may be less essential to a finding of impropriety. If the means are innocent or less blameworthy, the desire to interfere may be more essential.4 The logic is plain enough. Wrongful means already supply culpability, so the court needs less from the defendant's purpose; innocent means supply none, so the purpose must.
The plaintiff's interest moves the scale in a similar way. An existing contract receives greater protection than a prospective relationship. For the existing contract, respect for individual contract rights outweighs the public benefit of unfettered competition. For the prospective relationship, liability attaches only on proof of more culpable conduct by the interferer.5 A rough scale follows from the two passages. The weaker the plaintiff's interest and the more innocent the means, the more the plaintiff must show beyond the bare interference; the stronger the interest and the more wrongful the means, the less the plaintiff needs beyond them.
The Iowa court's treatment of the City in Roberts River Rides shows a plaintiff losing on the balance. After applying the seven factors, the court concluded that the City's actions were not improper.6 The plaintiff claimed damages from having to defend against the City's accusations of misrepresentation and from having to act to prevent termination of its lease. The court added a second ground: even assuming the City had improperly interfered, the plaintiff presented no evidence on the required element of damage.7 The balance decides one element; damage remains a separate one.
Because impropriety is a separate requirement, a court cannot stop at intent and injury. In the dispute between Westfield and Clabaugh and RIA, the reviewing court read the trial court's findings in the light most favorable to Clabaugh and RIA and still found a gap: the trial court “did not weigh the factors contained in section 767” and “made no finding that the interference by Westfield or the other petitioners was improper.”8 A finding of intent and injury leaves the case unfinished until the court has weighed the factors and found the interference improper.
The weighing does not always require a jury. A comment to § 767 recognizes that where “identifiable standards of business ethics or recognized community customs as to acceptable conduct” have developed, the existence of the privilege may be a question of law. The court reviewing Sverdrup's conduct had no such standards before it, yet it concluded that this was a case in which the propriety of Sverdrup's actions could be decided as a matter of law.9 The court's wording ties the ruling to the case before it.
Sometimes the weighing has already been done. Comment j recognizes situations in which “the process of weighing the conflicting factors set forth in this Section has already been performed by the courts.” Once the decisions have indicated the scope of the “more or less crystallized rule or privilege,” the responsibility in the particular case “is simply to apply it to the facts involved; and there is no need to go through the balancing process afresh.” Some of those situations are stated in §§ 769 to 773.10 The court in Walnut Street Associates, Inc. v. Brokerage Concepts, Inc. drew the consequence for one of them: where a truthfulness defense under § 772(a) is raised against a claim of tortious interference, analysis of the general § 767 factors is not necessary.11 A pattern that decisions have repeatedly resolved the same way no longer needs a fresh weighing in each case.
Jurisdictions phrase the requirement in their own words. Utah, for example, asks whether the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's existing or potential economic relations “for an improper purpose or by improper means,” causing injury.12 Purpose and means correspond to the first two of the Restatement's factors, and the next section follows them through the cases. Other doctrines can also bar a tort claim for economic loss: under the economic loss rule, a landowner in Corporex could not recover against a subcontractor for defective performance.13
An answer that recites the seven factors in order and announces a result has not weighed anything. A sound answer names the two or three factors that carried the weight on the stated facts, explains why, and concedes the factor that pointed the other way.